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ABSTRACT
Poland's post--war pattern of foreign trade has been
mainly determined by the political factor, Its Incorporation
Into the Sovlet--Bloc and strict adherence to the fundamental
Marxist Ideology.

Following Soviet experiences the Polish

government established a highly centralized economic system
of control In order to manage the system.

With respect to

foreign trade It found Its Immediate reflection In the establlshment of state monopoly of fo re i g n trade and almo st
exclusive reliance on comprehensive economic planning In
c a r r y i n g out the

foreign trade activity.

In

the first post—

war decade the performance of the foreign trade apparatus
was

strongly affected by a ve r y pronounced drive toward

autarchy and considerable neglect of the sector of foreign
trade.
From the

point of v i e w of the planning te c hn iq ue m a 

terial b a l a n c i n g
negligence

ruled supreme and caused almost complete

of p r o f i t a b i l i t y

considerations In carrying out

the foreign trade activity.
As a re su l t of po l i t i c a l
the

changes w h i c h took place in

mid 1950's, the degree of ce n t r a l i z a t i o n of d e c i s i o n

m a k i n g on the

economy wide scale to some extent decreased.
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The do c tr ina l

thaw w h i c h

fo r e i g n trade as a vital

followed br o u g ht the r e c o g n i t i o n of
sector of the economy.

In

effect,

foreign trade policies have been modified In order to overcome t h e ,au ta r c h l a l tendencies.
under

the heavy

M a t e r i a l b a l a n c i n g went

attack of critics and the problems of foreign

trade p r o f i t a b i l i t y b e g a n to focus atte nt ion on both; economic
t h e o r et ic an s
Bloc

and fo re i g n trade practioners.

e xp er ie nc e

However,as

Indicate, the absence of the automatic market

mechanism makes It e x t r e me ly dif fi cu lt to find the sat isf ac to ry
profitability cr ite ria and the Investigations in this field
are

still in the initial stage.

thu si as ti c

On

the other hand the e n 

drive towards reforms had only a very short life

and soon has be e n co unt era cte d by the co ns er v at iv e course
t ak en

by the political authority.
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INTRODUCTION
In a centrally planned economy resources are
allocated chiefly not by a market mechanism but by a
system of commands and directives radiating from the
decision making centre.

Economic planning and adminis

trative organization are introduced in order to transmit
directives downward, send up the information on which to
base further commands upward, coordinate the process of
decision making and evaluate the performance of the hi
erarchical structure. Foreign trade,as any other sector
of the 'command economy' is subjected to the discipline
of central planning and operates within its own organi
zational structure. '
The purpose of this study is to examine the basic
aspects of foreign trade in the Folish economy.
I shall attempt to provide a detailed analysis of the
process of planning and of the institutional framework of
the system as these two problems lie at the core of the
centrally planned economy and mainly determine its
operation and performance.
Poland's foreign trade,as it operates today^is the
outcome of the complex process of shifts and adjustments
made over the whole post-war period. Most of these
changes were originated by political factor and reflected
changes in the ruling ideology. Some of them were
introduced for economic reasons. Because of the still
changing nature of the system considerable attention will
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be given to the economic discussions on the underlying
principles of centrally planned economy and reforms which
were introduced in order to improve its performance.
Chapter 1 examines briefly the characteristic
features of the centrally planned economy.
topics are:

The key

the role of Marxist ideology, models of the

centrally planned economy and the concept of economic
planning.
Chapter 11 focusses on the administrative organiza
tion and schemes of control managing the system of foreign
trade.
Chapter 111 deals with the fundamental strategy of
planning.

It contains the analysis of the process of

plan construction and coordination with the brief evalua
tion of the adopted planning procedures and techniques.
Chapters IV and V present a summary view on the
roles of exchange and price-setting problems, in foreign
trade.

To some extent they are designated to prepare

grounds for the following discussion on reforms in the
system of foreign trade. Special attention is devoted
to the problem of effectiveness of foreign trade. Inten
sive research in this field undertaken by all countries
of the Soviet-bloc seems to indicate that effectiveness
is going to be their new criterion for trade.

The

analysis of the working principles and operation of the
foreign trade system in the centrally planned economy is
supplemented by the cross-section view on Poland's foreign
trade activity.

The last chapter presents an empirical. .. .•

study of Poland's pattern of trade.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABIh OF GORTEFTS

ÀBÜTEACT
IEERODUCTIÜE

CHAPTER

RAGE

I

1

EAUIC COROElTü
General Model of the Socialist
Economy and the Role of Foreign Trade
ilonning of Foreign Trade

CHARTER
I

II . ÛRGAE1EAT1ÜE OF FOREIGN TRADE
State Monopoly of Foreign Trade
Administration of Foreign Trade

19

CHARTER
III THE TECHFIQHE OF REAHHIHG
Flan's Construction and Coordination
Appraisal of the System of Central
Hanning

51

CHARTER
IV SOME FIHAHCIAE ASPECTS OF FOREIGF TRADE 68
CHARTER
V

PRICE COHTROVERSi
Domestic Frice Setiing Froblem-A Rote
Pricing in Foreign Trade

78

CHAPTER
VI RE PO RM U IE T H u . ü l Ü T E r OA

F O REI GE TRADE

102

Policy of Export Promotion
Saving of Foreign Currency

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER

VII

EFPECTIVERAAS AS A AAA CRITERION FOR TRADE
11?
Concept 0Ï the Effectiveness of Foreign Trade
in a Centrally Planned Economy
Effectiveness of Foreign Trade - Static
Approach
long-run Efficiency of Foreign Trade
Appraisal and Rrospects

CHArTER
VIII FOEAFD'S FATTERE OF TRADE
Volume and Dynamics of Exports and Imports
Commodity Composition of Foreign Trade
Geographical Directions of Trade
Balance of Fayncnts - A Rote
Concluding Remarks

155

BIBEIOGRAFHY
VITA AUCTORIS

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

BASIC CONCEPTS:
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I

GENERAL MODEL OP THE SOCIALIST ECONOMY AND THE ROLE
OF FOREIGN TRADE.
Defining a socialist economy K. Marx stressed

nationalization of the means of production as its most
distinguished feature.

It v/as a logical consequence of

.his economic doctrine devised primarily for examining
social relations of production which lay behind the market
and not the market mechanism as such.^ Therefore, his
theory is a rather unsatisfactory tool when dealing
with problems of national allocation of resources and it
seems it was never designated for such purposes, at least
not by Marx himself.

However,Soviet economic theory^

seems to misinterpret this point, taking every possible

As M. B. Bober explains; "to Marx economics is
prominently a study at class exploitation in a given
society and its evolution to the new, higher social
order, and the object of the economics at capitalism
specifically is the investigation at the principles
governing the exploitation at the proletariat."
M. B. Bober, Marx and Economic Calculation. AER
Volume 36, June 1946.
^

The designations;
"Soviet-economic theory" "economic
theory of the Bloc countries" will be used inter
changeably to mean not only the economic doctrine in
the Soviet Union but also in the countries of the socalled Soviet Bloc. In the light of recent political
events especially the breakthrough which took place in
Albania and Mainland China, the term "Soviet Bloc
countries" is somewhat inaccurate as the ideological,
political and economical unity of the group of countries
formally accepting Soviet leadership seems to be very
questionable.
It will be used here to mean the countries
organized into the "Council of Mutual Economic Assis
tance (CEMA) and including; Bulgaria, Csechoslovakia,
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Soviet Union and Rumania.
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effort to apply the Marxian labor theory of value as a
normative principle of valuation.^

The essential part

of this theory v/as the form of ownership.

On this base

Marx formulated the principles of class exploitation.
The theory contains a certain measure of internal logical
consistency in explaining social relations of production-,
but beyond that it contributes nothing to our understand
ing of the economic process.

In the outcome, Marx proved

himself incapable of fashioning any tools with which it
would be possible to tackle the problem of rational
allocation of scarce resources in the economy. Under
socialism the form of ownership changes and according to
the logic of this theory there should be no exploitationj
yet resources remain as scarce as they are under any
other economic system.

How should allocation of

resources be rationally devised?

As expressed by seve

ral economists, the form of ownership so heavily stressed
by the Soviet theory, based on Marxian teaching, is not
really relevant to economic evaluation.
For more detailed discussion see: M. B. Bober, op, cit,
and K. Spulber. The Soviet Economy, New York, W. ?/.
Norton and Company", 1962, p. 231.
^

N. Spulber, op, cit., p. 193»
Grossman writes; "We have had an ample opportunity
to learn in the last couple of decades (that) the mode
of ownership alone does not relentlessly prescribe the
organizational structure of the economy or predetermi
nate its functional efficiency."
G. Grossman, Introduction in G. Grossman ed. Value and
Plan: Economic Calculation and Organization in EasTern
Europe. Cali for ni aT Uni v er si ty Press, 196C)Y' pV 3".
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The socialist economy, like any other, continues to
strive to achieve rational allocation of resources in
relation to its given ends.

The basic difference lies

only in the method of pursuing that objective.

Market

economy employs the price mechanism as the chief device to
achieve rational allocation of scarce resources in
conformity with human wants.. The hierarchy of needs with
the availabilities of supply are synchronized by lateral
communication links between consumers and producers, and
thus the decision making on an economy wide scale is
decentralized,^
In a socialist economy market mechanism is to a
considerable extent replaced by a system of commands (diractives, targets) issued by the top political authority.

XX

The central authority sets up the hierarchy of needs and
strives to allocate resources in accordance with these
needs. The consumer can either be permitted or prohibited
the freedom of choice as the central authority does not
necessarily take into account the actual or presumed
preferences of consumers.

Characterizing this type of

Ibid, p. 7.
XX

It should be noted that market mechanism, while extre
mely limited in scope, still plays some role in a
socialist economy. Production and trade is concentrated
in the hands of the state and operated by a system of
commands but there is still a free market for consumer'
goods,

f r e e d o m of choice of o cc u p a t i o n and also i n e 

quality of rewards.
See, N. Spulber, op. cit., p. 193.
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economy G. Grossman writes;
"A command economy requires a vertical
communication system to transmit direc
tives downward through a chain of command
and to send up information on which to base
further commands and to evaluate the
. performance of subordinates.

The fidelity

of transmission of commands from higher
level, the reliability and timeliness of the
upward flowing information determine the
efficiency of the hierarchical organization."^
Economic planning was brought up to serve as a device of
channelling these commands through the administrative
ladder, to secure the consistency between directives
and;to some extent to help in their formulation by fur
nishing the centre with information to issue commands.
The extent to which economic planning is utilized and
its role in the allocation of the resources depends
XX
'
mainly on the adopted "model" of command economy.
Several models are practically or theoretically
possible. We are concerned here with only one group

X

Ibid, p. 4.
The word "model" has a different meaning here from
that used in econometrics. It represents a politicoeconomic set-up as determined by the aims and ideology
of the central political authority of the state.
See; P. J. Wiles, The Political Economy of Communism
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, l9b2, p.
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of models labeled by P.I.D Wiles as "allocation models"^.
These models differ from each other with respect to the
system of allocation of scarce resources.

On the very

extreme, in this classification there is the model of
"perfect command economy" or the so called "war commu
nism" - where all the resources are allocated centrally
in physical terms.

Very similar in character is the

model labeled by N. Spulber as "pure administrative
socialism" and defined as;
"a fully centralized system in which there are
no markets for commodities or services and in
which the CPA (Central Planning Authority)
allocates, on the basis of comprehensive plan,
labour and capital goods to the producing
units and consumer h- goods to the population.

Depending on the criterion applied it is possible to
distinguish several types of "models of the command
economy." In Wiles'classification there are 3 main
groups of models; ownership models characterized
by various types of ownership to which economy may
be subjected; distribution models concerned with
the manner of distribution of goods produced in the
economy and allocation models.
For the extensive analysis see op. cit.. Chapter, 1,
4, 9.
XX

The model of "War Communism" originally regarded by
Bolshevik ideology as the ideal pattern of the system
of social justice and mostly associated with the
names of tv/o Russian Communists.:Lenin and-,Kritsmann
was for a short period of time (1918-21) applied in
Soviet Russia but completely failed in practice and
had to be abandoned. See, P.I. D, Wiles "Rationality,
Market Decentralization and the Territorial Principle
in G. Grossman Value and Plan, p. 188, and also his
"The Political Economy of Communism, p. 29.
N. Spulber,

The Soviet Economy, p. 194.
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On the other extreme in Spulber's classification there
is "pure market socialism" defined as a "fully decentra
lized system in v/hich there are markets for all types of
commodities and only investment activities are indirectly
controlled by the C.P.A.^
The system currently adopted in economic practice
in Soviet-bloc countries approximates P. Wiles* model of
"centralized economy" where "the decisions as to inter
mediate resource allocations are centralized in a planning
office, but the choice of consumers and workers and of
public bodies that allocate land and capital are taken on
purely market-free principles."^
Of course, even in this model the degree of centra
lization of decision making may vary considerably and
depends on:
1) the extent to which the commands channeled down from
the centre contain the detailed production and plan targets ^
2) the proportion of total production and trade which
these plan goals cover,

^

Ibid.
This is "roughly speaking" the Yugoslav model and .essen
tially very close to the system usually referred to in
economic literature as "■ Lange-Lerner model". As
P. Wiles remarks it is a loose thinking to speak of
the "Lange-Lerner model".
In Lange prices are centra
lly fixed only outputs are decentralized and there is
in theory no competition.
In Lerner prices are decent
ralized and there is a c o mpe tit io n b e t w e e n the state-

owned enterprises.
See P. I. D. Wiles,"Rationality,
Market, Decentralization and the Territorial Principle,"
p. 210.
^

Ibid, p. 188.
L. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, Cambridge
Mass. The MIT Pre8s'%~1363T"pT^l'. ''
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3)

the degree of autonomy of enterprises in solving

problems and conflicts arising from their economic acti
vity.
The degree of concentration of decision making on the
highest administrative level has always been very high.
In the last decade the possibility of introduction of
some elements of the market to the economy in order to
make the system more flexible and operational has been
widely discussed in the economic literature of the Bloc.
The problem was considered very seriously in Poland
after the so called "Polish October of 1956"^ and some
steps have been taken to decentralize the decision making

X

"Polish October" is a name - given to the peaceful
revolution which brought W. Gomulka to power in
October 1956. New Political leadership which
arose under his _auspices was determined to be more
independent of ^oviet political and economical
guidance and supervision. The idealogical thaw
which followed created a favourable environment
for a nation-wide discussion on the merits and
demerits of the' existing political' and economic system,
In the course of these discussions the "Polish
model of the economy" and the "Polish route to
socialism" were determined.
For the review of the discussion see;
M. Montias, Central Planning in Poland,
New Haven and London, Yale UniversiTy7ress, 1962.
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wide s c a l e T h e

counter reforms which followed the

decentralization drive practically abolished the effect
of these reforms and revised the old highly centralized
model of the economy.
It is not hard to explain why the new movement towards
a more flexible economic system was so slow and proceeded
with extreme caution. Decentralization requires the
transfer of a considerable degree of decision making to
lov/er levels of the administrative ladder, thus v/eakening
X

On November 28, 1956 the Sejm passed a statute reor
ganizing the State Commission of Economic Planning
transferring it into a Planning Commission attached
to the Council of Ministers. The number of centrally
determined targets has been seriously cut down, and its
staff has been reduced from 1800 to 900 employees.
The number of centrally determined targets:
1956
Specific production targets
Centrally rationed commodities
Technical Coefficients
I

1406
1411
578

1957
768
1150
230

Source; U, N. Economic Commission for Europe
Economic Survey of Europe in 1956. p. 39. cited also by:
.b a n n i n g in Poland, p. 298.
ï'ril. 'lohtias,
The decentralizatl'on pFo'ce’ss~Kad' not gone too far, as
since mid-1958 several counter reforms have been intro
duced to erase the "mistakes" of "soft planning" and
recentralize the economy, the essence of these changes
and the reasoning underlying it are summarized in the
statement of P ol ish economist B. Mine who concl ud ed that

"the attempt to reform our economic system, baptized as
the "new model", had basically ended in failure. This
had to be the case...since this attempt was built on neo
marginal rather than on Marxist grounds."
B. M i n e , W.sprawie zmian w zarzadzaniu gospodarka narodowa
On Changes in the management of the national economy,
Zycie Gospodarcze,no. 8, 1959, cited by I. M. Montias,
Central Planning on Poland, p. 320.
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the economic power of the centre.

This is unacceptable

and too dangerous to the ruling regime.^

Besides this,

serious hinderance comes from the side of the "fundamen
talist Marxism" that Soviet economics rigidly adopted
for its theoretical bearings about the "anarchy of market
economy" and the advantages of order and harmonization
which central planning secures for the economy.

Even if

a decade-long experience in planning does not confirm
this statement, Soviet regime would not admit that Marx
could be wrong at this point.
Soviet-type economy is administered by .a series of
economic plans v/here the National Economic Plan is of
primary importance. It contains a definite set of tasks
which must be accomplished and which are binding as law
for the society as a whole.

The nation-wide economic plan

usually covers all important sectors of the economy.
Besides this, each sector has its own plan which is an
integral part of the national economic plan.

Foreign

trade apparatus, like all other sectors of the economy is
administrated by foreign trade plan.^^
The degree of detail of the foreign trade plan can
vary within a wide range depending mainly on the adopted
model of the economy, its position in the economy and the
situation in the balance of payments of the country.
Under the conditions of "pure market socialism" the central

See G. Grossman.

Introduction to "Value and Plan", p. 10,

30C

The foreign trade is defined by law as an integral part
of the over-all economic plan.
Z. Kamecki, J. Soldaczuk,
W. Sierpinski, Miedzynarodowe stosunki (Ekonomiczne.)
(International Economic Relations), Warsaw, P.W'.'e". Ï 9 6 4 ,
xx%PP. 497-499.
Ibid.
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foreign trade authority would set up the general line of
foreign trade policy specifying only general tasks (volume
of trade within very broad commodity groups or geogra
phical direction) to be achieved by trading enterprises.
Foreign trade enterprises would have a complete freedom
of choice of the means for accomplishing these tasks.

In

the "purely administrative model" the role of foreign
trade enterprises is limited to the "blind" performing
of directives prescribed by the central foreign trade
authority.

This means that the central authority not only

sets up the tasks to be achieved but also imperatively
indicates the means for their achievement.
Particularly, in the case of foreign trade the
"market model" has several advantages, as compared with
the administrative one.

First of all, it is much more

flexible and enables the fast adjustments of foreign trade
policy and performance to the continuously changing
conditions in the world market.

It stimulates the activity

of enterprises involved and arouses interest in management
for a good performance.

On the other hand the "adminis

trative" model has very severe shortcomings.
rigid,

It is very

routinized and generally unresponsive to changes

and trends prevailing in the world market.

In this model,

enterprises engaged in the conduct of foreign trade
activity have no incentive for better performance and
their activity is limited to achieving the targets preset
by the plan. The foreign trade authority having no direct
contact with the world market very often acts in a way,
which under the given circumstances is by no means "ration
al" and profitable, and concentrates mainly on bureau-
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cratic administrating of the subordinated enterprises
instead of policy making.

Therefore, the superiority

of the market model seems to be unquestionable.

In this

respect, the Soviet policy makers are eager to point out
several obstacles considerably limiting the practical
applicability of the "market model".^
A.

The first constraint to the application of market

model, they argue, is imposed by the situation in the
country's balance of payments.

The greater the deficit

in the balance of international payments, the more
justified and reasonable it is that the concentration
of the key-decision-making concerning the policy and
performance is in the hands of one authority.

As a

consequence the system of commands is applied as a device
for carrying out foreign trade deals.
B.

The model of foreign trade has to fit the general

model of the economy.

In other words, the adoption of

the market model of foreign trade depends to a great
extent on the role which the market forces play in the
operation of all the branches of the economy.
C.

The main difficulty is caused by the lack of any

adequate criteria for estimating the effectiveness of
foreign trade operations from the point of view of the
economy as a whole.

The existing formal criteria for

decision making in foreign trade such as profits or mate
rial intensity indicators have many such severe short
comings w h i c h make them usele ss for the purposes of

decision making.
X
XX

Ibid, pp. 499-502.
For more detailed elaboration on this point see
Chapter' 7.
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In Poland, since the first post-war period of reconstruc
tion of the economy until the late '50's the model of
foreign trade was based mainly on commands and directives.
Several reasons were responsible for that.

First of all,

there was the difficult economic situation of the country
which had been seriously ruined by war.

The efforts of

the state were centered on capturing the full control of
the very limited resources of the economy, its financial
means and devoting them to the reconstruction of the
country.

Political factors, and especially the incorpo

ration of Poland into the sphere of Soviet political and
economic influences, was very important.

Besides this,

there were several other factors playing a considerable
role, such as;
a) underestimating the role of economic calculation a direct effect of the vigorous adopting of the
Soviet economic doctrine,
b)

lack of experience in applying economic incentives
instead of commands ,

c) underestimating the role of foreign trade and a
i quite pronounced drive towards autarchy.^
The ideological thaw which followed the Polish coup
d'etat of October 1956, the nation-wide discussion on
the presupposed merits and demerits of the adopted
economic system and the very enthusiastic drive towards
reforms had a very short life, and in the long-run brought
surp risingly little change.

V ery soon the communist

X

For the discussion on autarchy in Soviet-bloc see,
U. N. Economic Survey of Europe. 1955, pp. 198-247.
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order had been reestablished and the conservative course
taken by Gomulka began to stand in sharp contrast with
recent trends in other East European countries
which proved to be much more reform-inclined,

A new

very cautious Polish attitude towards reforms seems to
be caused mainly by a political factor.
As expressed by A. Brzeski
"The fact that the nation which was in the
avant-garde of the reform movement is now
lagging is the result of a paradox of power;
the present rulers of Poland feel too strong
to yield to popular demand for a drastic reorgani
zation of the economy but too. v/eaktto. maintain
the status quo....
A regime that feels secure...may take the risk
of. experimentation, Stalin, Tito, Novotny,
Nadar and Ulbricht, may all have been in this
position at the time of the reforms but
Goipulka was not. In 1956-57 he was in control of
the apparat but the masses were in a mood for
revolution. More recently, the party itself
has been torn by violent struggles and,besides,
there is always the Church.
Not to rock the
boat may seem the best policy in such circumstances."
To sum up,

the economic effect of the reforms which were

introduced in the years following
was far from being significant.

the October coup-d'etat
The degree of central

ization of decision making has been to some extent
reduced.

However, the role of commands and directives

in foreign trade policy formulation is still enormous
with only a marginal range left for the play of economic
stimulants and incentives.

X

A. Brzeski, Economic Reform in Poland, The Cautious
Avant-Garde. The Quarterly Review of Economics and
Business. Vol. 1 humb'er 3, Autumn T9"6T^
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V/liat is worth mentioning here, is the considerable change
of reasoning underlying the formulation of these commands.
They are less vigorously based on a crude physical
targeting by a system of "material balances"

with a

relatively wider range left for economic calculations
and profitability considerations.

In Soviet planning practice each centrally allocated
product, had a separate "balance sheet" called a
"material balance".
On one side of the "material balance" all planned
sources of supply of the product in question was
listed and on the other side all planned uses of the
product. The planning process was confined mainly
to bring both sides of the account into balance.
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II

ECONOMIC PLANNING
"A plan represents a comprehensive set of accounts
linking a series of output, investment and consump
tion targets with the projected factor, commodity
and money flows to assure their attainment... the
accounts are balanced sheets with one side of the
account shov/ing resources and the other side their
distribution." x

The central plan defines the basic macro economic propor
tions, rates and directions, such as the rate of growth
of a national product and its composition, the distribu
tion of a national product to its various uses, the rate
and components of capital formation and the size and
composition of public and private consumption.
It identifies also the specific means and measures for
carrying the plan into effect.
Since the plan of foreign trade is an integral part
of the over-all economic plan, this serves as the basic
device to bring the two sides of accounts into balance.
The procedure of achieving this is not complicated.
After deducting the total domestic supply of raw materials,
finished and intermediate goods, machinery and equipment,
which will be available in a given planning period from
the total domestic demand presupposed by the plan,
planners arrive at the amount of necessary imports.
On
the other hand, total available surplus of commodities
of various kinds,

^

confronted w i t h the existing export

Quotation from N. Spulber, "The Economics of Communist
Eastern Europe; op. cit., p. 282.
15
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possibilities and import requirements form the foundation
for the export plan.
The import and export plans are established by
commodities or commodity groups in form of balanced
sheets expressed in terms of values to be realized in
foreign exchange in order to secure the required balance
of international payments.

The other set of balanced

accounts representing all exports on one side and all
imports on the other side of an account is drawn up in
terms of value at, domestic prices and for a number of
so-called "key commodities" subject to central allocation
in quantitative terms.

Besides, this import and export

plan is broken down according to market areas or partner
countries in order to balance foreign payments with each
market or country separately.

Taking into consideration

the period of time which is covered by the given plan one
can distinguish the following kinds of economic plans^^
a)
b;

perspective plan
long-run plans

c;

annual plans

In practice this is not always the case. Usually import
requirements surpass considerably the available export
supply, and adjustments must be made either by cutting
import demand or increasing exports by cutting supply
for domestic markets of commodities which can be
exported.
XX

S. Hatt, E. Szyrnanski'.., M. V/olski, System planowania
in Polsce, (The System of Planning Tn"p61am77 Warsaw
P.W.n". 1964, pp. 87-94.
Z. Madej, Punkcjonowanie gospodarki narodowej,
(Functioning of National Economy; in
Polityka • gospodarcza Polski Ludowe.j.Vol. 2, p. 53.
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d;

Quarterly and monthly plans.

Perspective plan , can be defined as the general outline of
the development of the economy for a period of 15-20 years,
It determines the rate of growth of the economy,

levels

of national income in successive years; and the rate of
growth and composition of investment outlays. The plan
establishes also the general lines of development of all
sectors of the economy.

By the very fact that it covers

such a long period of time it defines production and
trade targets in general terms only, leaving more detailed
targets to be filled in by long-run and annual plans.
As far as foreign trade is concerned it expresses the
preferences of the state in shaping the future pattern of
foreign trade in respect to the desired volume and
composition of foreign trade turnovers.^

The first rolisii perspective plan has been elaborated
for the period of 1961-1980. Besides the basic objec
tive of achieving the maximal possible rate of growth
of the economy it formulated the following goals
1; the considerable increase in the standard of living
which by 1975 should reach the present level of
consumption standards of advanced countries of
1
Western Europe
'2) Solving of the very severe housing problem
3) considerably higher rates of growth of exports and
of imports and the repaying of foreign debts.
See .J.M . Montias, Central Planning in Poland pp. 154-159.
^Iso K, Secomski, Problemy planowania perspectywicznego
(Problems of Perspective Planning) in "Polityka gospodarcza
Polski Ludowej Vol 2.M. Rakowski, Zag ad nièn i a ■ plahowani'a
wi'e1dlëThiego w Polsce Ludowg, (PrôïïTems~oî”Xong-run
Planning in People^s Poland), Warsaw, P.W.C. 1955, M.
Eklecki, Plan perspektywiczny na lata 1961-1975 (The
Perspective Plan for the Years 1961-75J Nov/e Drogi, No.8
(1958).
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A perspective plan determining in general terms the prin
cipal directions of the development of the economy serves
as a basis for the elaboration of subsequent five-year plane
It is the task of the five-year plan to give in concrete
as far as possible precise and quantitative form the goals
envisaged by a perspective plan which have to be achieved
during the period covered by that plan.^
drawn up on two interrelated planes;
term" version and a monetary one.

The plan is

a "real, physical

A five-year foreign

trade plan elaborated in conformity with the over-all
economic plan specifies the volume, rates of growth of
exports and imports and their commodity composition and
geographical structure.
interrelated versions;

The plan is drawn on three

a) in physical terras for commodities entering so called
"material balances"
b)

in foreign exchange

c)

in domestic currency.

The five-year plan is broken down into annual plans where
the general five-year targets are divided into yearly
allotments and presented in detailed and much more precise
fopm.
X
S. Hatt, E. Szymanski, M. Wolski,
w Eolsce, p. 88.

System planowania
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ORGANIZATION OF FOREIGN TRADE
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STATE MONOPOLY OF FOREIGN TRADE
The character of Polish economy has been basically
shaped by the course of political events during and after
World War II resulting in its incorporation into the
sphere of Soviet political and ideological influences.
The post-war government which arose under Soviet auspices,
has from the very beginning followed very strictly the
Soviet patterns of running the economy and adopted entire
ly Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Unable to stand on its own,

it continued to look to the Soviet Union for political
and social guidance.

The United Worker’s Party which

enjoys the exclusive power in the formation of social
and economic policy set for itself as the main task to
build the planned socialist economy.

It was understood

that the road towards a socialist society is "unique"
and that following Soviet experiences in this respect is
the most effective way of achieving that goal and an
integral part of the construction of socialism.

Accord

ingly, Soviet concepts and experiences were transplanted
on Polish ground and imitated as closely as possible.
Several reforms have been introduced to permit the exten-_
sion of the socialized sector and to recast the economic,
system in the Soviet mold.

As Poland was liberated,the

Polish Committee of National Liberation, which was created in
July 194,4 at Lubl in to b ecome the first government of the
country, took-over large and medium scale industry in its
hands.
20
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On January 3, 1946 a formal decree was issued to legalize
the nationalization of the basic branches of industry,
mining

communications, banks, insurance and trade^.

Thus, the state became authorized by law to operate the
nationalized enterprises on its own account or to transfer
them to "People's Councils" (Rady Narodowe) or to
cooperatives.

During the period of 1947-1949 several

restraints, controls and regulations were imposed on the
private sector in order to reduce the share of total
industrial production originating in this sector as much
as possible.^

All these measures resulted in almost

complete extinction of the private industrial sector of
the economy by the end of the 1940's.
Accordingly, the administrative apparatus has been
established to meet the requirements of highly centrali
zed, planned economy.

The nationalization of the major

sectors of the economy included the extension of the
state control over private trade in the country with
particular stress put on the concentration of the foreign
trade activity in the hands of the state.

A "De facto"

X

Dziennik Ustaw, 1946, No. 3, Item 17.
XX

In 1955, 99 percent of the Polish industrial output
came from state-owned enterprises and state controlled
cc-pperatives,, Rocznik Statystyczny , 1957 (Statis
tical Yearbook) Warsaw, T5^T7~pT 5T7
^^^^Land reform was decreed on September 6, 1944. Its prin'cipal aims were to eliminate the opposition of large
land owners, create new farms for landless peasants and
form the basis for future collectivization of agriculture.
See: Dziennik Ustaw, 1945, No. 3, Item 13.
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monopoly of foreign trade was established by Polish
government at the outset of the post-war period and was
considered as one of the major steps in the reshaping,
of Polish economy along new lines.

Direct and vigorous

state control over the movements of imports and exports
was by no means the "Polish invention" and was establi
shed as the result of imitation of the Soviet organiza
tional patterns. The nationalization of foreign trade
took place in the Soviet Union immediately after the
Revolution and foreign trade monopoly as such became a
distinctive feature of the Soviet economic system,
adopted lately by all the countries of the Soviet bloc.
(It is regarded as a component part of the Soviet-type
economy.) Thus, the concept of foreign trade monopoly
has quite a long tradition in the socialist economic
practice, but during these years its interpretation
changed significantly. Originally, the state monopoly
of foreign trade was understood to mean that the foreign
trade activity, of the economy was concentrated in the
hands of the state and conducted by state-owned enterprises.
Its purpose was to protect the economy against "any possible
capitalist intervention".

More recently, however, "the

X

See G. p. Kaliuzhnaia, Prayovye Formy Monopolii Vneshn&i
Torgovli USSR V ilch is'tori'ckeïïkômn^axv'it i ^ (The Yuridi-.
cal Forms of’ the' Monopo ly o7 Fo r eig n trade in their his
torical Development).
Yzdatel'stvo Alcaderaii Nayle USSR (Publishing House of
the Academy of Science of the USSR) Moscow 1951, p. 28,
cited by N, Spulber, The Economics of Communist Europe,
New York, the Technology Press of Ivlassachusetts InsfiTute
of Technology and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York
1957, p. 153.
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term which has been increasingly used to designate a
specific set of institutions and methods for carrying
out foreign trade".^ F. L. Pryor calls "the Stalinist
model of the foreign trade monopoly".^ With the develop
ment of over-all planning, the foreign trade monopoly
became the direct instrument of such a plan, having as 1
its main purpose the synchronization of the volume and
composition of foreign trade turnovers with the require
ments of a national economic plan.

From this point of

view, one should expect that the economic theory as well
%as current policy making, would be directed towards the search for the most effective model of foreign trade
monopoly which would be suitable for the purposes of
planning.

In fact, the majority of the discussions in r

the economy Press of the Bloc is limited mainly to the
institutional framework of the system and organizational
structure of the model of foreign.trade monopoly.
The.exp1anati0 n of this phenomenon beems to be quite
simple. For many reasons foreign trade was neglected in.
"7"ÏT*
the Soviet Union.
Simultaneously, the problem was
.j: .
. :. T?: ' yv .Citation from F. L, Pryor, "The Communist Foreign Trade
System, Cambridge, Mass. The M.Y.T. Press,
P™53'*
xx"":-: u.
th: Ibid.
XXX

.

Discussed by F. L. Pryor, Foreign Trade theory in the
Communist" Bloc. Soviet Studies, Vol. 14, July 1962, p. 41.
and by Baykov Soviet Foreign Trade. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 194’6’T
!
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hardly touched by Soviet economic literature,

it is

enough to say that in the official Soviet textbook of
Political Economy, issued in the middle of the 1950's,
only two pages were devoted to the discussion of problems
of foreign trade theory, while the book consisted of over
600 pages.^
Since Stalin's death problems of foreign
trade have begun to receive increasing attention;

but

what we call "pure foreign trade theory" seems to be still
neglected.

The other weak point in this chain comes

from the side of planning itself.

In spite of numerous

theoretical examinations and years of experience Soviet
planning techniques are still very crude and simply
unoperational.
The existence of a foreign trade monopoly is commonly
accepted in the economic literature of the Bloc

as one

of the most distinctive features of the socialist, planned
economy. It is usually motivated as follows:^^^
1) the basic reason for establishing a foreign trade
monopoly in a socialist economy arises directly from the
fact that all means of production in this type of economy

Politicheskaya Ekocomlya, (Political Economy) Academy
of Science 6f'"%Ee 'U'.3^.S.R . Institute of Economics,
Moscow, 1 9 5 5 , cited by J. Wilczynski., The Theory of
Comparative Costs and Centrally Planned Economics,
Economic Journal, Vol. 75, March 1965, p. 67.
^

The terms "Soviet Economic Literature" and "Economic
Literature of the Bloc" are used in te rch a n g e a b l y to
designate economic literature based on Marxian doctrinej

^ ^ S e e Z. Kamecki, J. Soldaczuk, W. Sier.pinski, Miedzynarodowe stosunki ekonomiczne, (International Economic
Relations), Warsaw", "Pahstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne,
1 9 6 4 , pp. 498-99.
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are "socially owned" and .the nationalization of foreign
trade as well as of industries, banks and transportation
is the necessary condition for the existence Of a Socialist
economy, - ■
2)

the other reason arises directly from the adopted

model of centrally planned economy.

As a state monopoly

foreign trade constitutes an integral part of the over
all economic plan of the country.

The main advantage

claimed for this model is the possibility of obtaining
such a pattern of foreign trade which would be "optimal"
from the point of view of the fulfillment of a national
economic plan and the achievement of the highest possible
rate of growth of the economy.^
X

Both explanations seem to be vague if not tautological
even from the logical point of view only. But there
are some elements in this approach which the economist
will find as not clearly stated and fully explained.
Since the middle 1950's interest in the trade problems
revived and theoretical examinations of the relationship
between "foreign trade optimum", plan fulfillment and
the maximization of the rate at growth began to receive
more careful attention. However, this theorizing did
not lead to any satisfactory solution of the problem
and even the notion of foreign trade optimum itself
has not been neatly defined. In general, "optimal
pattern of trade" is a relative concept, its real
content depends on the economic situation of the coun
try and the goals which the economy strives to achieve.'
Basically, there are two kinds of "optimality";
theo
retical and practical. Both can be analyzed by a
static or dynamic approach (long-run optimality).
Assuming that the objective which the economy strives to
achieve in the long-run is the maximization of the rate
of growth such a pattern of trade will be optimal which
contributes most effectively in the pursuit of this goal.
But if the objective is different, as for example maximal
satisfaction of human wants, (which does not necessarily
mean that the rate of growth will be set at maximum
there would be a completely different pattern of trade.
n
oj !^22
d.y
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which could be considered as "optimal" from the point of
view of the objective which has to be achieved. This is
the theoretical optimum as it is assumed that the policy
makers have the perfect knowledge and full command over
all economic variables in question which can be deter
mined in conformity with their preferences. In practice
there are several limitations and constraints imposed;
the knowledge is not perfect, factors are not fully mobile
le and several economic variables are determined by
factors which are beyond the control of policy makers.
In effect, practical optimum- such as optimum which
takes into account all the constraints and limitations
will be different from theoretical optimum. Static
optimum of foreign trade or so-called short-run optimum is
based on the assumption of constant productive capacities
of the economy. Again, depending on the objective, the
economy strives to achieve, it can be,,for example, a
pattern of trade which will secure equilibrium in the
balance of payments; full employment of labor force
or full employment of productive capacities etc. Accor
dingly there is the theoretical optimum and practical
optimum - such as optimum which can be achieved in a
given economic situation of the country and outside the
country;
e.g. on foreign markets.
For extensive analysis see:
Z. Kameki, J. Soldaczuk, W. Sierpinski, op. cit., pp. 506-

517.
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26

3)

the existence of foreign trade monopoly is regarded as

an economic necessity in the developing economy where the
difficulties connected with obtaining the equilibrium in
the balance of payments are formidable.

In these cir

cumstances a very careful examination of the existing
export possibilities and evaluation of the "degree of
necessity" of several imports and finding the "optimal
pattern of trade" are of enormous importance.
ment seems to be the strongest one.

This argu

The majority of

the countries entering the road of economic development
do experience a more or less severe deficit on the current
account of the balance of payments.

This situation is

not wrong in itself providing that this gap is being
covered by the flow of capital in the form of foreign
credits, loans, grants, direct investments etc.

But the

real trouble begins when all the above mentioned possibi
lities of filling that gap do not exist and increased
imports have to be covered by earned export receipts.
With some not too significant exceptions, this was basi
cally the situation which Poland's post-war economy had
to face. The demand for imported goods, expecially of
these designated for investment purposes increased consii

derably in the course of intensive industrialization.
At the same time the country found it extremely difficult
to increase its exports to the

extent that it would

cover all its import payments. Under the above circum
stances the state,control over import and export movements
can be helpful.

However, there is still the problem as

to. how much of the state control would bring the best
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results in a given economic situation. In the communist
opinion the perfect solution to the problem is the full
control by the state, expressed in the foreign trade
monopoly.

As Polish experience indicates^in spite 6f the ^

introduction of the monopoly of foreign trade, the situa
tion in the country's balance of payment was persistently
strained during the whole past-war period.^
On the other hand, it is not -difficult to find
numerous examples testifying that many export possibili
ties were lost because of the rigidity of the mechanism
of state monopoly, and several imports were not economi
cally justified from the point of view of a rational
policy of saving scarce foreign currency.

For example, in

many instances, domestic substitutes of imported commo
dities were available or import deliveries were not
synchronized to match the investment cycle.

In effect

foreign currency resources were "frozen" in these imports
while their "productive capacity could not be fully
utilized (especially with respect to imported capital
goods) etc.
After the second world-war state monopoly of foreigntrade^ regarded by Bloc economic literature, as indispen
sable for a socialist economy,had been introduced in all
the countries of the Soviet-Bloc, The characteristic
X

J. Niegowski W. Rydygier. , Problem y h a ndl u zagra-nicznego
Problems of Foreign Trade) in Polityka gospodarcza
Polski Ludowej, op. citl, pp. ^9'4-'599'.'' '
•
A. Zauberraan, Industrial Progress in Poland^ Czechos
lovakia and East Germahy ,'London "Oxford University ' ,
Press,'19 6 4 , pp. BÏÏÏ^TId.
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features of this monopoly are as follows:
1)

in all Bloc countries, foreign trade is conducted

almost exclusively by state-owned enterprises subordina
ted to the Ministry of Foreign Trade,
2) the Ministry of Foreign Trade*does not carry out foreign
trade transactions by itself, but guides and supervises
the activity of foreign trade enterprises (PTE's) within
the framework of the economic plan.

The Ministry of

•Foreign Trade is responsible for formulating the general
foreign trade policy, concluding'international 'trade and
payment;- agreements, and cooperating with the Ministry
of Finance in the management of foreign exchange resources,
3) all foreign trade activity is channeled through
foreign trade enterprises. Normally, each such enterprise
is exclusively entitled.to trade with foreign countries
in its particular field of activity and is assigned a
certain group of commodities in order to eliminate
competition between countries.
4)

foreign and domestic aspects of trade are completely

separated. FTS concentrate on foreign trade activity,

"

buying domestic goods goods designated for exports from
domestic producers and being responsible for the purchase
of foreign goods on behalf of domestic buyers.
5)

foreign trade monopoly is supplemented by the state

monopoly of foreign currency resources.^

See chapter 4.
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THE MINISTRY OP FOREIGN TRADE
When on July 21, 1944 the Polish Committee of
National Liberation established itself at Lublin to
function as the government of Poland, the administration
of foreign trade was- placed under the Department of
National Economy and Finance,^
On December 31', 1944 the Lublin Committee had been
transformed into the Provisional Government of Poland
and the omnibus Department of National Economy and Finance
was split into 3 ministries;

the Treasury, Industry and

Pood and Trade.
During the period 1945-1950 the activity of the new,
Soviet-oriented government concentrated on capturing the
full control over the economy and remaking with accordance
to the Soviet mold. The organizational changes in the
administrative apparatus were very frequent and aimed to
construct a highly centralized economic system adminis
trated by economic plans. In the course of this reorga
nization the administration of Foreign Trade rested in
various Ministries until finally a separate Ministry of
Foreign trade as a state organ of the Foreign Trade
monopoly was established. In July 28, 1945 the adminis
tration of foreign trade was placed under the Ministry of
Shipping and in 1947 was transfered to the Ministry of
Industry and Trade.

During the period of reconstruction

T. P. Alton, Polish Postwar Economy, New York, Columbia
University Pre8sT13531" p .'IT.
.
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of the economy the state control over all sectors of
the economy had been continually extended and the
Ministry of Industry and Trade expanded enormously.

On

February 10, 1949 the Ministry of Industry and Trade
was liquidated and succeeded by six new ones, among
them by the separate Ministry of Foreign Trade.^
task

Its

and activity had been defined by the decree of March

8, 1949 and included
1)

preparation of drafts of the foreign trade plans in

conformity with the over-all economic plan and the res
ponsibility for achieving goals'prescribed by that plan.
2)

for mulation of the general foreign trade policy,

conduct of trade negotiations and conclusion of inter
national trade and payment agreements, and supervision .
over their execution.
3)

regulation of the volume, commodity, composition,

and geographical structure of foreign trade turnovers
4)

direct control and supervision of enterprises which

actually conduct foreign trade activity.
5) establishment of foreign trade offices and nomination
of trade representatives abroad
6) organization of fairs and displays;

questions con

cerning the technique of trade, and standards.
Under the regulation of January 1, 1961 issued by the
Minister of Foreign Trade the organizational structure
of the Ministry of Foreign Trade was as follows:

^ Dziennik Ustaw, 1949, No. 7, Item 43.
XX

Dziennik Ustaw, 1949, No. 15, Item 96, also see, Alton
Polish Postwar Economy, p. 263.
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I
1.

The Minister's Office

2.

Personnel Department

3.

legal and Administrative Department

4.

Department
a) Office

of Planning
of Planning Technique and Plan's Coordination

h)

Raw materials and Consumption O;oods

c)

Machinery and Equipment

d)

"Perspective" Planning

5.

Department

of Control

6.

Department

of Finance

7.

a)

International Finance Office for Socialist

b)

Countries
International Finance Office for Capitalist

c)

Countries
Financing of Foreign Services

d) Accounting Office
Department of Foreign Trade and Commodity Turnovers
a)

General■Office

b)

Coal and Construction Materials

c)

Chemical Products and Fuels

d)

Agricultural Commodities

e)

Light industries, wood and paper

■i

8.

Department of Machinery and Equipment
a)
b)
c)

General Office
Metallurgy
Complete industrial establishments (plants)
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d)

Light Machinery, Tools and Apparatus

e)

Heavy Machinery and Communication Equipment

f)

Technical Office

9,. Department of Treaties I (for socialist countries)
10. Department of Treaties'll (Common Market, Scandinavian
Countries South Europe and Overseas Countries)
11. Department of Treaties III
(Latin America, Near, Middle and Par East, Africa)
12. Administrative Department
13. Institute for Economic Research
II

Auxiliary Agencies

1.

Central Board of Engineering

2.

Central Customs Board

3.

Central Board of Transportation and Shipping

4.

Central Standardization Board

The Ministry of Foreign Trade is headed by a Minister of
Foreign Trade who is the member of the Council of Ministers,
the highest organ of the state's administration. Directly
subordinated to the Minister of Foreign Trade are; the
Vice -Ministers, Directors of the Departments of the
Ministry, Directors of the Central Auxiliary Agencies
attached to the ministry and the Directors (Presidents)
of Foreign Trade Enterprises.

In very brief terms, the

tasks and responsibilities of various departments of the
Ministry of Foreign Trade are as follows;
The Personnel Department is responsible for an employment
policy within the ministry and supervises Personnel
Departments in all enterprises and agencies subordinated
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to the ministry ,

It also supervises the personnel of

Bureaus of Commercial Attaches and nominates permanent
trade representatives abroad.

Its responsibilities

embrace problems of education, improvement of skills of
personnel, training-on-the-job programs etc.
The Department of Planning is one of the most important
in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and is responsible for
the construction of Foreign Trade Plans in collaboration
with the Planning Commission attached to the Council of
Ministers.

Its specialized branch offices are concerned

with elaboration of foreign trade plans within two broad
commodity groups;

one for raw materials and consumers

goods, the other for capital goods.

The Branch Office of

"Perspective Planning" is responsible for formulating
long-run foreign trade plans in conformity with the re
quirements of the over-all "perspective economic plan of
the country."

Difficult problems of devising the technique

of planning, achieving the satisfactory degree of consis
tency and comprehensiveness of the foreign trade as well
as its coodination with the over-all economic plan are
handled by the Branch Office of Planning Technique and
Plan's Coordination.
Department of Control
In the centrally planned economy, the execution of
Economic Plans, is of enormous importance,.

When the

correct elaboration of the plan can be regarded as a
preliminary condition, the execution of the plan is the
necessary condition for smooth operation of the whole
economic system.

Therefore the apparatus of control
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which would enforce economic discipline with respect to
the execution of plans plays a very important role.
In Poland, the control over execution of planned
goals is exercised on three administrative levels:
a)

by the Supreme Chamber of Control (Najwyzsza izba

kohtroli) which is t ? h i g h e s t organ of state control
b)'- by the apparatus of control of all ministries. With
respect to foreign trade the internal control within
the ministry is effected by the Department of Control.
The scope of this control includes the organization,
administration and operation of all the subordinated
units with respect to legality, veracity, correctness,
c)

and compliance with the foreign trade

plan.

by a banking system financial control

over the appara

tus of Foreign trade monopoly is exercised by two
banks.

Narodowy Bank Polski (The Polish National Bank)

and Bank Handlowy S.A. w ■ Warszawie (Commercial
IS
Bank of Warsaw).
The Department of Finance is responsible for formulat
ing the financial policy of the ministry with respect
to its domestic and foreign sphere of

activity.

The Department of Foreign Trade Turnover and The Department
of Machinery and Equipment.
X

It should be noted that financial discipline exercised
by banks is very effective.

The Polish b a n ki ng system

has been constructed with a:view toward enforcing vigorous
financial discipline in the execution of a national
economic ,plan. Each economic unit is controlled by a
bank to,which it is obliged to turn for working capital
and investment funds. Banks also grant credits accor
ding to a'financial plan of the enterprise and currently
watch over the use of the credits to make sure that they
are not diverted to other uses than these specified in
the plan.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35

Direct Supervision over the foreign trade activity of
enterprises in the conduct of foreign trade, and over
the flow of exports and imports is exercised by two de
partments of the Ministry of foreign trade.
The Department of Foreign Trade is responsible for
trade in raw materials, agricultural commodities and
consumer’s goods.
The Department of Machinery and Equipment regulates
the flow of trade of engineering products.
The Department of Treaties
In the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade there are
three separate Departments of Treaties responsible for the
conduct of foreign trade negotiations,

the conclusion of

international trade and payment agreements, and supervision
of their execution according to the assigned countries or
trade areas.
The Institute for Economic Research
Is responsible for the conduct of economic research
in the field of foreign trade.

The scope of its activity

includes an examination of theoretical and practical pro
blems of foreign trade, questions of methods, technique and
organization of trade, careful study of the trends and
developments on international markets, movements of
prices and recently the investigation of problems of the
"effectiveness"

of f o r e i g n trade.

The Ministry of Foreign Trade supervises the activity of
several auxiliary agencies involved in the organization
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of the country's external trade.

The Central Customs

Board establishes tariff classification and the value
of the duty levied on imported goods.

It is responsible

for the collection of duties and makes investigations
relating to the manufacture and production of goods pro
duced in countries which export to Poland.
Two other auxiliary agencies are attached to the
Ministry of Foreign Trade;

the Central Board of Enginee

ring and the Central Standardzation Board which are
responsible for setting of technical norms and quality
requirements for the commodities entering foreign trade
and supervise the apparatus exercising direct technical
and quality control over the flow of exports and imports.
Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade
Among several auxiliary agencies subordinated to the
Ministry of Foreign Trade the Polish Chamber of Foreign
Trade deserves special attention.
It is a semi-official organization engaged in gene
ral foreign trade promotion activities.

The Polish

Chamber of Foreign Trade came into, being by the Decree of
the Council of Ministers on September 28, 1949 to foster
economic relations with foreign countries, to keep FTE
advised as to international marketing developments and to
perform specific international marketing services. The
members of the Chamber are: foreign trade enterprises,
the Polish Natio na l Bank, the Bank of Commerce of Warsaw,
the Maritime shipping companies, and the leading insurance
companies.
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The economic activities of the Chamber extend over
a number of important fields and include:^
1.

A careful study of foreign markets as to the concrete
trade opportunities for the benefit of Polish expor
ters and importers

2.

The performance of several specific services to
foreign trade companies such as issuing and legalizing
commercial documents (certificates of origin of the
merchandise, etc.)

3.

The furnishing of information on national and local

4.

laws and administrative regulations.
Legal guidance, appraisal and publication of commercial
customs

5.
6.

Arbitration of trade disputes
Organization of fairs and displays

7.

Publications of trade journals containing internation
al trade statistics, information on trade opportunities
etc.

Foreign Trade Enterprises (PTE’s)
Under the supervision and guidance of the Ministry of
Foreign Trade the actual trading transactions are carried
out by special, authorized enterprises.
In the first post war period companies interested in
the conduct of foreign trade activity were required to
obtain special licenses issued by the central organ of
f o r e ig n trade monopoly,

o ri ginally the F o r ei gn Trade

Committee at the Ministry of Food and Trade, Lately by

Ibid, pp. 306-307.
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the Ministry of Industry and Trade.^

The first state-

owned foreign trade enterprises were established, from
the legal point of view,^ as companies limited, as to share
holders;

and acted as state-owned domestic enterprises

and agencies.

Until 1947 private importers and exporters,

in some cases were permitted to conduct foreign trade
activity, but under very strict state control.
On January 3, 1947, a special decree was issued
which formulated principles of establishing socialized
enterprises and, at the same time, provided new legal base
for state-owned foreign trade enterprises.^""' P T E ’s
while being the exclusive property of the state, obtained
full legal identity a certain degree of financial inde
pendence and autonomy within the limits laid down in
their statutes.

In that period the enterprises empowered

to conclude trade deals with foreign organizations were :
1)

the above mentioned state-owned enterprises organized
as independent juridicial and financial entities

2)

Foreign Trade Bureaus - usually a branch of so called
"Central Boards of Supply and Sale" (Centrais Zaopatrzenia i zbytu) functioning as an intermediate adminis
trative body between a respective ministry and its

X

Ibid, p. 247.
S. Maksymowicz, S.Szczypiorski, Organizacja i technika
handlu - zag ranicznego

(O r g a n ! z a t i o n and üTeErTnii.que of

Pbr"elgh Tra3!eT^art"T, Warsaw, F.W.N., 1955;.
XX
XXX

Ibid, p. 249.
Ibid

'
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subordinate production enterprises. ’ In this organiza
tional schedule the Foreign Trade Bureaus were supervised
by the ministry in question as well as by the Ministry of
Foreign Trade.
3) A small number of limited liability companies owned by
nationalized economic units and cooperatives.
During the period of 1949-1955 the Foreign Trade Bureaus
and limited liability companies were gradually liquidated
or converted into independent, state-owned foreign trade
enterprises.

Thus, the management of the foreign trade

apparatus became centralized in the hands of the central
organ of state monopoly with almost uniform organizational
structure for all enterprises empowered to carry out
foreign trade deals.

The tasks and sphere of activity

of PTE were designated by the regulation which came into
effect in 1948 and included:^’
^
1)

"analysis of foreign markets

2)

collection of information on competitive sources of
supply

3)

arrangement of appropriate transportation of goods,
including suitable packaging and insurance

4)

setting prices on goods with the objective to maximize
profits while taking account of the competition of
other sellers

X

XX

Central Boards were dissolved by the resolution of the
Council of Ministers on December 23, 1950. Their
functions were taken over by the respective'departments
within a ministry.
See T.P, Alton, Polish Postwar
Economy, p. 88.
Ibid, p. 265 quoted from ^andel Zagraniczny (Foreign
Trade) April 1948 pp. 9-10 (Supplement to "Zycie
Gospodarcze, April 1-15, 1948.
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5)

assuming payments for goods sold as to avoid loss
while at the same time not making payment conditions
- too onerous

6)

liaison with production enterprises to assure that
the goods dispatched would correspond to the condi
tions of sale with regard to quality, assortment,
terms of delivery, packaging and transportation.

The regulation also introduced a uniform organizational
structure to all foreign trade enterprises.^

It was

based on following principles:
1)

imports and exports were separated, by the establish
ment of enterprises dealing solely either with export
or import activities.

2)

Bach enterprise was prescribed a particular field of
activity, being exclusively entitled to trade certain
commodities or groups of commodities in order to
prevent an overlap of lists of goods handled and
eliminate competition on domestic or foreign markets.

The decree fully defining legal structure and principles
of operation of socialized enterprises was passed on
October 26, 1950.^^ The emphasis was put on planning as
the most important and unique principle of carrying out
the economic activity by all state-owned or controlled
enterprises.
The organizational structure introduced by the regu
lation of 1948 had a rather short period of life,

^

Very

u . Zieleniewski, 8. Szczypiorski, op. cit., p, 245.
Ibid, p. 255.
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soon it became obvious that the conception is unattaina
ble in practice.

Its basic shortcoming lay in the sepa

ration of import and export activities in different
enterprises which was artificial, costly and difficult
to maintain in practice.

It is not too difficult to see

why this was so,
1)

There vras a considerable shortage of highly trained
foreign trade personnel and the separation of export
and import activities was making this shortage more

2)

acute.
It increased the number of enterprises engaged in
foreign trade and required the establishment of
several parallel organizational units for exports
and imports and thus increased the costs of running
the enterprises and made it impossible to ripen the

3)

fruits of the economies of scale.
The opportunities of thorough penetration of foreign
markets could be much better in enterprises which would
combine exports and import activities.

4)

It is relatively easier to apply a more effective
foreign trade policy, at least with respect to certain
markets when imports and exports are conducted jointly.
Besides this there is a possibility of considerable

5)

reduction of operational costs of the enterprise.
The same foreign agents and enterprise representatives
can perform buying and selling functions when exports
and imports are combined into the same enterprise.^

X

For a more extensive analysis of these points see,
Zr, Zieleniewski, S. Szczypiorski, op. cit., pp. 245246.
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The work of finding a more operational and effective
organizational structure of foreign trade enterprises
was proceeding rather slowly.

The task was not an easy

one as only such a structure could be accepted which
would fit the highly centralized model of the economy and
one which could be operated by economic plans. In other
words, the wanted structure was one for which it would be
easy to channel the commands and directives emanating
from the top and make the control over the execution of
these targets relatively simple and uncomplicated.

From

this point of view the conception which assigned to each
enterprise the sphere of activity according;to the ,,
commodity criterion was preferable as it was convenient
from the point of view of central planning.

In 1953 the

process of reorganization started resulting in the
recombination of exports and imports in enterprises
distinguished along the lines of the commodity criterion.
It seems that strict adherence to the commodity criterion
in assigning the spheres of activity to each enterprise
in question is by no means the best solution from the
point of view of the operational efficiency of the organ
izational structure, 'The system is simply too rigid to
be efficient but the very method of administrating the
economy by the stream of commands and directives enlisted
in central plan is not a bit less rigid than the hierar
chical structure constructed to transmit the directives
down the administrative ladder.
One can' wonder, for
example if it would not be better to base the activity
of foreign trade enterprises on purely commercial principles
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instead of command and directives.

To allow the market

forces to play and to estimate their performance and
leave the choice of most effective and workable organi
zational structure to the discretion of the enterprise
in question.

But this possibility is simply incompatible

with the "modus operand!" of Soviet-type economy.

It

would require to transfer a considerable degree of decision
making from the top to the bottom of the hierarchical
structure and thus weaken the power of the monopoly of
foreign trade. Certainly this solution is too dangerous
to be taken seriously into consideration by top political
authorities.
The political events of October 1956 and ones related
to it by a new drive towards decentralization and reforms
in the system of state administration brought some orga
nizational changes into the organ of foreign trade mono
poly.

Eliminated in the late 4 0 's from the sphere of

foreign trade activity, cooperative organizations and
hybrid state-cooperative enterprises have been granted the
permission to carry out foreign trade transactions.

The

decree No, 128158 issued by the Council of Ministers on
April 18, 1958 put into effect the process of reorganizeX’
tion of the socialized sectors of the economy.
It v/as followed by Recommendation No. 214159 of the Econo
mic Committee at the Council of Ministers issued on May
22, 19 5 9 . ^ This introduced certain modifications in the
X

Zasady zmiany struktary organizacyjnej panstwowego
przemyslu kluczowego, (Changes in the Organizational
Structure of the socialized key industries), Przeglad
Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego, No. 6, 1958.
J. Zieleniewski, S. Szczypiorski, op. cit., p, 256.
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organizational structure of foreign trade enterprises.
Most important among them seems to be the recommendation
to establish separate "Branch Offices" (Biura Branzowe)
within the enterprise which would specialize in trade
activity according to a narrower commodity criterion than
enterprise as a whole, the so-called Branch offices, while
being

the integral part of the enterprise were to enjoy

a considerable degree of operational and financial inde
pendence. Establishment of "Branch Offices" in foreign
trade enterprises was expected to achieve two goals;
1)

improve operational ability of the enterprise

2)

improve its cooperation with domestic producers.

With respect to the first point the reasoning was following
the size and scope of activity of the majority of foreign
trade enterprises which started as small firms grew
enormously to keep pace with the fast increase of Poland’s
post war foreign trade.

The vaster the enterprise becomes,

the more difficult are the structural problems of organiza
tion, management coordination and control. Larger organi
zations are more bureaucratic, tend to move more slowly
and to adopt themselves with increasing difficulty.
It seems obvious that the organizational structure which
fits small firms does not work in the larger ones.

But

foreign trade enterprises which grow into large organiza
tions were being managed like small ones. The state
decision making and administration were concentrated in the
hands of the President of the enterprise who was simply
unable to handle them. Undoubtedly, many of the duties
assigned to him could be delegated to lower levels ,of the
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executive staff and the enterprise could benefit from it;
as its performance would be improved. Many problems could
probably be solved faster without waiting for the decision
of the President.

Two solutions to the problem were

suggested. The first one proposed to divide large enterpri
ses into smaller ones having a more narrow scope of
activity determined according to the commodity criterion.
The adherents of Lhis point of view argued that these
smaller enterprises would be easy to manage and thus would
be able to operate more efficiently.

But at the same time

it was pointed out that an increased number of enter
prises would require the establishment of several parallel
organizational units in all of the enterprises.

In effect,

as opponents to this concept argued, the operational
costs from the point of view of the whole apparatus of
foreign trade would increase significantly.

As any

research in this field has not been done it is difficult
to assess the real value of this proposal. It is quite
possible for example that the advantages of a better,
more effective performance would surpass the higher costs
of operation.^

Finally the proposal was rejected for

other reasons.

During the years of operation, the

existing companies which established their position on
foreign markets, were already known to foreign customers
and had gained their confidence.

New companies which

would replace the old ones would have to start this

J. Zieleniewski, 8. Szczypiorski, op. cit., p. 258.
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difficult task from the very beginning.
The other proposal which was accepted envisaged
establishment of the Branch Offices which would specialize
in trade within strictly prescribed and homogenous or
closely related commodities.
They were to enjoy a
considerable degree of autonomy and could be looked upon
as smaller enterprises within the big one.

This proposal

had the advantages of the previous one b u t .at the same,
time it did not require the dissolution of existing
enterprises and the replacement of them by entirely new
ones.

(Diagrams No. 1 and No. 2 depict the organization

al structure with and without "Branch Offices".^)

What

seems to be most important in the new organizational
structure is the quite pronounced decentralization of the
policy making and the placement of it on the intermediate
executive level instead of concentrating it at the top.
By establishing Branch Directors who were in charge of
"Branch Offices" and granting them more authority, the
communinational channels were shortened and the process
of decision making became faster,
' It seems that this reform decreased the degree of
bureaucracy and inflexibility of the organizational struc
ture at least to some extent, but the breakthrough
did not go far enough to bring sweeping changes in the
X

It should be noted that both schemes show the or g a 
nizational structure as formulated by Decree No. 10
issued by the Minister of Foreign Trade in 1961.
Schedule No. 1 was designated for small enterprises and
those with a too diversified assortment in order to es
tablish Branch Offices. The old, uniform organizational
schedule for all foreign trade enterprises was not
■ exactly the same but its underlying principles were very
similar, Ibid, pp. 261-262.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47'

system.
2.

The other advantage claimed for this model was the

possibility of improving the cooperation between foreign
trade enterprises and domestic productivity.

The commo

dity pattern of Branch offices was determined to corres
pond as close as possible to the production profile of
cooperating with the domestic production enterprises.
It was expected that both partners would benefit on
bringing production and trade closer together. Trading
enterprises were given the opportunity to become better
acquainted with production possibilities.

Also producers

were able to be better informed as to the necessary
requirements of foreign customers. At this point it should
be noted that the new regulations envisaged also the
possibility for domestic producers to engage directly in
foreign trade activity by prescribing the conditions under
which such a concession could be granted. '
X
Ibid, pp. 270-273.
Also see, S. Polaczek, Zjednoczenia przemyslowe a
handel zagraniczny (Industrial Associations and Foreign
Trade) Gospodarka Planowa, No. 10, 1958.
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LINKS BETWEEN FOREIGN TRADE ENTERPRISES AND THEIR DOMESTIC

As it has been already mentioned Foreign Trade
Enterprises are not empowered by law to engage in domestic
production or distribution activities. They do buy the
commodities designated for export from domestic producers
and sell imported goods to domestic trading organizations.
All manufacturing and commercial enterprises of the
socialized sector are subordinated to respective ministries
in charge of given sectors of the economy.

On the inter-

mediate^adpiinistrative level there are Industrial Associa
tions (Zjednoczenia PrzemysloweJ which group enterprises
by industrial types.

The enterprises of the socialized

sectors of the economy possess a full legal identity and
are regarded as independent financial entities operating
on commercial principles.

The business contacts between

FTE and their domestic partners have been established on
a contract basis..

For the first time, the system of

Contracts of Sale and Purchase has been introduced by the
decree issued on April 19, 1950 as the legal manner of
conducting business operations between socialized economic
units.

This was supplemented by a resolution by the

Chairman of the State Commission of Economic Planning No.
226 issued on June 1, 1950.^^ This resolution formulated
3C

Ibid, p. 264.
and S. Szczypiorski, Organizacja Handlu hagranicznego
(Organization of Foreign Trade) second ed, Warsaw,
P.W.G. 1953, p. 99.
Ibid, p. 265.
48
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"The General Conditions of Sale and Purchase" binding in
all trade deals between PTE's and their domestic partners.
The above mentioned general conditions have been conside
rably extended and modified in order to strengthen the
discipline of foreign trade deliveries by the Decision
of the Chairman of the Planning Commission issued on
X
October 16, 1959.
Besides these legal steps, and in order that business
contacts between PTE's and domestic enterprises may be on
a more operational basis some organizational changes
have been introduced.

In this respect the most important
XX

seems to be the creation of so-called "Branch Committees."
These were established as advisory bodies attached to
foreign trade enterprises.

Branch Committees were composed

of the representatives from both the foreign trade enter
prises and the Industrial Associations or Enterprises in
question.

Their chief concern was to assure that the

goods ordered by PTE's from production enterprises and
designated for exports would correspond to the require
ments of foreign buyers with reaard to oualitv, assortment,
<. .

V

L...'

K/

t

packaging and above all that they would be dispatched in
due time.

As the situation on world markets changes

continually while production is based on annual planning,
it is not easy to reconcile production with the, current
requirements of foreign customers.

In this respect Branch

X

Ibid.

Ibid; p. 266.
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Committees were to play the role of an intervening body
devoted to effectively coordinating production v/ith the
varying foreign market situation.

From the practical

point of view, it seems that the only valid contribution
which Branch Committees were able to make was to better
mutual understanding of problems and tasks of industry
and the trade apparatus.

They failed completely in their

task of trade promotion .
i simply because they were not
furnished with sufficient authority to perform it.

In

order to promote trade successfully it was not enough to
introduce organizational reforms, as the main hinderance
was the crude and inadequate method of planning the pro
duction and trade. Steps which have been taken in order
to improve the planning process will be examined in
Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER THREE
TECHNIQUE OF PLANNING
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PLAN'S CONSTRUCTION AND COORDINATION
Plan construction is based on a two-way flow of
information, instruction and coordination and can be
divided into several stages.
Starting the process of plan elaboration, the Planning
Commission of the Council of Ministers must have as
precise as possible a picture of the economy containing
all the statistical data on all economic variables in
order to depict the availabilities of productive resources
and their composition.

The objectives and the priority

of tasks which have to be accomplished during the planyear are formulated by the top political, authority and
sent to the Planning Commission,

This statistical picture

of the economy together with the scale of preferences
established by political leaders serves as the basis for
planners to formulate a preliminary and internally con
sistent set of aggregate targets. The consistency is
achieved by drawing a preliminary set of material balan
ces.^ Material balances relate (link) output targets
with the factor requirements indispensable to produce that
output. The clue to material balance construction is the
system of output coefficients (technical norms).

They

are derived from technological practice and are possibly

H, S, Levine, Soviet Economic Planning (input-Output
Analysis and Soviet Planning) A.E.R. Papers and Proceedings. Vol. 52, 1962, p. 129.
E"." Ames, International Trade without Markets - The
Soviet Bloc, A.E.R, December, 1954,
52
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connected for technical progress.^

The quantity of

input materials required is calculated by simple
multiplication of planned output targets by the appro
priate input coefficients.

The state of the material

•

balances shows import requirement of the economy for a
period covered by the plan;

output targets - domestic

supply - decreases in inventories = import requirement.
For many years it was a common practice of the Bloc coun
tries to first construct a preliminary import

target

(a so-called "control figure") and there they adjust the
export plan to this target.

Roughly speaking the preli

minary export plan (control figures) is drawn up on the
basis of already concluded trade contracts, from
commitments arising from annual and long-run international
trade agreements, and from import needs determined by
material balances.
In the second stage, the "control figures" are sent
down through the planning hierarchy.

The foreign trade

targets are sent to the Ministry of Foreign Trade where
some of the general targets are broken up, some more
detailed targets added and then passed on to the foreign
trade enterprises. .
On the base of received directives and recommenda
tions and after consulting the respective domestic trade
organizations and manufacturing enterprises FTE’s prepare'
X

XX
XX

A. Zauberman, Industrial Progress in Poland. Czechroslovakia and East Germany. London, Oxford University
Fres's, Ï964, p . 4. E ." L'." Pryor, The Communist Foreign
Trade System, p. 56.
Z. Karnecki, J. Soldaczuk , W. Sierpinski, Miedzynarodowe
Stosunki ekonomiczne, p. 526.
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the propositions for the foreign trade plan.

The draft

of the foreign trade plan prepared by PTE has to be
elaborated in a detailed, operational form.

Once the

plan has been approved it becomes binding to the PTE.
The consultation with domestic partners, especially in
the case of the export plan, is very important for PTE's,
as it ensures them that the planned goals with regard to
the volume, commodity composition and terms of delivery
can be met by domestic suppliers.

The drafts of the

plan prepared by PTE's are passed on to the Ministry of
Foreign Trade.

In this stage the submitted drafts are

analyzed and estimated, the necessary adjustments and
alterations are made and the "synthetical" draft of foreign
trade plan is elaborated and passed to the Planning
Commission.

The drawing of this draft is essentially a

bargaining process where the Ministry, as a superior
organ, tries to raise some of the targets and cut out
the excess while the PTE's try to protect the "safety
margins" they have set up.
After receiving drafts of all sectoral plans, the
Planning Commission starts to work out an internally
consistent, over-all economic plan. As the data pictured
by sectoral plans differs considerably from the preli
minary "control figures" the Planning Commission has to
recalculate the material balances.

In planning procedu

res borrowed from the Sovietè , a balance is not easily
reached, and usually it does not happen that the supply
side (listing all sources of supply for all centrally
allocated products) equals the demand side comprising all
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the uses.of these products in the 1st calculation.

In

most cases it is the supply side which falls short of the
planned demands.

Through a series of successive adjust

ments the planners try to coordinate all the elements
of the plan.

It can be done in various ways.

Consisten

cy of the plan can be achieved using a so called "iterative
approach".

According to this method the deficit of the

product in question is made up by the increases in the
planned outputs of all the products which are the inputs
to the deficit product, followed by the increases in
the outputs of the products which are the inputs to the
input product and so on until the consistency is achieved,
So far, there is no premise on which to believe that
this method is currently applied in the planning practice
of the countries of Soviet bloc.

Usually the adjustments

are made in a completely different way.

The producers

of a deficit product are simply told to increase their
output without getting any additional inputs and the
users of a deficit product have to produce the output
determined by the plan having at their disposal less of
the deficit product that is normally r e q u i r e d . O n e can
wonder how this system works in practice. In a command
X

'

This unequality is usually solved (at least partially)
in accordance with the hierarchy of preferences es
tablished by top political authority by sacrificing
w h e n n e ce ssa ry low pri or i t y goals to fulfill targets of
higher priority.
^

The definition of iterative approach as formulated by
H. S. Levine, "Soviet Economic Planning, AER vol. 52
Papers and Proceedings 1962, p. 131.

xxXy^ S. Levine "The Centralized Planning of Supply in
Soviet Industry" in Joint Economic Committee, Comparison
of the U .S. and Soviet Economics, Part i, G.P.O. Washingtbn, 1959," pp. 164, 167.~
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economy the output goals prescribed by the plan are
binding to all economic units in question.

It is the

producer of a deficit product who has to worry about how
to produce the required output using less inputs.

Usually

it is done by lowering the quality of the product, utili
zing the "safety margins" or securing higher input coe
fficients from that which are feasibly workable.^
/a.o'-la
Arriving at the internally consistent set of material
balances is not the only problem which the planners find
difficult to deal with.

The system of material balances

is set up for a number of centrally allocated products
of "key industries''.^^

After substracting the requirements

for material inputs of key industries (covered by the
system of material balancing) from the output targets
set out in the directives, the quantities of output left
over are to be distributed among all other users. It is
only by pure coincidence that these left over outputs are
sufficient to satisfy total final demands, as determined
by the plan. It cannot come out in the normal course of
planning since the "control figures" serving as the guide
for drawing the draft-plan are set out in advance of the
X

XX

It is mainly due to the fact that input-coefficients
are. mostly inaccurate for several reasons. Usually
they are poorly aggregated even on the level of the
enterprise mahy of them are out of date because of
rapid technical progress and above all they are very
often unrealistically set.
The method of "material balancing" is in concept similar
to the input-output technique. However, the balances
are made up separately for each centrally allocated
commodity and do not prescribe a complete matrix which
is the case in respect to input-output method. There
fore, there are troubles with achieving consistency
between different sets of material balances
'
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entire planning process.

On the other hand, any kind of

industry depends directly or indirectly on inputs supplied
by other industries.

And again through a series of succe

ssive approximations planners strive to hit upon a new
set of outputs which would cover the desired levels of
demand.
Finally, it should be noted that no matter how diffi
cult the planners find it to arrive on the internally
consistent version of the plan, there is still a problem
of making provisions for unforeseen changes in final
demand or in output capacities.

It is here where one

of the basic shortcomings of the centrally planned system
manifests itself most acutely.

Even a perfectly consistent

and carefully elaborated plan does not secure smooth and
undisturbed operation of the economy in the period
covered by the plan.

A planner's expectations and

predictions do not necessarily coincide with the future
events of real life. If something unexpected happens the
plan is likely to breakdown creating several bottlenecks
and strains. On the other hand these events are not easy
to prevent or overcome as it takes considerable time and
pains to introduce necessary adjustments and modifications.
The heavy, bureaucratic machine of central planning is
almost entirely rigid, constructed to operate in the
prescribed direction.

Any deviation from this strictly

determined "route" almost immediately calls for fargoing changes in the whole system and it is an extremely
difficult and time-absorbing process.
Finally, an internally consistent "draft" of the plan
is drawn up.

By multiplying physical goals by respective
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prices, the monetary version of the plan is reached and
then consolidated into an over-all financial plan.

It

should be pointed out the operational coordination of the
requirements of a foreign trade plan with the over-all
national economic plan including several plans for production and investments, has proved troublesome in Polish
experience as well as in the experience of all other.
countries of the Bloc. It seems that the main reason
lays in the inflexibility of the model of economy
operating under the mechanism of centrally established
plans.

Providing that the plan targets for the domestic

market are established in the reasonable and not exagge
rated dimensions from the point of view of a real possi
bility of achieving them and providing further that the
state exercises the full control over the economy and
thus commands must be obeyed;

then the carrying out of

the national plan targets depends on the operational
ability of all the units of the economy.

In such a

situation the risk of non-fulfillment of the plan could
be eliminated to great extent.

By no means, is this so

in the case of foreign trade. The contact with the
wohld market brings in the elements of risks and uncer
tainty ,concerning the future trade turnovers.

Foreign

trade does not lend itself to the rigid planning
methods applied in a domestic market which is under the
full control of the state.
precise operational tools.

It requires more elastic and
leaving aside the problems

of the long-run planning where the probability of the
"correct guess" with respect to the future trends in the
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world market are minimal, we must admit that even planning
on the annual basis faces enormous difficulties.

While

the real export possibilities can be set up in conformity
with the requirements of a national plan with a great
degree of accuracy (this is a rather theoretical possi
bility as the actual planning methods are still very
crude), the conditions in the world market may require
great modifications of these plans,^

For these reasons,

export and import plans have to be formulated approximately
with a certain range left for modifications and adjustments.
Their fulfillment requires considerable "operational elas
ticity" of the enterprises conducting foreign trade, and
several modifications in the technique of plan construction
as well as certain financial means at the disposal of the
enterprise in question,
In the last stage of the planning process the final
version of the draft called "project" of the National
Economic Plan elaborated by the Planning Commission is
passed to the Council of Ministers for estimation and
approval. As H. S, Levine remarks it is not only a
X
The Economic literature of the Bloc seems to realize
this but the problem is still discussed on the academic
level only.
,
See: JJ.Nicgowskl, W. Rydygier, Problemy handlu zagranicznego' (Problems of. Foreign Trade) in "Polityka
gaspodarcza Polskl Lundowej,, Vol. 1 p'. 64 ÔT
XX

There are two types of "reserves" kept for emergency
purposes. The state reserves of foreign currency, gold
and important goods serving to fill the gap caused by
sudden changes in the world market or import irregula
rities and the foreign trade reserves designated usually
for sudden buying on the world market or emergency export
to meet the foreign payments, FTE’s do not keep any
reserved and can use the state or ministry reserves only
under special permission. Usually it takes considerable
time until the permission is granted and the chances of
profitable purchase or sale can be lost in the meantime.
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formality.^

In spite of the fact that while drafting the

plan planners try to keep as close as possible to the
general line determined by political authority, several
restraints imposed by resource and capacity limitations
and the requirement to meet the consistency condition made
the draft deviate in several respects from the line laid
down by top political authority.

The draft does not

please everyone with political power in the ruling "elite".
Therefore, several changes have to be made before the
draft is confirmed by the Council of Ministers,
The Council of Ministers presents the draft of the
National Economic Plan to the "Sejm" (Parliament) during
its winter session for final approval and promulgation.^^
Once the plan has been confirmed it becomes binding by
law to all economic units of the country.
APPRAISAL OP THE SYSTEM OF CENTRAL PLANNING
Socialist economic literature usually emphasizes two
main advantages arising from the application of central
planning as the operational device for carrying out foreign
trade activity.
1)

it protects "socialist economy" from the influence of
fluctuations so characteristic to "capitalist markets"
and thus secures the smooth and undisturbed operation
of socialist economy run by central plans.

X
H.

S. Levine,

Soviet Economic Planning, p, 130.

XX

S. Hatt, E. Szymanski, M. Wolski,
Poisee. p. 123.

System olanowania w
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2)

the concentration of the decision making in the hands

of central authority enables adoption of such foreign
trade policy which will secure the balance of internatio
nal payments and which is most effective for continuous
and fast economic growth.^
So far decade long planning experience has not provi
ded any strong proof to justify these claims.

Instead

it has revealed many shortcomings of the system which ,
seems to disregard them almost completely,
A.

To start with, the planning methods currently applied

are still very crude in spite of the fact that modern
mathematical methods and techniques especially those which
come from the "Capitalist West" are finding increasinglyextensive application in planning.
We have previously discussed some of the difficulties
the planners face in their efforts to meet the consistency
requirements when constructing an over-all economic plan.
This mainly refers to the wide-spread method of "material
balancing."
X

The latter is usually referred is "socialist economic
literature as "fundamental economic law of socialism".
See J-. V. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in
the U.8.S.R.
"Bolshevik". No. 18, 1952, p. 22.
XX

In Stalin's days they were regarded as an integral part
of "Bourgeois theory" and for this reason alone unassilullable into ,Soviet economics.
vV. A. Z a u b e r m a n wr ites
"the enthusiastic response which the mathematical
"novelties" have met in Soviet economics is indeed a
measure of the urgency felt in the task of overhauling
and modernizing the techniques of Soviet planning".
See A. Zauberman, New Winds in Soviet-Planning, Soviet
Studies. July I960, p. 1,
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Characterizing this method A. Zauberman v/rites:
"The underlying assumption of the "material balance"
system is a high degree of comprehensiveness, homogeneity
and precision. Neither of these premises has proved
sufficiently realistic...the central planner is engaged
in a losing battle against time. The whole conception of
a system of balances depends on the "principle of
simultaneity." To be consistent it must be homogeneous,
that is, it must correspond to the same "plan variant".
This requirement stands little chance of being met in
actual life. The computational burden of an adequately
expanded system of balances corresponding to each plan
variant is so heavy that by the time calculations are
completed it is already out of date...As technical
difficulties came to be realized, the range of items
covered by the system of "material balances" was cut down
to include only commodities of key importance...Thus the
premise of comprehensiveness has been dropped.
"Material
balances" have become no more than fragmentary estimates.
They have failed to form an integral system." x
Since the system of "material balances" which is at the
core of planning in the countries of Soviet bloc, has
been so often examined and heavily criticized by Western
economists as well as by some of the bloc economists
there is no need to repeat this analysis.

A, Zauberman,
Industrial Progress in Poland.
slovakia and East Germany, p. 5.
XX

Czecho

J. M. Montias, Planning with Material Balances in
Soviet-type Economics. A.E.R. vol. 49> December 1959,'
E. Ames, International Trade without Markets, The
Soviet Bloc, A.E.R. December 1954, E. L, Pryor, The
Comm u n ! at F oreign Trade S y s t e m , pp.

55-57.

and~M7''l^aîcôwTklT~~^agadn^^
nowania wieloletniego
w Polsce Tju.~.dowe.i~~TProblems of Long-terms Planning in
Fëôpîe^’^’pôland) V/arsaw P “.W.G. 1955, p. 35. M. Rakowski
pointed out that the exclusive reliance on "material
balances" in planning foreign trade leads to the
exchange of "surpluses" among socialist countries without
real benefit to any of the trading countries.
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B , , The other very severe shortcoming of central planning
is usually discussed in economic literature under the
heading of "efficiency problem".

The term "efficiency"

is used here to mean three different problems.

First,

there is the operational (functional) efficiency of
foreign trade concerned with the degree of utilization of
"economic calculation" for policy making and establishing
the criteria for estimating the profitability of foreign
trade from the point of view of the economy as a whole.
Efficiency in this meaning will be discussed in Chapter 7.
Secondly, there is the concept of the organizational
efficiency of the foreign trade system, examination of
which belongs rather to the "sphere of business adminis
tration" then to economics.
Thirdly, we can speak about the efficiency of
planning of foreign trade.

It is interesting to note

that the Bloc economists, when discussing the efficiency
of planning, are chiefly concerned with problems which G.
Gpossman calls "visible inefficiency" ie. "obvious waste,
poor quality of products, inertia, hoarding and so
forth - rather than with the "invisible" purely allocative
kind."*
It is quite obvious that a consistent plan does not
necessarily meet the efficiency condition. This means
that by reallocating the available factors more output can
not be achieved in one or more sectors or commodity groups

*

G. Grossman, Introduction to "Value and Plan", p. 10.
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without sacrificing output elsewhere.*
An efficient export plan would mean such a commodity
pattern of exports and an allocation to all markets
available, that would bring maximal revenue in foreign
exchange.
1)

The import plan will be termed efficient when;

given the financial means (in foreign exchange) at
the disposal of foreign trade authority it is alloca
ted to different markets and commodities so as to
maximize total output of imports

2)

the desired commodity composition of imports is
allocated to different markets in such a way that
the cost (in foreign exchange) of its purchase is
minimal.

However, it seems to be obvious that in real life, a
central plan can never be fully efficient if the degree
of efficiency is to be estimated according to the above
criteria.

Construction of an "efficient" plan would

require channeling to the head planners information on
all possible alternative processes for producing thousands
of commodities together with the possibilities of alloca
ting them to all available markets.
all this data.

Planners do not get

Even if they did they would not be able

to handle it as the computational burden of these calcula
tions is too heavy to be met even by the most modern
X

This is essentially Montias* definition of efficiency
who writes "assuming that planner s seek to max imi ze a
bill of net output, a program will be termed efficient
in terms of the information available to the central
planners if no other alternative can be found which
would yield more net output for at least one good with
out reducing the net output of any other good."
J. M. Montias, On the Consistency and Efficiency of
Central Plans, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 29,
October 1962, p. 280.
Also see N. Jasny, A note on Rationally and Efficiency
in Soviet Economy, Soviet Studies. Vol. 12, April, 1961,
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mathematical techniques.

Thus, the resources they have

to allocate cannot be targeted in a way such that they
would reach the surface of the production and trade
possibilities curve in real life.

Operationally more

meaningful would be the assumption that information is
not perfect - that,
, the data at the planners disposal is
necessarily aggregated and incomplete and that the planners
try to make efficient use of the information they get.
Thus, the practical production-possibility frontier
would be determined by scarcities of factors planners have
to allocate efficiently.

At this point another formidable

difficulty arises. In market economies scarcity of fac
tors finds immediate reflection in prices and thus it is
relatively easy to trace them.

Planned economies replaced

the market mechanism by a system of commands and direc
tives, Since economic calculation hardly finds any
application in this system, prices cannot be used as a
reliable indicator of factors scarcities.

The only

scarcity indicator planners can obtain are the surpluses
ana deficits in their material balances.

Thus, the

"vicious circle" closes. Planners, even if aware of the
short comings of the method of physical balancing on
which the system of "material balances" is based have no
way to escape it.
C,

The "import first" method of planning and complete
r e l i a n c e o n p h y s i c à l a l l o c a t i o n by m e a n s of m a t e r i a l
balancing leads to a complete negligence of.profitability
calculation in carrying out foreign trade operations.
determines total exports and imports but is useless in
allocating trade among different markets and individual
trading partners.
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D. The method is entirely static. Given the productive ■
capacities and produced output-mix and having in mind all
the above mentioned shortcomings, it determines a country's
imports and exports but it will not provide an answer to
planners where investments should be directed to develop
industries for export and import replacing purposes.
E.

Besides this, there is a number of 'houtine obstacles"

standing in the way of rational planning and accurate
performance of plans.*
1.

All the planning decisions for the year covered by a

given plan must be made in a relatively short period of
time as the "draft" of the plan has quite a long route
through the administrative ladder before being finally
confirmed. This general "rush" in drawing the planned
goals finds its reflection in very often unrealistic
targets setting and the lack of coordination between
several production and trade goals which later expresses
'itself , -: in several bottlenecks and shortages.
2.

In many instances the plan is not approved till the

end of the first quarter of the planning-year or later.
During this time the enterprises operate without a plan,
rushing to fulfil the planned goals at the end of the
year which causes uneven distribution of export and import
deals across the year with concentration of the majority
of foreign trade deliveries in the last quarter of the
X

See E. L. Pryor,
pp. 60-63.

The Communist Foreign Trade
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plan-year.
3. Separation of production and trade causes many conflicts
of interest between manufacture and foreign trade enter
prises.

In many instances manufacturing firms find export

production very inconvenient and unprofitable.

For them

it is always easier to produce for domestic markets where
the quality requirements are generally lower and the
chances for fulfillment of high production targets much
better.

On the other hand, in spite of the fact that

export production is regarded as being of highest priority,
the manufacturing enterprises seldom find assurance of
obtaining necessary raw materials and other intermediate
goods.
4. The rigidity of the foreign trade operated by a cen
tral plan;

its inability to adjust to the current market

conditions thereby having several bottlenecks and
shortcomings reveal themselves during the performance of
the plan are all responsible for the volume of foreign
trade being considerably below the "potential volume" of
profitable trade. As Pryor estimates in 1955, none of
the Bloc countries realized even 50 percent of their
"potential trade" per capita.*
X
Ibid, p. 27, table 1-2.
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FOREIGN CURRENCY STATE MONOPOLY
Poland’s monetary system was defined by the decree

issued on October 28, 1950,*
According to its provisions, Polish "zloty
became the official unit of currency; the gold content
of the zloty was set at 0.222168 grams and the rate of
exchange at 4 zlotys per 1 U.S. dollar.

Although defined

in terms of gold, the Polish zloty remains an internal
currency only and cannot be converted into gold or
foreign exchange at rates equivalent to its declared gold
parity. Because the function of/the■zloty as the 'official
currency has been limited to the domestic market;

the

state exercises full control over foreign currency holdings
of the country** through its exclusive right to buy and
sell such currency, and .all Vinternatiônal .brade is: .expreshed
in foreign currency and effected through authorized banks.
This regulation concerns the transactions carried out by
state-owned or controlled units of the economy.

The basic

rationale of this policy was to secure planned utiliza
tion of foreign currency holdings and effective fulfill
ment of the foreign trade plan.

Within that plan, the

very specific role in a Soviet-type economy is played by
the rate of exchange.

In a market economy

'■

/ ' ■

%
J. Malicki, Reforma systemu pienieznego (Reform of the
Monetary System) Gospodarka Planowa. November, 1950.
XX

Z. Kamecki, J. Soldaczuk, W, Sierpinski, on. cit.
pp. 149-151.
69

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70

the rate of exchange has a decisive impact on the price
structure and the level of foreign trade activity. As
a direct result of the existence of the state monopoly
of foreign exchange, and ;the .èntirely binterndl-character" of
Polish currency, the rate of exchange cannot he used as
a device regulating country's trade with abroad. In
practice, Poland has a number of different rates of ex
change.

All of these have three characteristic .features ;

a)

they are established in an arbitrary way by the state

b)
c)

they are rigid
they are used for the purposes of internal calcula

tions and accounting between state owned or controlled
units of the economy.
The rates of exchange are the main device used to finance,
control, and estimate the performance of foreign trade,
enterprises, among which we can distinguish an official
"gold rate" established at the level of U.S. $1 = 4 zlotys
(at its par value), an official "trade rate" used for
financing foreign trade and established at the level
U.S. $1 = 23.94 zlotys and a whole group of foreign
exchange coefficients.
Because the official "gold rate" was established
in a completely arbitrary way, it is unmeaningful
from the economic point of view and is used only for preparing
foreign trade statistics.

These are usually expressed in
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so-called "exchange zlotys" where four exchange zlotys
are valued at one U.S. dollar.
The trade rate is used to finance foreign trade
enterprises and its functions will be examined in the
next part of this chapter.
The group of foreign exchange coefficients or socalled "coefficients of effectiveness of foreign trade"
are without doubt the most interesting and economically
meaningful.

It is also however, most recent development

and not always formally accepted.

Before proceeding we

should probably examine the monetary system and rates of
exchange in order to determine both the reason why these
rates are rigid and established in the arbitrary way, and
also the role they are supposed to play in the economy.
Unfortunately, economic literature of the Soviet Bloc
countries is virtually silent on these points. Further
more, there is no indication that the problems of the
rates of exchange and their role in a "socialist economy"
have even been touched by economic theoreticians. The
policy makers while fixing the gold content of Polish
zloty did not make the slightest effort to explain why
it has been established at this particular level.

It was

certainly not the purchasing power of Polish zloty which
served as a base for determining its gold parity because
the latter was established at unrealistically high levels.
It seems more probable that Polish policy makers simply
"borrowed" the gold content for domestic currency from
X

For more detailed elaboration see Chanter 6,
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their Soviet neighbours as the gold parity of Soviet
roubel in 1950 was also set at 0.222168 grams of pure
gold,*

Even if this rate was economically justified for

the Soviet Economy (which is also very dubious) it does
not mean that this rate would fit to the entirely
different structure of Polish economy.
Several writers argue that the rate of exchange is
of no importance in a Soviet-type economy and therefore
the whole problem does not deserve any attention.
Roughly speaking, they explain that there is no direct
connection between the international and domestic economic
activities in a Soviet-type economy.
Economic life in the country is regulated by an
overall plan and hence monetary flows are not permitted
to influence the allocation of resources or employment to
any significant degree.

Simultaneously, the internal

character of the currency and stability of prices in the
domestic markets serve as a built-in stabilizer to pro
tect the domestic economy from any external disturbances,
Soviet experts also claim that the government has full
control over foreign currency holdings which ensures that
all payments are effected in conformity with the require
ments of the foreign trade plan.

It is the plan and not

the mechanism of the market which determines the volume
and structure of foreign trade.

Because of this, the

non-market nature of the trade rate of exchange is of no
X

Ï. Aizenberg, Exchange Rates and the ^rice Level in
the Socialist Economy, Problems of Economics, November
1962

.
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importance.
In early. 1950‘s E. Ames argued that in fact, there is
a link between foreign and domestic activities in a Soviet
type economy and that the rate of exchange can have quite
an important influence on the stability of the monetary
system.

In his opinion, the relation runs from the

amount of trade inbalance (which depends on the level of
the rate of exchange) to the size of the necessary money
supply.

He explains that the rate of exchange determines

the amount of trade inbalance v/hich must be financed
either by the Treasury or the Central bank, and therefore
it affects the money supply (of the economy).
A number of writers found this explanation unsatis
factory,** They pointed out that the effect which E,
Ames describes is of very limited practical importance
because it can easily be offset by appropriate monetary
policy.

The logic of this argument seems to be confirmed

by the experience of Soviet-type economies. Trade in -ba
lance and budgetary financing not only occur, but
chronically persist, however they do not influence
monetary stability or domestic prices to any substantial
degree.

However, this is not a sufficient proof to state

that the rate of exchange does not play any role in
Soviet-type economy and can be disregarded by economists.
X

E . Ames, The Exchange Rate in Soviet-type Economies.
Review of Economics and Statistics, May, 1953.
XX

R. Bird, The Possibility of Fiscal Harmonization in the
Communist Bloc. Public Finance Vol. 19, 1964.
P. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, op. cit,
pp. 267-270.
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The exchange still remains as the basic element in
calculating the profitability of trade.

Recent research

work in the field of effectiveness of foreign trade
clearly indicates that an economically meaningful rate
of exchange is absolutely indispensable for this purpose.
DOMESTIC FINANCING OF FOREIGN TRADE
Financing foreign trade in a "socialist economy" has
specific features which are entirely different from those
characterizing foreign trade in Western countries.

In

particular, the foreign and domestic aspects of financing
overseas trade are completely separated.

This is a

consequence of:
1)

the existence of a state monopoly over foreign trade
and the fact that production and trade are separated;

2)

the existence of the state monopoly over foreign currency

3)

on-account— of the centrally planned nature of the
economy.

The provisions of the export plan determine amounts of
foreign currency which each FTE has to obtain from its
exports.

Payments received for goods sold abroad are

accumulated in special accounts in the "Bank Handlowy w
Warszawie S. A," (Commercial Bank). However, they do not
belong to the enterprise which earned them. The state
is the rightful owner of these accounts, and uses them
to pay for imports. Imports are established in accordance
with the provisions of an import plan and each FT E receives
the required amounts of foreign currency to pay for
required imports. Nevertheless, FTE's enjoy some econo
mic independence in that they may buy goods designated
for exports,from domestic producing enterprises.

Under
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these circumstances there must be some mechanism enabling
them to clear their accounts and secure financial equi
librium. .Foreign Trade Enterprises use data on the rate
of exchange (official trade rate), the level of domestic
prices and the level of foreign trade prices which makes
financing in their domestic sphere of activity very simple
and to some extent primitive.
Financial calculations in export
1 . Domestic price of the exported
, commodity (in current zlotys)

zl.

112

2.

zl,

8

3.
4.
5.

Planned profit of PTE
Total Cost

z T n W ”

Export price of the commodity
FOB = $3 X 24 (trade rate) =

zl.

Budget difference (negative)
Totalrevenue

zl.
48
zl. 120

72

Total costs to the enterprise in this case are zl, 120
(including planned profit) while the dollar price of the
commodity translated into zlotys at the official trade
rate is only 72. The loss to the enterprise on this
transaction amounts to zl 48 and is covered by the Budget
of the State.

This is the so-called negative budget

difference,
FINANCIAL CALCULATION IN IMPORTS
1.
2.
3.

Import price paid by FTE
(cif 87 X 24 (trade rate)
Planned profit of FTE

=

Total Cost

"
zl, 168
:zl. 12
zTT T8Ü~

4.

Domestic price of the commodity

zl. 350

5.

Budget difference (positive)

zl. 170
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The profit made on this transaction or so-called positive
budget difference amounts to zl. 170.

It is a result of

the difference between the selling price of the commodity
in the domestic market and the total costs of this
commodity (import price of the commodity translated into
zlotys at the official trade rate plus planned profit of
PTE).

The positive budget difference cannot be retained

by the enterprise and it is transferred to the state.
There are several other points that should be observed
about these trade calculations:
Profits made by the PTE are secured automatically.

The

rate of these profits is established by the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and profits are directly calculated into the
costs of operation of the enterprise.

Thus, these profits

cannot be regarded as a significant measure of economic
effects generated by the activity of the enterprise in
question. The balance between negative budget differences
paid to PTE’s and positive budget differences received
from PTE is passed to the state budget.

As has already

been mentioned, the rate of exchange is not used as; a
device for regulating the country’s foreign trade.
However, the level at v/hich this rate is established is
important. The exchange rate directly determines the
value of balances on the account of budget differences.
V/lien the trade rate is established at a relatively high
level, positive budget differences occur for almost all
imports (import price expressed in domestic currency is
lower than the domestic price of the commodity) while on
the other hand, almost all export transactions bring
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negative budget differences (domestic price higher than
export price).
To sum up, if we hold domestic prices as given, the
higher the rate of exchange, the higher are the budget
differences (positive and negative).

The fact that there

are positive budget differences in imports and negative
differences in exports at the existing trade rate does
not, of course,mean that all imports are profitable and
all exports unprofitable.

Any change of the trade rate

would change the whole picture entirely. At the same time
the method offers no chance to evaluate the activity of
foreign trade enterprises in any meaningful way. For
example, if an enterprise pays an unreasonably high price
for imported commodities, and the rate of exchange is
high, it will not be reflected on the account of budget
differences to any significant degree.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DOMESTIC PRICE SETTING PROBLEM- ^ ;
In the economic'literature of the Bloc there has been
a great deal of discussion on the role which prices play
in a centrally planned economy.*
Without making an attempt to review this animated
debate, a few remarks should be made on the role which
socialist prices do not play in the economy.
Under the system of physical targeting of planned
goals and material balancing, prices ceased to be an
autonomous force determining production, resource allo
cation and consumption. Prices were not abandoned com
pletely, as.even in the condition of physical allocation,
some weights are necessary to combine the yearly produc
tion of different commodities.

Thus, prices began to

serve as a common measure allowing addition of potatoes
to tractors and so on. For this purpose, it is convenient.
to have prices which are stable over a long period of time.
s.

_

■

It seems obvious that these accounting prices that plan
ners attach to targeted outputs are by no means accurate

X

■

For a review of the Polish discussion see, o> Lisikiewioz,
Konferencja poswiecona teorii cen w gospodarce socialistycznej Ekonomlsta, No. 3, 1958. The summary or
these discussions is also prescribed by J. M. Montias
"Central Planning in Poland, The problem is also discu
ssed by M. Bernstein, The Soviet Price System, AER vol.
52, March, 1962.
A. Zauberman, The Soviet Debate on the Law of Value and
Price Formation in Value and Plan.
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measures of opportunity costs, and cannot.secure efficiency in the allocation of resources.
From 1949 to 1955
the State Price Commission in Poland made use of two
different pricing methods.*

A system of fixed prices

was applied to all producer's goods and raw materials
used in the socialized sectors of the economy.

They

were mainly derived from current 1937-1938 prices with
some consideration given to the industry's average cost
of production at the time the prices were put into effect.
With the passage of time, supply and demand conditions
in several industries changed significantly. Fixed
prices could not make any allowance for these changes,
and soon it became necessary to introduce a system of
subsidies in order to compensate for losses arising
from a generally higher level of production costs as
compared to the selling price of the products.

For

years, subsidizing was a common practice in many branches
of the econonjÿ, especially in industries such as mining,
which faced decreasing returns. The effect of these
policies was widespread waste and uneconomic use of
resources (especially raw materials and semi-fabricates)
which were very cheap, even though their supply was per
sistently falling short of the increased demand resulting
X

. M. Montias, Price-setting Problems in the Polish
Economy.
De c e m b e r ,

J o u r nal of P o l i t i c a l E c o n o m y , Vol. 65,
T937..
;
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from high rates of economic growth.*
Underpricing in the socialized sectors was compen
sated by the high level of prices for consumer goods.
Because of the low priority which this sector received
in the hierarchy of pr e fe re nc es ..of ..planners who jyere .con-

,.

cerned mainly with the rapid expansion of the capital
goods sector, the consumer's demand surpassed by wide
margins the available supply. A high level of retail
prices for these goods was established to bring supply
and demand into equilibrium, while the gap between prices
and much lower production costs was absorbed by turnover
taxes. These taxes provided a major part of the financial
means designated for investments.

In 1955 a wide debate

on the role of prices in the socialist economy, and on
the methods of setting prices started in the Polish econo
mic press. As Compared with the discussion on prices
which took place in almost all of the Bloc countries at
this time, Polish price debate seems to deserve special
attention.
It was less futile than other Bloc discussions
and did not limit itself to the issues on the scope and
forms in which "law of value" still operates in a socia
list economy.

On several points the break away from the tradi-

X
Z, Kamecki, J. Soldaczuk, W. Sierpinski, op. cit.,
p. 202.
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tional orthodoxy was really amazing.
Several schools
of thought have arisen, each expressing different points
of view. The "revisionists" recommended marginal cost
pricing and market mechanism as a device to bring about
the allocation of resources in conformity with consumers
demand.

They believed in consumers sovereignty unhampe

red by administrative controls and wished the top plann
ing authority to control the economy through an indirect
XX

For example according to Marxian doctrine no other ,
factor except labor is entitled to a functional remune
ration, If non labor income exists under socialism
it is only due to the specific social relations making
it possible. On those grounds, traditional orthodoxy
maintained that interest on capital is to have no
important place in the cost structure of a socialist
economy.
At this point A. Zauberman refers to Prof. Oscar Lange’s
statement which^;"pointed but that, the ,price, formula
implied therein may correspond to a useful moaern
solution if it were assumed that capital accumulation
has been carried on as far as to reduce marginal net
productivity of capital to zero as a socialist society
would tend to do.”
Thus, A. Zauberman remarks "the distance which separa
tes the mirage of a zero marginal productivity of
capital from the real economic environment of the
Soviet Bloc countries - measures the inadequacy of
Marxist classics" concept of price, as a particular
principle for the planner, who despite that distance,
has to refrain from any explicit profit and interest
charge, A. Zauberman, "The Soviet Debate on the Law
of Value and P r i c e F o r m a t i o n "In V a l ue a nd Flan, p. 21,
Polish economists working on probTems o f t h e effective
ness of investment include the remuneration for capital
in their formulas of the coefficient of effectiveness
of investment. See; M. Rakov/ski, ed. Efektywnosc inwestycji, Warsaw, 1962. K. Laski, Efektywnosc inwestycji w gospodarce socjalistycznej, (Effectiveness of
Investments.in a Socialist Economy) in "Polityka
Gospodarcza, Polski Ludowej, part I.
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monetary and fiscal policy.*

The "conservative" group

lead by Stalinist economist B. Mine, vociferously suppor
ted Soviet-type administrative planning.
A months-long fierce battle between revisionists and
conservatives and all the intermediary groups cooled down
in June 1957 when the Economic Council, an advisory body
of the Polish Council of Ministers;
finally formulated
and published the principal proposals for the price reform.
The thesis were less radical in character than were many of
the voices in discussion.

They expressed the compromise

between the opposing groups and postulated the prices in
the manufacturing sector to oscillate around the socalled "prices of departure". The latter were defined
as AVC of the relevant group of the "highest cost" enter
prises in each industry, and a proportional profit was
designated to cover the desired accumulation.

These

"prices of departure" were in turn to be adjusted by
adding a positive or negative mark-up in order to secure

The "revisionist" point of view in the discussion was
most explicitly expressed by S. Kurowski "Model a cela
gospodarki narodowej" Model and ends of the National
Economy,
Zycie Gospodarcze, No. 7, 1957.
Also W, BrUsl [TroTi prawa wartosci w gospodarce socjalistycznej.
(On the role of the Law of Value in a
Socialist Economy) Ekonomista , No. 5, 1956.
W. Brus, Uwagi o proïïTëmïe racnunku marginalnego w gospo
darce socjalistycznej (Remarks on the role of marginal
calculus in a Socialist
XX

Economy),

E k o n o m i s t a , No.

3,' 19 58 .

For a defence along Marxian lines see article by B. Mine
in Gospodarka Planowa, No. 8, 1958 also his "Zarys teorii
kosztow produkcji i cen, Warsaw, 1958.
Tezy rady ekonomicznej w sprawie ksztaltowania sie cen
(The thesis of the Economic Council on principle of price
formation) in "Snoroceny" (The price controversy) Warsaw,
Kiw. 1958, pp. g^2F:
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equilibrium between supply and demand in the market.
Prices derived in this way were intended to serve as ba
sic indicators for current economic decisions but not
for investment decisions.

The reforms which followed

discussion were even less radical and of rather limited
importance. In 1956, fixed prices were abolished and
replaced by the so-called "transfer prices", established
on the base of current average costs of production.
They were to serve for the^ purpose of planning and were
to remain unchanged till I960.

As,at the same time, most

of the previous subsidies v/ere erased, the discrepancy
between current and transfer prices in effect widened
instead of closing.
Certain improvements were made in
the pricing of raw materials and semi fabricates.
Sub
sequent increases of prices of key raw materials, fuels and
semi fabricates significantly narrowed the differential
between prices and cost of production in these sectors.
The other important feature of these reforms was the ann
ouncement of the policy of linking the price structure
of these products with the prices prevailing in the world
market as advocated by Kalecki and others.* In general,
all these reforms beside removing some of the most strii

king irrationalities in price and costs relations left
the distorted price structure unchanged.
II

PRICING IN FOREIGN TRADE
Setting prices in for eig n trade seems to be a n even

X

M. Kalecki, 0 cenach' sunowcow podstaw.owycm (On prices of
basic raw materials), Ekonomosta No, 3, 1958, U. Kachariasz. 0 wlasciwa polityEa cen surowcow, (For a correct
Policy of naw-katerials Prices ; j'inance, I;o. 6, 1956.
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more troublesome problem for both Bloc theoreticians
and foreign trade practitioners than setting prices, for
domestic markets.

Bloc economic literature on this

problem usually emphasizes the existence of two separate
systems of prices : one applicable in trade v/ith nonBloc countries or the "capitalistic world" and the other
for intra-bloc trade.

The distinction is being made in

conformity with Stalin's famous proclamation of the exis
tence of two world markets,*

Ideological or theoretical

justification of this situation is usually vague and full
of holes.**
X

It is peculiar that even the very question why Bloc
countries use the "capitalist prices" in their trade,
something which stands in open disagreement with the
two separate world markets proposal, is completely
avoided.
The answer seems to be simple: world market
prices are used because, in spite of all efforts. Bloc
countries have failed to establish their own price
base - but Bloc literature does not want to admit this
"obvious truth".
XX
In 1952 Stalin wrote "the disintegration of the single
all embracing world market must be regarded as the
most important sequel of the Second World War and its
economic cnsequences..........the economic consequen
ces of the existence of two opposite camps was that
.........now we have two parallel world markets
also confronting one another."
fr. Stalin. Emblems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.
New York, Int^li^^tfomr'BÜbïi^
After 1956 several Bloc economist questioned the
validity

of this pr o p o s a l .
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In the trade with non-Bloc countries "capitalistic
world market prices" are used, simply because market econo
mics would not accept any others but world market prices.
Thus, equality of price levels is the first and underlying
condition of trade relations with the Western world.
There are several other additional reasons. In their
trade with the ,Western v/orld, rBloc countries have' little j if
any influence on world prices.
is rather small:

Their share in world trade

it amounts roughly to about 10 per cent

of international trade^ In any commodity group the
quantities traded are not large enough to affect prices on
the world market.

By the very nature of the commodities

exchanged (mainly raw materials and foodstuffs), the
position of Bloc importers and exporters much closer appro
ximates the competitive "price taker" than the monopo
listic or digopolistic "price dictator".

Besides this,

there are other factors working to deteriorate the
bargaining position. The goods offered by Bloc countries
are usually below world quality standards and thus are
not easy to sell. At the same time, the ambitious indus
trialization programs undertaken by all bloc countries
require sizeable dimensions of imports to implement these
programs.

In many cases, this demand has to be directed

to the world market,//regardless of the strained situation
in a country's balance of payments.

All these factors

X

Only lower than world market prices would be accepta
ble by "capitalistic world" but obviously Bloc countries
would not be willing to take "less" if they can get
"more".
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have significantly limited their ability to influence
import and export prices v/hich have to be adjusted to the
level prevailing in the world market.
As far as intra-bloc trade is concerned, efforts are
being made to avoid the employment of world prices and to
elaborate their own system of prices.

There is much

literature on the problem of finding adequate principles
for intra-bloc price-setting since different schools of
thought present various and, in many instances,, contrasting
arguments and proposals.
Economists of the "old orthodox school of thought" are
deeply dissatisfied with the use of "world market prices"
for intra-bloc trade, regarding them as highly unsuitable
for a socialist economy.* "Capitalist market prices" are
rejected by them on ideological grounds as not "equivalent"
and distorted by "irrational capitalistic disturbances"
(of monopolistic, cyclical or speculative character).
Secondly, there are some practical considerations which
.make "capitalist market prices" very inconvenient for
planners.

The frequent changes of world prices increase

the degree of uncertainty in foreign trade planning and
X

XX

Most distinctive representative of this group is Russian
economist K. Ostrovitianov.
There was a great deal of discussion in Bloc literature
on "equivalent prices" but the very term of "equiva
lence" has never been neatly defined and comes to have
several meanings as used by different authors. Most
often it is understood that two commodities in two
different countries are exchanged at equivalent prices
when they contain equal amounts of domestic labor-hours
For extensive discussion on theoretical problems of
"equivalent trade" see P. Pryo2'. Communist Foreign
Trade Theory, Soviet Studies, July, 1962.
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a plan's performance, and complicates the planning process
itself.

Taking into consideration all the efforts of

Bloc policy makers taken in order to protect their domestic economics from any external disturbances, this
m-" T n n 1: r
r> t
; n <^m ^
argument seems to be very important
to
them.'

The "new orthodox school" which emerged more recently
focuses its arguments on a different set of considerations. X X
They seem to avoid questions on equivalent trade and place
less stress on undesirable (harmful) distortion of world
market prices. In their opinion, demand and supply
relations in the Bloc are quite different from those'.in
the Western world.

Many Bloc goods are relatively high-

cost products as, compared with the production cost struc
ture outside the bloc.

In the raw materials sector, there

is a long-run trend for demand to fall short of available
supply, which is reflected by a steady decline
for raw materials on the world market.

of prices

In contrast to

this situation there is a persistent shortage in the wholeBloc of many vitally needed raw materials. As the result
of autarchic policies and a rather limited or undiversi
fied natural resource supply in all Bloc countries (with
the only exception of the U.S.S.R.), domestic demand for
raw materials was increasing much faster than domestic
production, causing severe deficits for a number of key
raw materials.

*

Z. Kamecki,

This situation encouraged many otherwise

o. Soldaczuk, W. Sierpinski'..,^ op. cit., p. 205.

XX

As expressed by Prof. 0. Lange "domestic prices are
effectively insulated from external influences to pro
tect the economy from "capitalist fluctuations and
crisis.
0. Lange. Essays on Economic Planning (Calcutta, I960)
p. 11.
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uneconomical investment projects in the raw material
sectors, and raised the average production costs in these
industries significantly above the world market prices.^
The principle of comparative advantage would suggest that
in such a situation it would be more profitable for the
Bloc countries to import cheaper '’western raw materials"
than to develop their own more costly ones.

There are,

however^ several reasons why this proposal is unacceptable
to the Bloc countries.

First of all, there are political

considerations.and the desire of the bloc governments to
be economically independent of the advanced West.

Western

strategic embargo is usually quoted in support of this a r g u m e n t . S e c o n d l y , deficits in the balances of payments
would not permit them to increase imports of raw materials
and other commodities from outside the Bloc to the level
corresponding to their demand.

X

It is also interesting to note that the U.S.S.R.'s
exports include a very large proportion of raw materials.
While the U.S.S.R'
imports - a large proportion of
manufactured goods. The present bloc's problem of
prices results, therefore,in favourable terms of trade
for the Soviet Union.
XX

Political tensions and hostility still do exist in more
or less pronounced form, therefore another embargo can
be viewed as a possible danger to Bloc countries. How
ever, the Soviet blocade of Yugoslavia, and later of
Albania would suggest that the blocade by a bloc
nation is also a visible possibility.
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Thirdly, there is an "infant industries" argument favo
ring the development of new industries, despite the high
initial production costs, which are to be offset by future
benefits when these industries "grow up" and reach their
maturity.
In addition, some authors stress the relative
scarcity of capital in the bloc as compared with the abundancy of capital in advanced Western countries. The use
of "capitalistic prices" reflecting their factor endownrnent would discourage capital intensive, long maturing
investments, which because of the capital sdarcity,should
have very high returns.^
The other commodity group for which demand and supply
relations are entirely different in the Bloc are food
stuffs. As a rule, income elasticity of demand for food
stuffs is relatively low at high levels of income but it
it may be very high at low levels of income. As a
consequence the demand for foodstuffs in the advanced
West usually falls below the availabilities of supply
and^in effect, there is a long-run tendency for the prices
of these goods to decline.

In contrast, the Bloc countries

are still in the low income group and their elasticity of
of,demand for foodstuffs is relatively high. The Bloc
X

It has never been explained how this proposal can be
brought into agreement with the Marxian labour theory
of.value where scarcity of capital and high returns
for these p r o du ct io n factors are negligible.
Besides
this it is not clear to what extent the high or low
capital output ratio enter planners' calculations and
influence their investment decisions.
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countries experience a continuous demand pressure on
the market.
Low "capitalist market prices" would not
induce production and intra-hloc trade in this commodi
ty group.

These schools of thought advocate establish

ment of completely separate price systemsfor intra-bloc
trade.

It is worth mentioning, that.in spite of the fact

that many bloc economists are unhappy about the use

■

of "capitalist world market prices" in Bloc trade and
express a strong belief that sooner or later their own

system of prices will be elaborated, no tenable proposal
in this respect has been suggested.
In general, it has
been agreed that intra-bloc foreign trade price setting
should be based on production costs in the Bloc,
However, the next question, as to how these costs of

production should be measured, brings a variety of
proposals, but,in fact.no answer.

Shaynin's idea of

basing prices on a labor-hour of production and his
complicated system of averaging the different amounts of

labor embodied in the commodities produced in various
countries, in order to derive one common price for the
whole Bloc,is interesting, but certainly unworkable in

practice?^ Dismissing labor-hour of production as a device
to measure the value of the commodity, there are only
the domestic price structures in each Bloc country left

X
Bela Csikos - Nagy. Stworzenie wlasnej bazy can na
swiatowym nynku socjalistycznym (Elaboration of the
separate price-base for a socialist world market),
Gospodarka p l a n o w a , No. 11, 1962,
B.

Shaynin, Proportions of exchange, Economic Journal

LXX December, 1960^ pp. 769-783.
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to be compared.

Taking into consideration the distortion

of domestic price systems and arbitrary rates of exchange,
it is hard to believe that any solution to this problem
can ever be found along these lines.
On the other extreme in this debate, is a group of
economists who believe that intra-bloc prices should
approximate as closely as possible the prices in the
world market."" They argue that the disparities between
intra-bloc and world market prices would create unequal
exchange conditions and favor price discrimination.

For

example, if the intra-bloc price for a certain commodity
is continuously kept above the world market price,
certainly Bloc importers would prefer to make their
purchases on the world market.

On the other hand, in

the case where the intra-bloc price is set below world

market level, Bloc, exporters would not be willing to
sell their goods to "socialist buyers" when the sale on
world market is obviously more advantageous.

Secondly,

the "Socialist world market" is a somewhat misleading

expression. In the situation where bilateral trade
agreements are being concluded in relatively short
periods of time by organizations of foreign trade mon o
poly in each country, and supply-demand considerations
have only limited influence on policy-makers' decisions,

there is really no market in the traditional meaning
X
See P. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System,
p . loo.
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of this word.

This argument speaks in favor of the use

of world market prices.

Thirdly, they point out that

the discussion on a separate "socialist price system"
is still in the initial phase, and that there is no
indication that it can be elaborated in the near
future.

Where the market mechanism is absent, the

reliability of costs and prices, and economically mean
ingful rates of exchange are indispensable for any
economic calculation.

The domestic price-setting problem

has not been solved yet and the rates of exchange are
not even subject to discussion.

In this situation

world prices are,perhaps.not ideal but still the only
possible solution.

It should be noted that most of the

adherents to this point of view do not advocate direct

transplantation of "capitalist world prices" to "socialist ground".

What they usually have in mind, are adjus-

ted world prices which are "purified of elements of

irrational capitalistic disturbances" (inflationary,
cyclical, speculative... etc) and kept unchanged for a
certain period of time.
This is basically the idea of
"stop-prices"^ which have been used in intra-bloc pricing
practices. This approach to the problem of pricing
has many weaknesses and its adversaries were quick to
detect them.
A.
The major objection has been raised against the
notion of the "world market prices".

In the post-war

X

Stop-prices are the prices derived from average world
market' prices of a given year and kept frozen for a
conventionally agreed period of time.
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world they argued - free flow of goods and money has been
seriously limited by governments of several countries
by all kind of restrictions;

ie.

import quotas, foreign

exchange regulations, custom unions, economic and mone
tary blocs, foreign exchange agreements...etc.

Under the

above circumstances there are many markets and no such a
thing as one world market price.
It was then suggested that "world market price"
refers to the price of the chief market.

However, it is

still open to discussion what criteria should be used for
the choice of "chief world market".

Besides this, the

notion of the price of "chief world market" is meaningful

only with respect to a group of staple commodities which
are almost homogeneous and standardized (raw materials,
agricultural products).

Machinery and other differentiated

products certainly do not fall into this category.

On

the other hand the share of this group in the internation

al market is significant and constantly increasing.
B.
It has been stressed that prices of the world market
.should be purified by climimation of irrational capitalis
tic disturbances which cause the distortion of world
market prices.

What are the principles of this purifica

tion and how should it be done?
C.

It has never been agreed as to what is the proper time

span for the "stop-prices" to be kept unchanged.

In

addition there is still a problem over how long the
world prices should be averaged to serve as a base

for deriving a stop-price?

Undoubtedly, there are many

other objections which can be raised against this proposal.
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The problem can be attacked on ideological, theoretical,
or practical grounds.

Without going too far into the

details of this debate there is still one question which
has been raised by the critics of the stop-price system.
The question deserves special attention simply because it
really invalidates the whole idea of stop prices.

There

is no need to repeat that many bloc theoreticians are
not satisfied with the use of "stop prices", as this
confession appears in a whole series of writings on the

subject.

Secondly, as a rule they stress that "stop
prices are used as a temporary solution only until the
Bloc's own basis for prices is elaborated.

But what is

their merit over the use of current world market prices?

The old argument that they are purified of the "undesirable
capitalistic disturbances" looses its grounds because
the criteria for this purification is at least questiona
ble, if not non-existent.

Thus, the "stop-prices" retain

all the shortcomings of world market prices.

they have additional major weakness.

Besides this,

Being frozen over

a longer period of time, they deviate from the current
level of world prices and thus cease to reflect actual
exchange conditions on the world market.

They also do

not reflect cost structure within the Bloc.

Between

these two extremes there is a broad group of contributors,
or rather several groups as their viewpoints differ
X

See St. Polaczek, Odrebny uklhd
cen w handlu zagranicznym dla krajow socjalistycznych. (A Separate
Price System in Foreign Trade for a Socialist Country).
Ekonoinista, Wo. 1, I960, p. 26.
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considerably on several questions.

Their common feature

is that they try to compromise both opposed groups and
build their proposals on valid contributions of both
schools of thought.

What they postulate is some kind of

mechanism which would more or less directly link domestic
price System with the world market prices.
Distinctive in this group seems to be M. Kalecki's
contribution.^

He advocated that domestic prices of

raw materials should be based on prices prevailing in

the world market..

This proposal was strongly supported

by several other Polish economists and was discussed at
the ninth Plenum of CEMA (June, 1958).^^ A. Znuberman's
comment. on M. K a l e c k i ’s proposal was that "this is seen
as the first short-cut to r a t i o n a l i t y " . It seems that
this proposal plus Prof. K a l e c k i ’s authority paved the
way to several price regulations which were introduced in
Poland in the :late ighO'ey: :It .is interesting to note .that
on the other hand, in the famous debate on price formation

Prof. Kalecki was quite explicit in his rejection of
the "automatism of prices" in the domestic market.

X
M. Kalecki, 0 cenach surowcow podstawowych.

(On prices
of basic raw materials), E ko no m i s t a , No. 3, 1958.

^

The ninth plenum of CEklA made recommendations to use
the average world market prices as basis for the 1958
intra-bloc prices.
Taking into consideration that
du r in g the period 1951-1957 otop-prices based on 19491950 average world prices were binding it was a real

progress.
^^^A. .Zhuberman, The Soviet Debate on the Law of Value and
Price Formation, p. 33.
IV

M. Kalecki, Rady Robotnicze a centralne planowanie.
(Worker’s Councils and Central Planning) Howe Drohi, No.
12, 1956, pp. 41-42.
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Another original proposal v/as formulated by St, Polaczek,^

Rejecting the complete isolation of domestic and foreign
trade prices, he postulated indirect interdependence
between domestic and world market prices.

In his model,

the domestic price for goods entering foreign trade is
composed of two elements:
a)

a domestic equivalent of world market price (it is

derived by multiplying foreign price by the actual rate
of exchange)
b)

a positive or negative mark-up (custom duty paid or
premium received)

Duty paid or premium received would serve as the instru
ment of distribution of national income in conformity with
the preferences of the state.
world market price W a s

Domestic equivalent of

supposed to guide traders and

producers and encourage their activities into the most
profitable directions.

The rate of exchange, or rather

the whole set of differentiated

(according to commodity

and geographical criterion) rates of exchange as well as

the amount of mark-up were to be established by the
state.

.

The advantages claimed for this model are:
between foreign and domestic prices is retained

the link
( element A)

and at the same time the protection against any undesirable

external disturbances which would affect domestic economy
is. secured ( element B).
It seems that the model has at
X

Polaczek,

op. cit.
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least one basic shortcoming.

The rate of exchange or a

set of rates of exchange is designated here to play a
very important role as it is the main factor determining
the amount of the "domestic" price equivalent.
It calls
therefore, for economically meaningful rates of exchange.
With the rates of exchange which are used now the model
has no more validity than the very heavily criticized
system of positive and negative budget differences.

In the light of the theoretical discussion on prin
ciples of intra-bloc price-setting it seems obvious that
they have failed to furnish the Bloc policy makers with
any satisfactory prescription for solving their pricesetting problem.^

However, the post-war intra-bloc

trade was growing at rapid rates and the flow of commodi

ties had to be priced.

Actual pricing practices in the

Bloc seem to indicate the utilization of several more or
less formal or informal criteria;

the demarcation line

between them being extremely blurred and difficult to
make.

As P. Pryor remarked "the price setting in foreign

trade between the European communist nations is a boiling
X

To interpret this as a symptom of their inability to
deal with economic problems of "real life" would be
an un fa ir judgment.

It should be realized that

their freedom of creative thinking is rigidly restric- •
ted by ruling ideology and fundamental Marxism,
These
are the safety lines they are not supposed to pass.
The ideological thaw which followed the Polish "October"
1 9 5 6 certainly loosened these ties and this seems to
explain why Polish contribution to the Bloc price
discussion can be regarded as most orominent.
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stew of propaganda, ideology, economic forces and selfd e lu s i o n /

Formal pricing criteria are usually included into
bilateral trade agreements and thus are rather easy to
disentangle.

During the period of 1945-1950, the intra-

bloc prices were based on current world market prices
(at the time trade agreement had

been negotiated).

These prices were kept unchanged during the whole period
covered by the trade agreement in question, irrespective
of the movements of prices on the world market which
occured in the meantime.
In the early 1950's as a result of the Korean War,
world prices for several commodities and especially the
so called "strategic raw materials" went up very rapidly,
Regarding that world market prices had become distorted

and were deviating from the "real value of the commodities", (because of elements of cyclical and speculative
character) the Bloc countries decided to eliminate these
"irrational disturbances" from their prices.
F. Pryor,
XX

The Communist Foreign Trade System, p. 131.

As declared by Zoltarey in 1951 "...in mutual trade
among all socialist states prices are fixed on the basis
of world prices...(they) are stable and adjustment (of
world market prices) excludes the factor of temporary
price changes which are connected with speculative
machinations of capitalist monopolies, the military-

inflationist business cycle and so on...
V. Zoltarev, 'Trade Relations of the USSR with socialist
countries.
Vneshniaia Jorgovlia, Nov. 1957, quoted by
/. Wszelaki,njoTïEunist Economic Stra t eg y : The Role of
East Central Europe, Washington, D . ITT, National
FTânnTng Association, 1959, p. 631.
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From 1951 the average world market prices of 19491950 were being used in intra-bloc trade.
These socalled "stop-prices" were retained for the period 19511957.
As the discrepancy between current world market
prices and "stop-prices" widened,especially in the
instances where the "stop-prices" were considerably below
world market prices, several countries began to complain
that they were discriminated.against. Many Writers began to
question openly the wisdom of these practices while demanding
a price revision.^
In effect, the 1958 trade agreements specified that
average world market prices of 1957 were to be employed
in 1958 for intra-bloc trade. The 1957 prices were also
retained for the 1959 agreements.
However, the supporters
of "stop-prices" began to stress again the dangers of
transmission of "capitalistic disturbances" on "socialist
economies" through prices.

Their position was evidently

strong enough, as they persuaded the return to "stopprices" which this time were based on 1957 world prices.
As the "stop-prices" had many opponents, something had'
to be done to quiet the opposition.
Thus, arrangements
were made to adjust these new "stop prices" every few

years in order to avoid great discrepancies between "stop"
and current world p r i c e s . F o r the economist investigatX

8. Polaczek, Article in "Hotatnik Agi tatora", No. 17
(1956).
2. Karaecki,J'. Sotdaczuk, '.7, Sierpinski,

0 0 . cit.

pp. 2 0 3 - 2 0 4 .
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ting intra-bloc pricing methods, these formal criteria
seemed too crude to deserve more detailed examination.
Besides this, it is obvious that they form only the
cover of the price boiling pan, and the clue to the problem must be looked for inside.

Several official state-

ments and declarations^ play on the international
working class solidarity, but this is only another veil

to cover the real economic and political practices
which stand behind the official "harmony of proletarian

internationalism."
F. Pryor's and H. Menderhausen's^^studies in this
field have very interesting material on real pricing

methods and practices.

They try to prove that prices are

not "objectively set" but rather bargained in heated

X

In 1956
Gomulka, First Secretary of the Polish
United Workers party declared;
"The mutual relations
between the parties and states of the socialist camp.,
should be shaped on,the principle of international
working class solidarity... on mutual confidence and
equality of rights...on rational solution, arising
from...the spirit of socialism on all controversial
m a t t e r s ... this is how it should be and - I would saythis is how it is beginning to be."
Cited by 2 inner
ed. National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern
Europe. New York: ' Columbia"University P r e s s , 1957,
pp. '257-8.
XX

F. Pryor,op. cit., Chapter V, 1;. Meindersliausen, Terms
of Trade between the Soviet Union and Smaller Communist Countries, 1955-7. Santa Monica, R'ahd Corporation
Paper "January"18, 1959 and "The Terms of SovietSatellite Trade ; A Broadened^A h a T y F T s Y ^ a nta lionica,
Eân3"lTôrporation Paper, P-T) 8Y3Y"1anT 7, I960.
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disputes where national interests, threars, questionable
trade practices, political pressures, discrimination

are intermingled and the participants employ every possible
measure to achieve a stronger bargaining position.
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The political thaW which followed W. Gomulka's

rise to power in October 195& cleared the way for the
determination of the so-called "Polish route to Socialism"
and for the Polish model" of a centrally planned economy.
For the first time the wisdom of blindly imitating the
Soviet development pattern began to be openly questioned
and efforts were being directed towards development of
a system which would be more suitable to the factor
endowment and economic situation of the country, the
latter was so strained that reforms were essential.

As

the result of a heavy,investment policy during the SixYear Plan, several disproportions plagued the economy.
The industries created during the Six-Year Plan had been
too material,intensive and ill-adopted to the resource-

base of the country.

In many instances they could not

be operated at capacity because they depended heavily
on imported raw materials which,in turn,were extremely
difficult to provide because of the difficulty in the
situation of foreign payments.

The policy of "preferen

tial growth of capital goods industries" began to show
its effects.
The situation in the balance of payments
was strained and the rate of growth of the economy
slowed down.
X

In effect, foreign trade began to be the

.

During the period 1951-1957 the average annual rate
of growth of the economy was about 8.8 percent.
It
fell down to 5 percent in 1958 and remained around
this level during the subsequent years in spite of
many efforts to accelerate the role of growth of the
economy. A. Bodnar, op. cit., p. 13.
103
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lagging sector of the economy, and the main bottleneck
in the economic development of the country.
While theoreticians were working on finding some
criteria of profitability which would guide those who
planned foreign trade policy and secure a more profitable
flow of trade, a new foreign trade policy began to be
introduced.

The reforms which began in the early 1960's

focused on the organizational side of the system of for
eign trade.

They aimed at-improving the country's situa

tion in the balance of trade which was to be achieved by
the policy of export promotion

accompanied by the policy

of "saving foreign currency" on the import side.
POLICY OF EXPORT PROMOTION
The Organizational reforms which took place in the
early 1960's were designed to make the system of foreign
trade more flexible and more responsible to the changing
conditions of the world market.
This in turn was expec
ted to enable the possibility of obtaining a significant
increase in the country's exports,
QUICK YIELDING INVESTMENTS
^ On August 19, i960 the Economic Committee at the
Council of Ministers issued the decree which formulated
a new investment policy with respect to foreign trade.^
The decree gave priority to investments in those indus-.
X

tP Niegowski, W. Rydygier in Polityka Gospodarcza
Polski Ludowe j , Vol. I, Op. cit., pl 6 3 0 .
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tries which were

(or could) producing goods for exports,

and made the Ministry of Foreign Trade responsible for
the evaluation of the investment program from the point

of view of export possibilities.

As the Investment

Program for the Five-Year Plan for I 96 I-I965 had already
been formulated in June I960 the investment principles
could not be fully utilized.

Their role had to be

limited to the révisai of the investment plan, to the

introduction of changes and modifications where it was
possible, and to the making of a new schedule for the
beginning of new investments. Priority was given to
those investments v/hich were designated to produce for export;
In February 1962 the Political Bureau of the Polish
United Worker's Party issued a decree recommending the
preparation of a special investment program to aid in the

development of export industries and in the construction
of special warehouses for storing commodities designated
for exporting^ Thé 'inveatmèat decisions were to be based
on long-run export possibilities with the emphasis on
those export productions which could be directed to
markets with convertible currencies, and which would be
based on domestic raw materials and semi-fabricates.
Improvements in storing facilities, aimed to shorten the
time needed for export deliveries.

These improvements

would also, make it possible to conclude trade deals
when the conditions on the world market were most favourX

Ibid, p. 637,
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able (buying when prices were low and selling when it
would be most profitable).
Secondly, in order to promote exports two special
funds were established to finance the so-called "quickyielding investments".

The fund was established with

foreign currency and was at the disposal of the Minister
of Foreign Trade.

It was designated to finance the

purchases of foreign, machinery and equipment.

More

specifically, the fund was to be utilized for investments
in those export industries where the return of the invested outlays could take place within two years by export
receipts or savings on imports.

Additionally, it was

required that undertaken investments should be highly
profitable (eg. that they had good coefficients of
efficiency). Priority was given to those investments
which could produce for "difficult export markets" (markets where the deficit in foreign payments was most
severe).

The other fund was established in domestic

currency and designated to finance the purchase of
domestic capital goods for investments in export indus
tries.

The appropriate credits were to be granted by two

(Narodowy Bank Polski" and "Bank Inwestycyiny") on
very favourable conditions but only on the recommendation
of the foreign trade enterprises in question.
The con

banks

ditions on which credit was granted were as follows:
a)
b)

investment had to be .completed) within 18 months
the period of return for the Invested outlays could
not be longer than three years.

EBSIÏI OF ffiïDSOB IIBLîSî
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IMPROVEMENTS IN THE PLANNING OF EXPORT PRODUCTION
As years of experience of centrally planned economies
indicate, planning of foreign trade is much more diffi
cult than planning in domestic sectors of the economy
which are under the full control of the state.
Foreign trade involves contact with foreign markets

which are independent of the planning authority but
which at the same time condition fulfilment of the plan.
Foreign trade, certainly, does not lend itself to the

rigid planning methods applied in domestic economy and
requires more elastic operational tools which permit
quick and effective adjustment of the foreign trade plan

to the changing conditions on the world market.

For these

reasons export and import plans had to be formulated with

some range left for modifications and changes.

However,

the latter was only true with respect to foreign trade
enterprises which were directly engaged in the conduct
of foreign trade activity, while domestic enterprises

producing for exports were subordinated to the discipline
of internal planning.
In the early 1960's, the policy
makers became aware that in order to promote exports
successfully the planning methods in industries and
enterprises producing for exports must also be modified
accordingly.

Several measures have been taken in order

to improve the planning process in export producing
enterprises and industries.
enterprises

First of all, a number of

or branches p r o d u c i n g f o r

exports

only,

have been excluded from the general system of domestic
planning of production and covered by specially construe-
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ted export production plans.

The planned goals in these

plans were established less rigidly with the provisions
made for necessary adjustments and modifications which
could arise in the course of plan execution.

Besides,

special provisions have been made to secure the adequate
supply of raw materials and semi-fabricates used in
production.

At the same time it has been envisaged that

the planned wage fund and employment would be adjusted
according:

to the requirements of production processes.

The above mentioned measures however, could not be
fully applicable to enterprises producing for both domestic and foreign markets. As the bulk of production of
these enterprises was directed to the domestic market,
they remained subject to the discipline of domestic
planning. With respect to that part of the production
which was designated for exports, arrangements have been
made to ease financial restrictions concerning surpassing

the planned wage fund and employment, and to secure the
adequate supply of materials used in export production
which were excluded from the normal system of planned
distribution. With respect to the latter it has been
suggested that funds for payments of urgently needed
imported rav/ materials could be drawn from the special
reserve fund established in foreign currency and given
to the disposal of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

X

X

The Decrees No. 106 and 108 of the Council of Ministers
issued on March 27, 1962, Monitor Polski, No, 29, 1962.
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OTHER CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM OP FOREIGN TRADE

It has been recognized that a significant increase
in exports could be obtained on the basis of existing
production capacities, providing that several obstacles
inherent in the institutional framework of the system of
foreign trade were removed. The most important of these
obstacles were:
1) The foreign trade monopoly, operated by a central plan,
very rigid, and therefore unable to adjust quickly to
changes in the world market.

During the previous years

attention had been focused on mobilizing a maximal supply

of potentially exportable commodities.

However, this

meant that only half of the trade task had been performed.
To promote trade successfully it is not enough to secure
the supply of exportable commodities, it is also necessary
to have the ability to sell them.

This part of trade
business was almost completely neglected by enterprises
engaged in the conduct of foreign trade.

There was no •

market research, no advertisement, and none of the

measures which form the basis of the contemporary sales
promotion policy were utilized.

In effect, trading en

terprises had no information on what was going on in the
world and their products were mostly unknown to their
potential foreign buyers.

Improvements which have been

made in this respect include:
a) The Institute for Market Research attached to the
Ministry of F o r e i g n Trade w a o e s t a b l i s h e d , It's m a i n
tasks were to conduct intensive market research, prepare
market surveys and submit reports on concrete trade
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opportunities for the benefit of Polish exporters.
b)

Similar tasks were assigned to the Bureau of Commercial

Attache's attached to Polish Embassies abroad.
c)

In cases where it was justifiable, foreign trade

enterprises were granted the permission to have their
own permanent representatives abroad.

These representa

tives would keep them informed on recent developments
in the market in question
d)

Several steps have been taken in order to develop

and improve the advertising media.
2)

Separation of production and trade caused many conflicts

of interests between PTE's and domestic manufacturing
enterprises.

The links between PTE's and their domestic

partners were extremely weak.

In many instances, domes

tic producers found it very inconvenient to produce for
exports.

Their production targets included in economic

plans, were very often exaggerated. The fulfillment of
targets was often difficult as the requirements of foreign
buyers with respect to quality, assortment or packing
were higher than those of domestic buyers, In addition to
this, the contact of domestic producers with foreign
markets which would familiarize them with the most recent
techniques, and production methods, and quality require
ments was minimal.
Changes in the system of planning of
export production was the first step on the way of making
ex p o r t p r o d u c t i o n b e t t e r a d j u s t e d

prevailing on the world market.

to

c ur re nt

conditions

The links between PTE's

domestic producers and the foreign market were strengthe
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ned to some extent by the establishment of "Branch Commi
ttees".

Their tasks and role were already discussed in

Chapter 2.. To repeat shortly, they were responsible for
devising effective cooperation between producing and tra
ding enterprises and informing the former on recent

production methods and techniques used by leading foreign
producers.
3)

It has been recognized that some very important

obstacles in successful trade were:

exported commodities;

poor quality of

inadequate packing and long

delivery periods in addition to overdue delivery.

Measure:

which have been made in order to improve the discipline
of export deliveries are as follows:
1) Decree issued by the Chairman of the Planning Commi
ssion at the Council of Ministers formulated new General
Conditions of Sale and Purchase,^ It envisaged that
trade deals were to be negotiated between P T E ’s and their
domestic partners within the framework of General Condi
tions of Sale and Purchase.
(Once such a contract was
negotiated it was binding by law).
2)

The quality control of cormnodities designated for

exports was considerably strenghtened and the apparatus
of control extended. , First of all, two top agencies
responsible for setting technical norms and quality

standards, the Central Board of Engineering and the
X
The decree was issued on October 16, 1959 &nd replaced
one issued on June 1, 1950.
See, Monitor Polski,
ur. 92/1959.
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Central Standarization Board (for staple commodities),
were required to revise and raise, where necessary,"the
existing quality standards and norms.

Within this formal

framework, the quality and technical control which was
being exercised on two levels;

namely

a)

by experts of the producing enterprise

b)

by the apparatus of control subordinated to the

Ministry of Foreign Trade ("Polcargo" and Central Stan
dardization Board) was significantly improved and extended.
INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN TRADE
Besides the reforms which were introduced in order
to improve the organization and the operational ability
of the system of Foreign Trade some efforts have been
made to evoke incentive and material interest of the

personnel engaged in foreign trade activity.

The achieve-

ments in this field are by no means impressive; however,
at least something has been done to stimulate the incentive

of.the management and personnel by letting them share the
financial benefits of better performance. In I960, in
addition to the already existing "enterprise-fund"^
(fundusz zaktadowy), a system of bonuses was established
to reward employees distinguished by achievements at work.

The amount of bonuses granted depended on the financial
results of the operation of the enterprise in question;
the latter were evaluated on the base of fulfillment of
X

The "enterprise-fund" has been established in enter
prises of the socialized sector from profits which
they-were permitted to retain and was left at the disnosal of the enterorise.

R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113

the planned goals and especially on the fulfillment of
export plan targets.
In order to interest enterprises in undertaking the
production for export, a price reform for exportable
commodities was introduced in 1962.^

The reforms enabled

manufacturing enterprises to set higher prices on exportable commodities than on those commodities for the domes

tic market, in cases where production for export was more
expensive and more time absorbing because of higher
standards and quality requirements.
Higher prices received on export production made it
possible for the enterprise to increase its total amount
of profits.

This, in turn, meant an increased "enterprise-

fund" and more financial means to be distributed in
bonuses and premia.
It is extremely difficult to assess to what extent
the above measures were effective in stimulating incen
tive and better performance and thus eased the task of
export promotion.

In general, it seems that their

impact was of minimal significance and failed to bring

any lasting improvement in exports. Polish literature
on the subject usually blames the measures which were
taken in order to stimulate incentives.
It is pointed
out that the criteria for granting premia and bonuses
were wrong, full ,of gaps and shortcomings that the . X
The decree of the Council of ministers No. 55 issued
on February 13, 1962 Monitor Polskl, No. 22. 1962.
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administrative procedure and legal regulations were
inadequate and ineffective,

it seems, however, that the

clue to the problem lies somewhere else.

The underlying

principle of the system was to devise some tools which
would connect financial results of the operation of the
enterprise with the incentives stimulated by financial
reward for good results.

But, in the situation where

cost and price structure are distorted, the evaluation
of economic results of the activity of the enterprise
can be very misleading and incorrect. This means, in
turn that the evaluation of incentives leaves also much
to be desired,

II

SAVING FOREIGN CUER2NCY
The policy of export promotion was accompanied by

the policy of elimination or decreasing of the volume of
imports which were of lower priority or which could be
replaced by domestic substitutes,

in this way scarce

amounts of foreign currency were being saved for high

priority, indispensable imports and the deficit in the
balance of trade, if not decreased, at least did not grow.
In the early 1960's the attention was focused on
the revision of planned import demand.

For this task

special committees were established to analyze and estimate the degree of necessity of imports listed in the
annual and long-term plans.
analyzed

over

During I960 these committees

20,000 i m p o r t p r o p o s a l s f o r a t o t a l v a l u e

of approximately 1,900 million of exchange zlotys (about
475 million $).

The value of orders directed to domestic
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instead of foreign producers amounted to about 200
million of exchange zlotys (approximately 50 million
In the course of revision of import requirements
special emphasis has been placed on the elimination or
diminishing of imports from those markets to which it
was extremely difficult or impossible to increase exports
ie.

where the deficit in the balance of trade was most

severe.

At the same time Imports from markets where

Poland?8 payment position was satisfactory have been
considerably increased.

It should be noted that the

révisai of import plans was concerned only with reexamination of.import requirements for machinery and
equipment and did not cover other commodity groups listed
in the import plan.

Besides this, the révisai was concer

ned only with estimating the degree of usefulness or
necessity of several imports.

Many other questions

important from the point of view of saving foreign
currency were not taken into account.

For example the

re-examination of import plans did not include proper
timing of import deliveries to match the investment cycle

in order to avoid delays and to prevent too early deli
veries which while not utilized still had to be paid for.
It caused unnecessary "freezing" of scarce currency and
incomplete utilization of imported productive capacity.
It has also been nointed out that several industries

J_. Niegowski, W. Rydygier,

op. cit. p. 651.
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produced poor quality gooda as compared with their
foreign competitors in spite of the fact that they were
working with better quality and more expensive imported
raw materials. However, domestic producers made every
possible effort to avoid the utilization of lower quality
raw materials in their productions.

They had a very good

reason for it, as less efficient raw materials used in
the production process could not be reconciled with
existing technical norms, productivity requirements,
planned employment and wage fund. . While the latter were
not permitted to be overpassed the planned production goals
had to be fulfilled.

It seems clear that under the above

circumstances the fulfillment of the planned production
goals could be secured only if all other elements of
the plan were modified accordingly, but this v/as not
always the case.

;

Several attempts to solve the above

problem have been made on the legislative level,^ To
some extent they cleared the way for a more rational
utilization of imported raw materials and set the produc
tion targets and technical norms on a level more realistic
and tenable in practice.

However they were too limited

in scope to exhaust all the possibilities which are or
could be opened in this field.

X

The decrees which regulated these questions were:
Decree No. 106 and Decree No. lOG issued by the
Council of Ministers on March 27, 1962.
:
See: Monitor Polski, No. 29, 1962.
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THE CONCEPT 0? THE EFFECTIVENESS 0? FOREIGN TRADE IN THE
CENTRADIY PLANNED ECONOMY
"In the world socialist market, goods are exchanged
at prices based on international value, there is no place
for non-equivalent exchange in socialist foreign trade.
That is why international socialist trade is mutually
profitable and guarantees a saving of social labor to
each trading country."^
The relaxation in the political climate which took
place after Stalin's death, created a much more favourable
environment for the economists to bring under discussion
the supposed merits and demerits of the existing economic
system.

The animated re-examination of previously un-

questionable "socialist economic laws" proceeded in a
rather particular way.

The political changes did not go

BO far as to permit the economists to question the
"self righteousness" of Karxist-Ieninist orthodoxy which
still ruled supreme.

However, the economists were given

some range for more diversified interpretation of these

rules which began to be twisted in innumerable ways in
order to make them more applicable to the problems of
real economic life.
This doctrinal thaw brought the recognition of
foreign trade as.a vital sector of the economy and raised

the proDlem of the efficiency of a centrally planned
X
G. Shagalov, The Economic Efficiency of the Socialist
Countries Foreign Trade,
Problems of_Eçanami&&, December 19o5, Vol. 8, No, 8,
"p."5U.
118
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economy and efficiency of foreign trade.
The investigation of foreign trade profitability
within the overall economic framework was initiated by
Hungarian economists;

J. hiska and A. Harias in the

journal Kozgazdasagi Szemke in 1954^7

Shortly thereafter

the problem began to be examined in C8RR and in Poland
and in 1956-57 was discussed at three all-Bloc conferences.

Polish contribution to the a l l - B l o c d e b a t e s on

efficiency, seems to deserve special attention because'
of the relatively higher degree of sophistication of the
theoretical

examinations and as being much freer of Marxian,

dogmatism.
Since mid-1950's, increasingly the strained situation
in Poland's balance of payments was calling for "essen
tial" reforms in the system of foreign trade.

The n ew

political leadership which emerged in 1956 finally
recognized that the Soviet born method of physical balan
cing of "material balances" was completely inadequate as
a criterion for trade and realized that no improvement
can be expected without basing the system on a "sound
economic calculation". This raised the problem of the
profitability of trade.
The theoreticians started by drawing a distinction
between the profitability of each foreign trade transacX

J. Lisk a,
A. M a r i a s , E f f e c t i v e n e s s and the I n t e r n a tional Division of labour. East European Economics,
Summer 1963, Vol. 1 No. 4. translation from Kozqazdasagi Szemle, 1954, No. 1.
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tion and the over-all profitability or "effectiveness"
of foreign trade.

The former was disregarded as irre

levant for the "socialist economy", where the over-all eco
nomic considerations must always go before the interests
of individual enterprise.^
This micro-economic approach to the problem of
effectiveness caused a great deal of difficulties not
only in finding some satisfactory yard-stick for measuring
effectiveness, but first of all made it extremely
difficult to define the exact meaning of effectiveness.
The usual practice for Bloc economists in such a
case is to look for guidance in Marxian writings, but the
Marxian definition expressed in highly abstract terms
certainly did not help in this particular problem, and
brought a lot of confusion. According to Marx "effec
tiveness is a method whereby certain results are achieved
by minimum allocation of r e s o u r c e s " , A s hiska and
harias explain, allocation means the sum of total social
labour assigned to the commodity, and results mean the
maximal fulfilment of the needs of society, the most
important index of which is the constant rise of national
income.

^

A, Rolow.Rachunek efektywnosci w handlu zagranicznym.
(ProfitabiTitv Calculation in Foreign Trade)' "Warsaw
P. W. G., I960; p. 9.

XX

J. Liska and M. Marias, op. cit., quotation from
Das. Kapital, Hungarian edition vol. Ill, p. 114,
Op. cit., p. 3.
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Effectiveness in foreign trade is thus a relative
concept:

it is a ratio of total expenditure of social

labour assigned to.the exported commodities to the total
use-value of imports which secures maximal rate of growth
of national income.

Even disregarding Marxian distinction

between the use-value and value-in-exchange (labour-value),
the problem involves more than quantitative comparison
between the costs and the revenue from exports and expen
ditures on imports.

Besides the quantitative effect which

this ratio would express, there are some qualitative
aspects of the problem, such as the usefulness of the
several exports and imports for the national economy,
its impact on the rate of technical progress, employment pre
ferred structure and the distribution of national income.
All of them would finally find reflection in the obtained
rate of growth of national income.%

For many of these
XX

elements quantitative assessment is practically impossible.
Thus, the discussion on effectiveness had to confine
ifsclf to those elements which could be expressed in
quantitative terms.

Even here, the problem of finding

the adequate criteria for estimating the degree of effec-

'

tiveness of different import and export structures proved
to be very troublesome.

To start with, the economists

x; .
Z. Kajfiecki, J. Soldaczuh, It. Sierpinski,

op. cit., o. 518.

"It is clear that thereafter we need a whole system of
indices that could reflect diiferent asoects of economic
effectiveness and serve as a basis for multi-faceted
enialysis." V. terelfiov; V. ohcistitko, lnte:?nc.ti.on,al
Socialist Division of labour (Criteria of Effectiveness)
hroblem.s o.i Eco.ror:ics, Nov. luck, Vol. VII, No. 7.
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trying to grapple rigorously with the theoretical problems
of efficiency of foreign trade had no single guide line to
rely on as the "pure theory of foreign trade for a
socialist economy" does not exist.
Several efforts to develop the theory of internatio
nal trade along Marxian lines stopped on the avid
discussions of "equivalent trade" measured by the amount
of "simple labour embodied in the exchanged commodities, ,
Marxian distinction between "international and national
value" brought additional confusion to this theorizing
and led some economists to the absurd conclusions that
international trade, while equivalent when expressed in
terms of international value is not equivalent from the
point of view of national values.

The old economic

principle of "comparative advantage" expressed by Ricardo
in the 19th century proving that "non-equivalent" trade
can also be beneficial for both trading countries, was
completely forgotten in these discussions.

On the other

hand it seems that "Western economic theory" has nothing
to offer to the "Bloc economists" working hard to find some
firm ground for their "effectiveness" research.
I

We can easily disregard several statements of the

economists of the "Stalinist era" of the Prumkin kind,
describing "western" foreign trade theory as.."vulgar,
X

M. liorovitG,

P r o b l è m e Economics,

No.

4, 1958 pp.

10-20.

quoted by F, Pryor, Foreign Trade theory in the
Communist Bloc, Soviet Studies, Vol. 14, July 1962,
p. 55
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pseudo-scientific,

reactionary foreign trade theory

disseminated by bourgeois economists...(to) serve as
theoretical basic for the Western discriminatory foreign
trade policy towards the socialist countries"" - for the
same reason of being unscientific.

This statement does

not, of course represent the point of view of all Bloceconomists. What is more important, since the middle
1 9 5 0 *8 , the Ricardian principle of comparative advantage,
began to be discussed in Bloc economic literature and
was formally approved.

Elaborated by CEMA in 1962 the

"principles of international socialist division of
labour" mention the comparative advantage as a criterion
for the specialization of production and trade within
CEMA.^^ At the same time, it has been pointed out, that
the principle has a limited usefulness for foreign-trade
policy making because of its short-run and static cha
racter.^^^The criticism seems to be justified but
certainly this is not the most important point.
X
A. Frumkin, The Insolvency of Bourgeois Foreign Trade
Theory. Problems of Economics, No. 12, 1959, p. 58.
XX

Zasady Micdzynarodowego socjalistycznego podzialu
pracy RWPG.
(Principles of International Socialist
Division of Labour), Handel Zagraniczny, Nn. 7, 1962
p p .

3 I 8 - 3 2 4 .

: ------------------------------------------------------------

2. K a m e c k i , j. Soldaczuk, W. Sierpinski, op. cit. p. 125,
p. Mine, Gosrodarka Planov/a, No. 11, 1958.
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As expressed by Y. Wilczynski:
"The theory is simply
incompatible with the modus operandi of a centrally
planned e c o n o m y , T h e reason for this is that the
theory in all of its/versions refers to differentials
in "real" or opportunity costs and these are untraceable
in economies'where the market mechanism is absent.
Socialist prices certainly do not reflect economic .
values on the microlevel and on the macro-level reflect
the planner's preferences rather than the "value to the
society".

Distorted domestic price system, unreliability

of the rates of exchange and the lack of vigorous foreign
trade theory are the main obstacles to the meaningful
^effectiveness calculation".
In Poland, both economic theoreticians and foreign
trade practitioners became deeply involved in the exami
nation of the effectiveness of foreign trade.

The problem

has. been extensively discussed in the economic literature
while at the same time three economic institutions have
been preoccupied’in research in this field.
institutions are;
1)

These

The. Commission for the Distribution of Productive

,Forces vt attached to the Polish Academy of Science .
2i) The Institute for Scientific Research at the
Planning Commission
3)

The Institute for Economic Research - attached to the

X

J, Wilczynski, The Theory of Comparative Costs and
Centrally Planned Economies, Economic Journal, Vol. 75,
'March 1965, p, 64.
^

J , Wilczynski, op, cit., p. 69.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

124

Ministry of Foreign Trade,
Their task was to elaborate a system of indices of econo
mic effectiveness of foreign trade which would permit
determination of which commodities can be most profitably
produced for exchange on foreign markets and which should
be purchased abroad,
,
The research proceeded along two main lines:

.

A) Static "analysis of the effectiveness of foreign
trade which included analysis of
1)

the effectiveness of exports

2)

the effectiveness of imports

3)

the over-all effectiveness of foreign trade

B) Efficiency of investments from the point of view of
foreign trade. Both approaches to the effectiveness
probleim will be briefly examined,
II

EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN TRADE -

A) Effectiveness of Exports,
' ■/• The analysis in this respect is

STATIC APPROACH

conducted on the

assumption of the given productive capacities of the
economy, and therefore can be relevant only for a shortperiod of time. It is concerned with finding the guide
lines for the current operational and planning problems
of foreign trade.

This has been done by constructing

a number of foreign trade efficiency coefficients, all
of them designed to measure the relative advantage of
different exports and imports from the standpoint of the
economy as a whole rather than from the point of view of
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an individual exporter or importer.

So far the greatest

progress has been made in devising various indices of
effectiveness of exports.

Profitability of exports

was approached from the cost side and the coefficients
were devised to measure "the saving of social labour."
However, in the conditions of the distorted domestic
price system, the estimation of the "social labour costs
of production" is a difficult problem.

Generally speaking

all the proposed coefficients of export efficiency
compare domestic costs or prices with foreign prices, and
differ in the formula for "purification" of domestic
costs or prices in order to obtain a closer approximation
to the amount of "social labour" embodied in the commodity
in question.

The first and most crude coefficient of

export efficiency the so-called "financial coefficient
of efficiency" (kurs wynikowy finansqwoy-Kwf) was introduced by foreign trade practitioners in 1952; that is
before the problem of effectiveness began to be widely
discussed by economists.
The coefficient compares the export receipts obtained
with the domestic price of the goods;

where

C = domestic wholesale price of the commodity
M - domestic portion of marketing costs
Oz= average export price in foreign currency
(f.o.b.)
-

^

!

Rolow, A,, op. cit., p « 21,
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It indicates how many units of domestic currency must be
spent to obtain one unit of foreign currency.

The lower

the value of the coefficient, the higher is the profita
bility of a given export. The compilation of this
coefficient is very simple, but on the other hand its
reliability is highly questionable because of the dis
tortion of the domestic price system.
2)

Gross Foreign Exchange Coefficient of Export Efficiency

#*11i«n.«mi#niii|i| I iiii'n

I mil iin«i iMiiiim i

iT i !■

iniim

^irmrZa iii. n.-.iiiii i w ii.i nni«.»i ■inium

n «iwn iinrii

««**«#*»

(kurs wynikowy brutlo)
The coefficient relates domestic costs of production
of the exportable commodity to foreign exchange receipts:

™
where:*

ex

_

E + M

" — UT"

K = the average cost of production plus
domestic transportation costs
M = domestic protion of marketing costs

Replacing the domestic price by the production costs
Improved to some extent the reliability of, the coeffi
cient, especially in cases where the mark-up element
(high turnover taxes in consumer's goods sector etc) was
significant and caused wide discrepancy between the price
and production costs. However, the latter is only true
with respect to the last stage of the production process.
The cost of production is being calculated on the basis
of prices of rav/ m a ter ia ls or s emi-fabricates use d in
production.
If the prices of these factors of production
are distorted they are transmitted automatically to the
calculation of production costs in the intermediate stages
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of production.
3)

The Net Foreign Exchange Ooefficieht of export Efficlency/ (kurs wynikowy netto) KWN
In this index account is taken of the import content

of component materials on which foreign currency has been
spent.

where:

K = cost of production plus domestic transporta-

.

tion costs
i

M = Value of imported materials used for produc
tion in domestic currency at domestic prices
i
M z= Value in foreign currency at world market/-,

pi
•

prices of imported materials used in pro
duction,
M =

domestic portion of marketing costs.

The coefficient focuses in determination of "net gain"
from trade in terms of foreign exchange. By elimination
of the costs of imported raw materials or semi-fabricates
from both the numerator and denominator of the ratio,
the KWN index tries to determine whether from purely
foreign currency point of view it pays to export commo
dities of produced materials from imported materials.
More elaborated versions of the coefficient make allowan
ce for the possible loss of foreign currency where some
domestic but potentially exportable materials are used in
the production process. Some try to determine to what
extent further processing of exportable commodities is
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worthwhile from the point of view of earning additional
X
foreign currency.
This group of coefficients has one positive feature.
They can reveal some of the most striking irrationalities
in fdreign trade. For example, they would indicate the
situations where export is absolutely unprofitable
because the cost of imported raw materials is not covered
by foreign currency receipts obtained from exports of
commodities which include these raw materials, or situa
tions where it pays better to export raw materials than
final products.

However they are not free of any other :

shortcomings of previously presented coefficients.

DOC

' In order to widen the profitability check on exports
two auxiliary coefficients were introduced;
1)

The Coefficient of Material Intensity of Exports

, This coefficient is the ratio of costs of :materials
used in production and expressed in foreign currency, to

X

Ibid, pp. 43-51.

^ :

XX

For extensive discussion on the usefulness and short
comings of these coefficients see;
M. Rakowski, Z problemow badan efektywnosci produkcji
exportowej (On problems of Examination of the Effec
tiveness of Export Production) Gospodarka Planowa
No, 2, 1957.
J. Najnigier, W sprawle urealhienia oraz poglabienia racaunku 1 metody badanla efeKtyvmosoi wymlany
towarowej z zagranica (On improvement of Calculations
and Methods of Examination of Effectiveness of .Commo
dity Exchange with Abroad) Gospodarka Planowa. No. 1
1960 .
"
.
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the foreign market price of the commodity.
WMz
where:

=

Mz - foreign exchange value of all component
, materials used in export production
Gz - average export price in foreign currency

The coefficient shows the "material cost" of obtaining
one unit of foreign currency.

The value of the coeffi

cient cannot exceed 1,
0 = WMz = 1
Wtïz '= 1 is a limit which indicates that a given export
transaction is already unprofitable as it compensates
only for the expenditure of the materials used in its
production, but does not cover other production costs.
2)

The Foreign Exchange Coefficient of Labour Intensity.

X

This index has been devised to show more clearly
the "value added" by labour over and above the value of
materials used in production.

It determines the amount

Of "net gain" (in terms of foreign exchange) obtained
from spending one unit of foreign currency on materials
used in the production of an exportable commodity.
X

For a detailed analysis of this coefficient see
A, Rolow, Efektywnosc eksportu - metody badania (effec
tiveness of Exports - Methods of Examination), zycie
Gospodarcze, uv, 24, 1958.
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where :

Mz.= foreign exchange value of materiale used
in production
Cz - average export price in foreign currency
M^z ~ value of imported materials used for
production (in foreign currency at world
market prices)

. ,

Poland's natural resources are rather limited (with the
exception of coal and sulphur) while the rate of growth
of the population is high.

Thus, it would be desirable

to direct export production to those branches and
processes which are less material intensive and more
labor intensive. The employment of the index of labour
intensity is the first step in this direction.
II

IMPORT EFFICIENCY STUDIES
As compared with the investigation of problems of

export efficiency, the study of the efficiency of imports
has' been relatively neglected. Besides, these two inter
related problems were handled in different ways.

The latt

er stems directly from the Marxian theory of value and his
distinction between value-in-use and value-in-exchange.
The aim of exports is to maximize the value-in-exchange
while the ultimate goal of imports is the maximization
of the value-in-use. Accordingly, the effectiveness of
exports was approached primarily from the supply side
(production costs side) while the'demand side was decisive
in the determination of import requirements.
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The second reason for this situation, is found in
the very system of central planning.

In soyeral instances

import requirements are determined rigidly by the over
all economic plan and condition, its implementation^or
are designated to remove some serious bottleneck in the
economy. When import demand is inelastic, profitability
considerations are certainly less important.
Thirdly, the calculation of import profitability
coefficients is much more difficult as several imported
commodities are not produced at home and therefore no
comparable costs data are available.
: ,j: ■Generally speaking, the basic coefficients of import
efficiency have the same (or very similar) formula .as
export coefficients.

Their number is smaller and not

all versions of export coefficients have corresponding
import coefficients.
1)

.

Financial coefficient of import efficiency,
_ The coefficient compares expenditure on purchase of

foreign commodities (in foreign currency) with its domes
tic price.

where:
G - domestic wholesale price of the commodity
M - domestic marketing costs
Cz- average import price paid expressed in
foreign currency
' From the formal point of view, the higher value of
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the coefficient indicates the higher profitability of
imports. This is not always true, because of the diffe
rent methods applied in pricing producer ■ and consumer ^ '
goods.

As a result, the coefficients of import profita

bility of these two groups are entirely incomparable.
What is more, even within more narrow commodity groups,
the coefficients are highly misleading. Luxurious or
low priority commodities usually have a high coefficient
which would suggest high profitability in these imports;
while raw materials and machinery have low coefficient of
profitability, which indicates that they should be eli
minated from imports,
2)

Gross Foreign Exchange Efficiency of Import Substi
tution
In this index, the domestic costs of production of

imports substituting commodities are compared with its
foreign market price
- K V / B . „

p

=

1^1

where:
K - average costs of production of import substi
tuting commodity
Cz^“ average import price (in foreign currency)
of the commodity (c.i.f)
The coefficient'has a similar character to the Gross
Foreign Exchange Coefficient of Export Efficiency
(KWB exp) .presented previously;, and the same short
comings.
Substituting domestic prices by domestic costs of
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production, causes the price differential between pro
ducers and consumers goods to be partially eliminated
but only in the final stage of the production process,
3)

Net Foreign Exchange Efficiency of Import Substitution
The coefficient is designed to determine foreign

exchange efficiency of imports at different stages of
processing,
™
where;

imp -

Mz

=

Kp = K - M - cost of processing

while.

K = average cost of production of import
substituting commodity
M = value of materials used to produce a unit
of commodity at domestic prices

Dn

o

- "net saving" of foreign currency resulting from a
given production process of import substituting
• commodity defined as the difference between:
1
Cz' - average impOrt price of the commodity in
foreign currency
Mz

- value of materials used in production at
foreign trade prices in foreign currency,

A low value of the coefficient indicates a high "saving
of foreign currency" obtained on production of an import^
substituting commodity and at the same time a low effi
ciency of import of the commodity in question,^
X

For detailed analysis see A, Rolow, Rachunek -Ekonomi.czmy w handlu zagranieznym, op. cit, pp. 77-84.
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.SOME THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN PROEITA' BILITY.CALCULATION.
The calculation of coefficients of foreign trade
efficiency presents several difficult problems which
from the first observation seem to be of technical

^

character but cannot be removed without rigorous analyti
cal investigation of their theoretical basis. Domestic
costs of production play a very important role; in several
formulae or versions of the efficiency coefficients.

Most

often the average production cost is used for these
purposes.

But the average production costs differ in

various production enterprises.
Therefore, the question arises as to what average
cost of production should be taken for the effectiveness
calculation.

The weighted average cost of production

of the industry would be relevant if all enterprises
within the industry produced for exports.
rather a exceptional case.

The following example will

help to, illustrate the problem,^

x

f

h

.

But this is
.

. '

„ ,For example, according to the M, Fiszel estimates,
the average variable cost of production of sulphuric
- acid in three different plants were ;
p.
312,58 zl per ton, 413,36 and 562,80 el per tona
respectively,
M, Fiszel, Zagadnienia cen i r achunku ekonomicznego
(Problems of Prices and EconomIc""naTcuIa?r0nT"FWlf,
Warsaw, 1958, pp. 157-158.
XX

It was presented by A, Rolow, op, cit., pp. 89-90,
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Assume that a given commodity is produced by four
plants only. The Gross Foreign Exchange Coefficient' of
Export Efficiency for the industry would have the follo
wing formula;
KWB

r=
ex

where:

+ %3 ^3 + %4 %4
—
-y-—-"-PT"-——-r"""""— —ÿT"-''-"—
Cz (q + q H- q 1 q^)

~

K
Cz

K^, Kg, K 3 , K. are average costs of production
in these plants.
0 2 * 9 3 * 94 “ quantities produced

Cz - average import price paid, expressed in
foreign currency
The data are:
Plant 1

-

= 100 zl, p Qj

= 1000 units

KWB^

= 10 zl/$

Plant 2

- Kg

= 90

zl, ^ qg

= I 5OO units

KWB^

=

9 zl/$

Plant 3

- K?

= 90

zl, ^

= 1500 units

KWB^

=

9 zl/$

Plant 4

- K,

= 80

zl, ^ q^

= 3000 units

KWB^

=

8 zl/$

The Foreign trade price of the commodity is 10$.
The average cost of production of the industry is about
87 ^1,
and

D 7 «1
KWB.

.

=

=

8i7 zl/$

Thus the average coefficient of effectiveness of exports '
of the commodity is 8,7 zl/$.
Assum e now that only plant 4 is p r o d u c i n g for export,
while the other plants produce for the domestic market.
In this case the coefficient KV/B^ - 8 zl/$ NS relevant.
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It seems that analysis in marginal cost terms rather
than in average cost terms would be proper for these
X
purposes.
As F. Pryor remarks - "if only average costs are
used in the cost calculations for the coefficients, then
some sort of "scarcity rent" should be added to the basic
production cost of goods to take demand factors into
XX
account."
!Phe other gap which F. Pryor points out in this '
analysis is the absence of any type of interest change
XXX

on capital which should be added to the production costs.

X

.This approach to the problem would indirectly stem
from "the theses of Economic Council" in the P olish
price debate. Go called "prices of departure" were
b a s e d on AVC of the r e l e v a n t g r o u p of "highest cost
enterprises in the industry. From this position there
is only one step to marginality.
XX

'

F. Pryor,

Foreign Trade theory in the Communist Bloc.

Soviet Studies, Vol. 14, 1962, p. 48. According to
Pryor ^one notable exception" in this case was the '
article by Polish economist F, Drabowski in Gospodarka
Planowa, ho. 1, p. 79, I did not see the article.
XXX

Ibid,

p .

49.

It should be noted that this element is taken into
account in the "dynamic approach" to the problem of
effectiveness of foreign trade.
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The scarcity of capital element is missing in this cal
culation,

A similar problem presents the rate of depre

ciation of capital.

This element is Included in the

calculation of production costs.

However the practice

of establishing the rate of depreciation on an unreaso
nably low level, put into doubt the reliability of cost
calculation. It should be recalled here that the entire
cost calculation leaves much to be desired.

The elimina

tion of some irrational elements which is being done in
the final stage of production before entering the foreign
trade profitability "check-up", cleans only' the surface
of cost structure, leaving the whole inside untouched.
Obviously, the depreciation element does contribute to
the distortion of the cost structure, but is not the
most important contributor. As A, Rolow points out,

;;

during the period 1951-1954 the average share of depre
ciation in industrial production costs was somewhat about
3 percent, and the differentials in Gross and Net Foreign
Exchange Coefficients in many instances ran in the
hundreds percent,^ This seems to suggest that the fillingof the small gaps in the costs calculation does not help
too much when the whole analysis of effectiveness is
very questionable,
B,

The second building bloc in the coefficient formulas

is the average foreign trade price.

The problem is to

X

Ibid, p. 115.
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■determine what world market price should be used to
compare with the domestic "social labour cost of production and how this price should be

a

v

e

r

a

g

e

d

"

.

^

Prices for the same commodity differ with respect
to the specific foreign market or currency in which pay
ment is effected.

For example:

the unit price for

1 ton of acetylene exported Cf.o.b. in exchange zlotys)
to Iran was - 261 to Egypt - 286 to Hungary-355, to
Turkey - 524. Prices obtained from export of colophony
were:

(in exchange zlotys per ton) to Syria - 700,

to England - 763, to Austria - 826.^^
are too significant to be neglected.

These differences
But on the other

hand, the question arises whether these prices are com-parable:.

Judging from the method of their computation

they are hot compared.

.

An exchange zloty (or

accounting money unit) price is derived by multiplying
the foreign currencies in question by a rigid and arbi
trary rate of exchange.

It seems to be obvious that the

purchasing power of one exchange zloty obtained from
export in British market is not equal to the purchasing
power of one exchange zloty obtained in the Egyptian
market.*^*

Further, as has been pointed out in the Bloc

discussion on foreign trade price formation for several

The problem was controversial in the Bloc debate on the
principles of foreign trade price formation.
^

Quoted by A. Rolow, op. cit., p. 117.

^*^Froblem was discussed by B. Najniger, op. cit, pp. 28-29,
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individual differentiated commodities (many types of
machinery and equipment fall into this category), the
world market price does not exist. What price should be
then applied?
2)

Trade with several countries is based on bilateral

clearing agreements. An absolute differential in prices
may be somewhat misleading in these circumstances. For
example, it is possible that export prices obtained in
trade with a given country are higher than those on
another market.

But at the same time, the prices paid

for import are also higher. This would suggest that the
"terms of trade" element should be somehow built into
the formula of the effectiveness coefficient.^
3. The same difficulties exist in the estimation of
the value of imported raw materials or import substitu
ting commodities in foreign currency prices.

Proper

calculation of these costs is of enormous importance for
the calculation of net foreign exchange coefficients of
effectiveness.
4.

There is a statistical problem as to how the movements

of world market prices should be handled in the compu
tation of foreign trade profitability coefficients. Thé
main difficulty is caused here by the separation of domes
tic and foreign trade prices.

For example;

the increase

of export prices for cotton fabrics was caused by the
X
b A, Rolow, Niektore zagadnienia rachunku efektywnosci
eksportu, (Some problems of calculation of effecti
veness of exports) Handel Z'agranic.zny, No. 2 / 1957.
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increase of prices for cotton on the world market.
Thus, the import of cotton is now more expensive, however
this is not reflected in the domestic price of cotton
which remains unchanged (principle of stability of
domestic prices).

The domestic cost of production of

cotton fabrics is not affected however, ’the ■higher
export price of cotton fabrics would indicate that the
profitability of these exports increased. If the increa
se in price of cotton was greater than the increase in
the price of cotton fabrics the profitability of this
export could in fact decrease instead of being increased.
.Several other theoretical or methodological objec
tions against the coefficients of efficiency of foreign
trade may be raised.

Without going too far into the

details of this analysis, some attention should be devo
ted to another interesting contribution to research on
effectiveness of foreign trade,
P f■ Concept of the Limiting the Rate of Foreign Trade
Profitability
'_*■ As has been mentioned already, the coefficients
of efficiency have a relative character. They can
provide answers to some specific questions of choice
with regard to the commodity structure of foreign trade;
more specifically they can, for example, indicate that
the export of commodity "a" is more profitable as compa
red with the export of commodity "b" but, in general,
they fail to provide any absolute measure of profitabili^
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iy.
This means that they would not indicate that both
exports are entirely unprofitable for the economy. In
other words, some additional device is necessary to
indicate what is the critical value of the coefficient
beyond which all transactions are unprofitable and should
not take place.

This is the idea of the so-called

^limiting rate of foreign exchange" introduced by M.
Ealecki and St. Polaczek.^ The limiting rate of
foreign exchange was primarily designated as ah/auxiliary device for pricing raw materials. The reasoning
was as follows: given the price and wage levels, it is
possible to determine the ceiling for the prices of raw
materials in relation to their foreign market prices.
This ceiling value of domestic raw material prices defi
ned las the ratio of these prices:to the world market
prices was called the "limiting rate".

X

.

,

According to A. Rolow some of the coefficients pro
vide also an absolute measure of profitability.
... He mentions; KWH, WMz, WPz, As he does not explain
"p 'this I do not exactly understand what is the proof
for this statement. A. Rolow, op. cit., p.:164.
XX
M. Kalecki, St. Polaczek, Uv/agi w sprawie metody
ustalania cen surowcow podstawowych.
(On methods
of formation of prices of basic raw materials).
Gospodarka Planowa, No, 4. 1957. For an interesting
: :.analysis see:
P. Glikman, St. Polaczek, E fe kty wn oso
handlu zagranicznego i kurs .maxymalmy,
(Effectiveness
of Foreign Trade and the Limiting Rate of Foreign
Exchange) Gospodarka Planowa, No. 5, 1959.
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The formula for the limiting rate of foreign exchange
is the following:
Kmax

=

a=

where :

A p - increase of that prrfcion of the wage fund
which is spent on consumption goods (inde
A

pendent variable)
- increase in the production of consumption

m

goods (in value terms) induced by the
increase in the wage fund (dependent varia
S-

ble)
value of

imported or exportable raw materials

contained in each

100 zlotys of increase

of the value of the production of consump
tion goods.
For practical purposes, the computation of the formulas
for coefficients "a" and "s" has been simplified.
"A" wasdefined as the
ratio of the wage fund in the
consumers

goods sector(F) to the total value

of consu

mers goods at domestic prices (M) or
F
* = M.
and coefficient "s" according to the formula
8 - §

.100

where S - value of imported or exportable materials
used in the production of the consumers goods
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sector at foreign exchange prices.
M -

total value of consumer's goods at
domestic prices in domestic currency

Computed according to this method, the limiting rates of
■V*

foreign exchange were;
for 1955 - 56 zl/$
1957 - 59 zl/$
1958 - 69 zl/$
The Jifferences in the value of the limiting rate in
different years were explained by:
a)

changes in domestic and foreign trade prices

b)

changes in the structure of domestic production and

wages.
In the light of this analysis, export of a consumer’s
commodity which in 1955 had the coefficient of efficiency
higher

than 56 zl/$ was absolutely unprofitable and

could only increase thedeficit
instead of decreasing it. Further

in thebalance

of trade

researchalong

these

lines seems to be promising and can provide the policy
makers with a useful yardstick for their foreign trade
decisions.

Major difficulties in this research lie on

the technical side as the computational burden of these
calculations is very heavy. It is expected, however, that
new techniques combined v/ith high-speed mechanized com
puters would be able to handle the problem.

P. Glikman, St, Polaczek op, cit., p, 33.
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E.

OVER-ALL EFFICIENCY OP FOREIGN TRADE
The above outlined methods of measuring the effec

tiveness of foreign trade have another fundamental short
coming. There is no link between the efficiency of
exports and efficiency of imports which are treated sepa
rately. Further, the elaborated coefficients apply
only to particular commodities or groups of related
commodities «

In effect, they are detached from the

general context of the economic life of the country.
On the other hand, the economic efficiency of foreign
trade.is an integral part of the over-all efficiency of
the economic system, and the structure of foreign trade
must fit the structure of the economy.

In a centrally

planned economy, even in the short-run planning, the
number of decisions which planners have to make number
in thousands. If planners have a choice of a whole
variety of commodities which can be exported or imported
a number of markets where this trade can be directed, and
in addition many different production processes for many
different commodities, the problem of determining the
pattern of trade which would meet the efficiency condi
tion becomes extremely difficult. The existing coeffi
cients are hardly useful for these purposes, and with
the lack of more sophisticated methods, the planners
have to rely on their intuition. But efficiency resul
tin g from intu iti on is pure chance.
It has been recogniz
ed! that for the purposes of plan construction, a combined
and synthetic analysis of exports and imports efficiency
is indispensable.
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Starting with a given complex of conditions (limi
ting factors; labour force, lower and upper limits'of
production and marketing) and taking into account basic
technological and economic interdependencies, together
with the consequences of alternative uses of the limited
factors of production, there is an enormous•Variety of
possible export, import and production variants relating
to foreign trade. Among these ample possibilities an
"optimal pattern of foreign trade is looked for; for
example, one that ensures maximization of national income
o'oupled'. of with a balanced state budget.

It seems ob

vious that the large number of variables subject to the
decision making, produce an immensely involved system
where the "optimal solution" is practically unattainable
with present facilities.
Such a "synthetic" model of foreign trade efficiency
was proposed by a Polish economist W. Trzeciakowski
The model is constructed with the aid of input-output
analysis and a linear programming technique.

W. Trzeciakowski, Model optymalizaeji biezloej polityki
kierunkowej w handlu zagranicznyra (À Model of the
Current Optimization of the Directions of Foreign
Trade) Gospodarka Planowa, No. 8-9, I960.
For EngTTsri translation see: W. Trzeciakowski. A
model of optimization of foreigh trade in a Planned
Economy and its Application). Regional Science Asso
ciation: Papers vol. 8, 1962. âïïalffT^TiaszczynsloTT*'
W. Trzeciakowski, Efficiency Prices and Economic
Calculation in Foreign Trade, Structure and Directions
of Foreign Trade, Regional Science Association: Papers
X, Lurich C o n g r e s s 2, Vol. 10, 19^31
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Given the limitations of:
1) production factors and constraints arising'from
2)

policy postulates
technological interdependencies (Leont ief's matrix!^

,a syste® of equations and inequalities is constructed.
Solving the system, a number of equilibrium prices are
derived which secure an optimal trade pattern.
Characterizing this model A. Zauberman remarks;
"in perfect and generalized form it brings to
its ultimate conclusions the logic of t h e ,
Kalecki - Polaczek limiting rate. The price
of a final good (and the derived prices of the
intermediate goods) would lie somewhere between
the celling and a floor. These would be set by
foreign market prices translated into domestic
currency at the limiting efficiency rate;
beyond these critical values competing imports
and exports would become uneconomical and within
.them the inter-enterprise bidding, real or on the
planner’s desk could pinpoint the equilibrium
price. XX
b
The model throws an interesting light on the question
as to how in the centrally planned economy where automa
tic market mechanism is absent, the problem of effecti
veness of foreign trade can be approached on theoretical
grounds. However, at present, an economic research in
this field has not passed the phase of creating theoretiX

This is basically A. Zauberman interpretation.
See: A; Z.auberraan, The Criterion of Efficiency of
Foreign Trade in Soviet-type Economies. Economics,
February 1964, p. 11.
Ibid.
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cal models and practical applicability of these investi
gations still belongs to the future.

Ill

LONG-RUN EFFICIENCY OP FOREIGN TRADE
In late 1950's the problems of the intensification

of the international socialist division of labour within
the framework of coordinated long-run economic plans,
began to be widely discussed in the Bloc,

■

For the pur

pose of long-run planning of foreign trade,, it was
necessary to drop the assumption of constant capacities
and to introduce the time dimension into the profitability
calculationir-v .

The effectiveness of foreign trade

began to be investigated in the context of the general
analysis of investment efficiency.

The correlation

between investment policy and long-run foreign trade
policy is undoubtedly very close. The investment deci
sion of today determines the productive capacity of tomo
rrow. It can be a production for export or a production
of import substitutes. It has been recognized that an
investment program cannot be fully efficient without
taking into account the possibilities opened up;by
foreign trade and dynamic coefficients of foreign trade
efficiency began to be built-in into the formulas for the
x;
In 1962 CEMA formulated the principles.of internation.'8l socialist division of labour and made recommenda
tion for coordination of long-term economic plans of
its member countries. See; Zasady Mledzynarodowego
6qcjalistycznego Podzialu Pracy R.W.p.G, (Principles
of International Socialist Division of Labour in CEMA)
Handel Zagnaniczny. no. 7, 1962, pp. 318-324.
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effectiveness of investment.

It should be noted that

synthetic analysis of foreign trade efficiency in the ■
framework of an over-all investment efficiency is extre
mely difficult to deal with on theoretical or methodo
logical grounds.

So far, intensive investigations in

this field did not pass the initial stage and did not
bring any satisfactory results.
Static analysis of foreign trade efficiency proved to
be a-f very awkward problem to the Bloc theoreticians and
policy makers.

Dynamic analysis inevitably multiplied

the formidable theoretical and computational problems
it encountered in the static approach.
As in the static approach, dynamic analysis of foreign
trade efficiency concentrated on constructing the formu
las for coefficients of efficiency.
with the purpose of determining

They were devised

.:tb-’ what extent it is

profitable (in terms of foreign exchange) to expand
the capacity of export or import substituting industries.
1)

the simplest formula is coefficient of foreign ex

change efficiency of capital investment.^

It relates

"net" foreign exchange receipts over an annual period
to the capital outlay necessary to achieve that planned
increase in the productive capacity,
'
WYz =

BCz* - EM^z

^

y

ED%
y

X

A, Rolow, op. cit., p. 148.
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ED^b = ECgK - EM*g
where

- annual "net" foreign exchange.receipts

and EC„^

- amount of foreign exchange obtained during
the year as a result of the investment.

EM^

- Value of imported (or potentially export
able) materials used for the production ,
during the given year (in foreign exchange
at world market prices),

y
.

“

investment outlay indispensable to secure
the planned increase in productive capaci
ty (at domestic prices and currency).

More often, in practice, planners make use of the index
of capital intensity of investment which is reciprocal
to the presented above coefficient.
Y
WKz It measures the minimal investment outlay (in domestic
currency) necessary to get one unit of foreign currency.
Both coefficients are applicable to those investments
which have the same period of useful life. In a variant
of this type of coefficient, the factor of time is intro
duced.
The coefficient of foreign exchange efficiency of
investments which takes into account the period of
exp lo ita ti on of the investment has the formula:
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where

m ~ expected number of years of exploitation
of the capital investment
- average annual "net foreign exchange receipts

More elaborated versions of the foreign exchange index of
investment efficiency include allowance for the capital
invested.

One of them is called a "synthetic Index of

Foreign Exchange".
Efficiency of Investment;
E = KWN + (Wkz 9)
where KWN - "net foreign exchange coefficient of effi
ciency of exports (or imports)
q - coefficient of investment discount
It should be noted that as with most .of -the, static :,ooeffioients
of efficiency, coefficient "E" can be utilized for an
analysis of the effectiveness of capital investment only
in the final stage of production of the exportable (or
import substituting) commodity. It does not take into
account capital'outlays in the connected branches of
industry.

This fact seems to be in disagreement with

the so strongly stressed complexity of the effectiveness
research, which should cover the whole economy.

However,

it does not seem to be necessary that in order to build
rolling-stock factories, the analysis of effectiveness
should be extended to, 'for-example' iron ore and coal
mining.
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II

APPRAISAL AND PROSPECTS
The intensive research in the field of efficiency

of foreign trade which started in Bloc countries in, the
mid-1950's seems to indicate that the "era of material
balancing" is passing and that Bloc countries try to
elaborate more precise and operational tools to guide
their decision making. It has been recognized that the
economic calculation is by no means less important in
a centrally planned "socialist" economy than in any other
economic system.

However, as Bloc experience indicates,

the absence of automatic market mechanism makes it ex
tremely difficult to assess economic values to all
variables which should enter economic calculation and
guide the process of decision making.

The basic

obstacles v/hich made economic calculation impossible or
unmeaningful lie at the core of the adopted system of
centrally planned economy and only their removal can
clear the way for rationality as the underlying principle
of the "socialist economy".

At the present stage of

economic knowledge, resources cannot be allocated in a
rational way without a reliable price system v/hich would
reflect opportunity costs and factor's scarcities.

But

prices in a Soviet-type economy are set in a more or
less arbitrary way (mainly in accordance with the
preferences of top political authority), and do not
ne ce asa ril y reflect these costs and scarcities.

The

marginal pricing theory teaches that in equilibrium,
prices of factors of production should equal their
marginal products and product prices their marginal costs,

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

152

But the concept of marginality is rejected by the tra
ditional doctrine in the Bloc,
The distorted price system is accompanied by rigid
and economically unmeaningful rates of exchange.

Adding

to these the separation of domestic and foreign trade
prices the picture is complete and it seems clear that
in this situation planners are deprived of any reliable
and simple yardstick to measure the extent to which the
trade is gainful. The Bloc-wide discussion on pricesetting problem and the preoccupation with devising
foreign trade profitability coefficients indicate that
Bloc policy makers and theoreticians are fully aware of
the numerous inherent weaknesses of the centrally planned
economy, which cannot provide any simple mechanism to
ensure rationality in their decision making.

Accepting

the distorted price system and largely arbitrary rates
of exchange as the "malum necessarium", they are search
ing'.

for other criteria of efficiency which could be

effective in a centrally planned economy. There is no
heed to repeat that various coefficients which have been
devised to measure efficiency of foreign trade are crude.,
full of shortcomings and mostly unreliable. What seems
to be important here, is the fact that they are not
completely useless. The breakthrough in the entirely
irrational material balancing has been done with their
help and even this crude profitability "check-up" made
it possible to introduce several improvemenis in the
composition and prices of exports and imports. In Poland
the computation of the "effectiveness coefficients", was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

153

conducted quite extensively. For example, in 1959 the
profitability calculation covered about 7 .O percent of
X
the volume of exports.
Further research in the field, especially research
utilizing modern econometric methods, combined with high
speed, high-memory-store computers seems to be very pro
mising and can furnish planners with very useful tools
to effect the most gainful flow of trade. However,
these perspectives should not be over-estimated. It is
true that efficiency considerations are gaining grounds
in Soviet type economies, but it does not seem probable
that new methods can revolutionize economic planning in
the nearest future. It is still strongly emphasized
that several non-economic considerations are much more
important for the Bloc policy makers than economic
efficiency. As expressed by Soviet economists;
"Economists in socialist countries believe that
economic efficiency,..is not the only criterion
for determining the structure and directions
of foreign trade. The final decision in
structuring foreign trade takes into conside
ration non-economic factors which in some
cases assume fundamental importance,xx

X

R, Bauer V. Czerniansky, The Significance of Indi
cators of Foreign Trade Profitability for the Inter
national Socialist Division of Labour, East European
Economics, Winter 1964-1965, Vol. 14, H o T ? T ^ 3 ^ F 4 T
XX

A. Borisenko and V. Shastitko, Vnpshhaya Torgovlya
No. 5, 1 9 6 2 , p. 2 5 . Quoted by A. nauberman. The Soviet
and Polish Quest for Criterion.of Investment Efficiency,
Economica, Vol. 29, August, 1962, p. 246,
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Speaking to a group of American sena to rs .visiting Moscow,,
N, Krushchev quite clearly explained what these so
highly-valued non-economic factors,which go before

efficiency,are;

"we value trade least for economic

reasons and most for political reasons,"

X

New York Times, September 18, 1955, quoted by J.

, op, cit., p. 65,
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The preceding chapters have considered the underly
ing assumptions and working principles of the foreign
trade system in Poland's economy.

The attempt has been

made to present how the system operates, how it is orga
nized and what are its m o s t .distinctive problems and

However, in order to have the full
picture of the c o u n t r y ’s post-war foreign trade , it seems
characteristics.

indispensable to include some empirical material which
would illustrate the tendencies and problems previously
described.

In this chapter, I shall attempt to present

'

an integrated analysis of P o l a n d ’s post-war pattern of
trade, discuss its successes, problems and achievements
on the basis of the available statistical information.
In a country with a relatively small domestic
market and without huge and diversified natural resources,
foreign trade seems to be an important sector of the
economy.

In addition, if this country makes every

effort to promote industrialization and speed up the rate

of economic growth, the role of foreign trade becomes
even more important.
What the real impact of foreign trade is on the
process of the country's economic growth :

whether it

plays the role of one of the leading sectors or becomes
one of the difficult bottlenecks, depends mainly on the
initial, conditions of the country in question and its
fundamental strategy of developments.

On the basis of

Polish experience it seems safe to conclude that it did
not facilitate her process of economic development and

156
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remained as one of.the most severe bottlenecks,

Conside-

Arable neglect of foreign trade and autarchical policies
which prevailed during the first and post-war decade
.seem to be the most important factors responsible for
that situation. Since the rnid-1950’s, some measures
have been taken to overcome the autarchical drive, and
problems of foreign trade began to focus; attention of
the policy-makers. However, the imprint'Which previous
policies left on the economy proved to be very difficult
to remove,
- : ! During the post-war period Poland’s industrial
expansion was proceeding at relatively high rates while
her share in world trade remained basically on the same
level as in the pre-war period.
Poland’s share of world trade 1929-1964(percent)
1929

1938

.1.0

1.0

1950
1.05

1962
1.2

1964
).

1.2

Source:
A. Zauberman, Industrial Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, p. 276,

U. N. Statistical.Year

book, 1965, pp. 3 9 0 -3 9 2 .
It is extremely difficult to calculate the proportion of
dollar estimates in national product absorbed by exports.
The existing pricing and cost methods together with the
incomparability of foreign and domestic prices for goods
subject to imports and exports, makes the computed
Poland’s yearly industrial growth rates claimed were:
19.1 percent during the period of 1951-1955, 9.3 per
cent for 1956-1959 and 8,3 percent in 1963 respective
ly, A. Zauberman, op. cit., p. 108.
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proportion of GNP^ expressed in dollars,which is passing
through foreign trade transactions, highly questionable.
According to Polish sources about ten percent of GNP
is being continuously absorbed

by exports.

Exports as Percentage of Adjusted

GNP, 1957:

Poland

France

West Germany

Italy

10.1

.17.5

24.1

13

Source:

B, Wojciechowski in "Gospodarka PlanowaV No. 8

Norway

U.K.

33.0

24.5

1959 p. 23, quoted by A. Zauberman, p. 279.^
These data reveal a strikingly low share of exports in
Polish. GNP as compared with other countries of Europe.
Comparisons between foreign trade per capita in Poland
and other European countries bring similar results.
Foreign Trade per Capita. 1962:
Poland
West Germany
France
^ 482

33ll;.

Italy

U.K.

216

456

Source;, Ibid, p. 278.
,
However, it should be noted that the per capita level of
foreign trade in post-war Poland increased considerably
w h e n .compared with the corresponding data for the"-inter=war
period.

'

Zauberman refers also to other assessments yielding
different results, e.g. 3. Krynicki, Problemy handlu
.•^zagranicznego

(War s a w 1958) p.

214,

It suggest3"™tîmF“

exports represented about 8.5 percent of GNP in 1955.
J. Witt and Dorozynska in "Handel Zagranlczny" No. 8,
1961 arrived at 7.5, 8 and 7 peFcêntiôFT^^bA, 1956 and
1957 respectively.
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Polish Foreign Trade per capita 1928-1961:
(Comparable (1956) dollar prices)
1928

1938

1950

1961

63

30

62

106

Source: Ibid.
According to the statistical data shown in Table 1
Poland’s foreign trade has been increasing at relatively
high rates during the whole post-war period.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE I
POLAND’S FOREIGN TRADE
TURNOVER

IMPORTS OIF

EXPORTS FOB

""""'"I

^

BALANCE
m p An r

MILLION OF DOLLARS AT CURRENT PRICES^**^^

1938
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963 .
1964
1965
1966%
1966xx

473
694
1049
1251
1302
1785
1611
1605
1772
1851
2007
2226
2287
2565
2821
3191
3531
3749
4168
4426
4651
4987

.

248
401
516
632
668
924
836
774
803
932
1022
1251
1227
1420
1495
1687
1885
1979
2072
2130
2238
2361

225
248
533
619
634
861
775
831
,869
919
985
975
1060
1145
1326
1504
1646
1770
2096
2296
2413
2626

-23
-153
+17
^43
-34
-63
-6l
+57
-34
-13
-37
-276
-167
-275
-169
-183
-239
-209
+24
+166
+175
+265

DYNAMICS OF
lATPORTS
EXPORTS
TNDEZiySO
= 100
37
60
77
94
100
138
123
116
135
140
153
185
177
211
224
252
282
295
310
319
335
353

X

Pre-war boundries
XX

::

According to Plan
Sources: 'Concice Statistical Yearbook of Poland, 1966
Central Statistical Office, Warsaw, 1966, p. 16?
Economic Surveyof Europe in 1965 U.N. New York
196b, p . 567
U. N. Statistical Yearbook 1965, pp. 390-393.
T. P. Alton, Polish Postwar Economy, p. 272.
160
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35
39
84
97
100
135
122
131
137
145
155
152
165
180
209
237
259
280
330
360
379
414

161

By the end'of 1946 foreign trade began to function under
national economic plans. The first Polish over-all
economic plan was elaborated for the period 1947-1949 and
essentially remained as a plan of reconstruction through
out its course.

The goals for foreign trade as set in

the Three-Year Plan (1947-1949) were very ambitious.
Imports were to increase by 190 percent in 1947 and by
over 250 per cent in 1949 as compared with 1938.

The

expected increase in exports amounted to 50 per cent in
1947 and to 150 per cent in 1949 as compared with 1938.^
The anticipated deficit in the balance of payments
amounting to 767 million dollars for the period of
1947-1949 was expected to be covered by foreign aid and
credits. However, these expectations failed. In early
1947 Poland was unable to receive a loan of 600 million

dollars from the World Bank of Reconstruction,and
Development.

At the same time, under Soviet pressure

Poland refused to participate in the Marshall Plan.

As

the result of these, the Three-Year Plan was underful
filled by a wide percentage.

The realized imports fell

short of those envisaged by the plan by 45 per cent in
1 9 4 7 and by 28 per cent in 1949.

This also had a decisive impact on the implementa
tion of planned investment goals. Since about 25 per
cent of total investments were to be covered by imports.
X

T. P. Alton, op. cit., p. 272.
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the investment targets as set out in the 1946 ’’draft"
of the Three-Year Plan were only 69 per cent fulfilled,^
The Six-Year Plan envisaged to "construct the bases of
socialism" in Poland was elaborated for the period of
1950-1955. In this plan the law of socialist develop
ment, or the so called "absolute principle of preferen
tial growth of capital g o o d s ^ industries" found its
full implementation.
During this period the autarchic tendencies were
prevailing in the economic policy of all countries of
the Bloc including Poland.

Efforts were directed to ach

ieve the highest possible degree of economic independence
of any other nation.

-

As expressed by a German economist:

Ibid, p. 271.
:
The main stress in this plan has been placed on the
development of "heavy industry". In 1949 a percen
tage share of investment outlays in the national
income amounted to 15,6 percent, and to 27,9 per cent
in 1953» declining later to 22.2 per cent by 1955.
Under the Six-Year Plan approximately 77 per cent of
total investment were designated for the "productive
purposes" and about 50 per cent for the development
of capital goods industries,
D ochod harodowy Polski 1954 i 1955 (National Income
ôî’*"PoIan3^ 1954 and 1955) Warsaw, Glowny Urzad'Statystyczny, 1957, p. 47.
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" a constant task of planning is the reducing of necessary
.imports,'!^ f.:'" Accordingly, the "Import first" method
of planning of foreign trade and physical balancing of
"material balances" dominated trade.

To some extent,

the emphasis on autarchy and neglect of the foreign
trade was caused by the post-war political tensions
and the Western embargo on strategic exports to the
■communist countries.

As stated by Hilary Mine, who was

at this time the Chairman'of the State Commission for
Economic Planning:
"this forced us to develop domestic
production in a number of branches hastily and at high
c o s t The Six-Year Plan goals for foreign trade have
been basically fulfilled.

By the end of 1955 total im

ports amounted to 932 million dollars and were more than
3 times higher than in 1938.

During the period of 1950-

1955 total imports increased by 40 per cent and total
exports by 45 per cent. In 1955 total exports amounted
to, $919,000,000 and were more than four times higher than
those in 1938.
These figures look less impressive when compared
with the annual rate of growth of industrial production
in this period, which reached the level of 19.6 per cent
X

Quoted by Zauberman, op, cit., p. 24 from R, Bauer,
Die Planning der wintschaftlichen Jaetigkeit der
volkseigenen handelsunternechmeh Deutscher Yhnen-und
AushenlxancThX in der DDR CUoc'torâr"Dissertation,
HbcEscEûTê^ur Okononie), p. 44.
^

H. Mine, Speech at the Eight Plenum, October 21, 1956,
Nowe Drogi, No. 10 (1956), p. 123, cited by'J. M.
SontTaF~in "Central Planning in Poland, pp. 64-65.
^ iiiiii i n II I II-mill 1,111, I II I I ,- . .

—

imi.iii

■, i

«'

7

X

X
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for .1950-1953 and 15.5 per cent for 1953-1955.^ During
the period 1950-1955 the annual rate of growth of trade
per capita was 5.3 per cent and the annual increases in
industrial production per capita were 14 per cent.
This seems to indicate that increases in foreign trade
turnovers could be faster, and the "trade potential"
could be more fully utilized,^ As the result of poli
tical changes which took place in the Soviet Union after
Stalin’s death in 1953, several economic reforms were
introduced in the Soviet Union.

Following the \ ead of

U.S.S.R., Poland modified her economic policies in order
to slow down the rate of expansion of the capital goods
sector. The autarchic ideas have come under heavy
/
attack and foreign trade has been finally recognized as
the vital sector of the economy, while problems of
X

A. Bodnar, Gospodarka eurapejskich prajow socjalistycznych, (Economies of European Socialist CountriesTT
WSrsa%, K. W., 1962, p. 102.
^
i

According to E. Pryor’s definition "trade potential"
means "the volume of trade at the point where it is
impossible to obtain a higher national income by a
change in volume and/or composition-of foreign trade."
P. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, p. 26.
It should Be”"'hoîe^!"%TlETïIW'""^^ilrrThat the correlation
between the rate of growth of industrial production
and the rate of growth of trade can be a weak one which
does not mean that the trade potential is not utilized
fully providing that there is à large domestic market.
Secondly, methods of computation of "trade potential"
seem still to be controversial, Hov/ever, in the case
of Poland which does not have a huge domestic market
and in the light of her autarchical policies this
comparison seems to be justified.
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specialization of production and advantages of interna
tional division of labor began to be widely discussed.
The dramatic events of October 1956 which shook-up the
leadership of the Polish United Worker’s Party, revealed
the wide-spread discontent with the policy of "blind"
imitation of Soviet-economic patterns. Very serious
disproportions in the development of industries created
by the Implementation of the Six^Year Plan, shortages
and bottlenecks came to

light for the first time and

were discussed not only in the specialized journals,
but,also by the daily press. The situation was really
strained,and called for "essential reforms".
Finally a new policy, based less on "material
balancing" and giving a wider scope for economic cal
culation; of the two Five-Year Plans, (1956-1960 and
1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 5 ) was announced,

'It raised postulates translated

into! to decrees and ordinances with the purpose of
removing' excessive centralization of decision making and
defective planning. The two Five-Year Plans seemed to
be much more consistent internally, with the planned
goals:set on more "reasonable" levels.

The pattern of

t

trade:in this period had undergone deep changes. First .
of vail ^ the political events of 1956 encouraged the
reestablishment of closer commercial and financial
contacts with the Western world.

Various credits.granted

atnthis time to Poland by Western countries,and the most
Important of which was credit granted by the U.:6.A. on
very'favourable terms,could considerably help to relax
thetrather strained situation in the Polish balance of
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payments.

At the same time, however, the situation on

the world market turned out to be very unfavorable to
Polish exports swallowing almost entirely the positive
effect of credits.

In the early 1950's the overwhelming

bulk of Polish exports consisted of raw materials and
foodstuffs, with coal being the principal export item.
After the end of the "Korean boom" and especially 4he
effect of drastic reduction of prices for coal, the
position of coal as the major foreign exchange earner
was weakened.

At the same time quantities of coal

exported were drastically reduced.

Simultaneously, foreign

earnings from exports of foodstuffs shrunk,significantly
as the result of hazardous agrarian policy of forced
collectivization leading to the serious collapse of the
agricultural sector.

If we add to this the fact that

Poland was heavily dependent on imports of raw materials,
it becomes clear that foreign trade appeared to be one
of the most severe bottlenecks in Polish economy.

The

pronounced deterioration of Poland's foreign trade
position can be easily evident from the statistical data.
During the period of 1958-1961, the value of exports
increased by 4 1 . 9 per cent and value of imports by

37.5 per cent.

Simultaneously the volume of exports

•

increased by 151.5 per cent and the volume of imports by -.

139.5 per cent.

Thus,the terms of trade considerably

deteriorated, the ratio of the per centage increase of

value to the percentage increase of volume of exports for
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this period was 93.7 while the same ratio for imports

98.6 .%
It seems safe to remark, that some of the difficul
ties of this period were also due to the significant
shifts that occurred in the structure of Polish foreign
trade. The proportion of raw materials and unprocessed
products previously dominating in Polish exports was
continuously diminishing being replaced by a steadily
increasing share of machinery and other engineering
products. As a consequence, the 1961-1965 plan heavily
emphasized the increase in exports, which was indispen
sable owing not only to the difficult situation in the
field of foreign trade, and the considerable burden of
foreign debts which had to be repaid but also the conti
nuously increasing import demand due to the development
of the economy.

In 1965 total imports amounted to 2130

million dollars and total exports to 2296 million dollars.
Thus, the average annual rate of growth of imports in
this period was 8,4 per cent while that of exports 14,2
per cent.

In the light of these data Polish balance of

J. Niegowski, W. Rydygier, Problemy handlu zagraniezn e g o , pp. 604 - 6 0 5 .
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trade should be closed with the surplus of 166 million
dollars.%
X

This data is from "Economic Survey of Europe in 1965
U. N. New York, 1966, p., 561
They differ considerably from those quoted by A, Kar™
pinski in "The Polish Economy" 1961-1965. Warsaw,
Pelonia Publishing' House !l96^, p. 99. According to
Karpinski total exports were expected to reach a
value of 2055 million dollars in 1965, which gives
an increase of 55 per cent as compared with I960,
Total value of imports were to reach the amount of
1902 million dollars which means that imports were
to go up by 27.2 per cent in the same period.
Accordingly the commodity turnover of Polish foreign
trade was to close with a favorable balance of
.$153,000,000, According to.data provided by Niegowski
and Rydygier-, the favorable balance of trade was to amount
;.167,5: mill*" dollars in 1965 and total imports
to increase by 30 per cent as compared with I960
while total increase in exports by 43 per cent.
See Ibid, pp. 598-599.
It should be noted that all this data can give no
more than a rather poor reflection of reality, and
cannot be interpreted liberally.
Besides the usual distortion affected by necessary
aggregation, changes in the structure and price
relations, several other factors affect the picture.
First of all the existing pricing and cost methods
in respect to domestic markets make the domestic and
foreign prices completely incomparable. Further,
Polish statistics present all the foreign trade data
in terms of "exchange zlotys" achieving the common
denominator for all foreign currencies in question
by multiplying them by a rigid and unrealistically
set rate of exchange, then lumping it .together into
aggregate values.
.
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II

COmiODITY COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN TRADE
•While Polish post-war foreign trade turnovers were

increasing at relatively high rates trying to keep
pace with the growth of her industry, far going changes
took place in the commodity pattern of trade.

Analysis

of the commodity composition of Polish foreign trade is
rather difficult due to the unavailability of statis
tical information, especially for the period 1948-1955
when Polish official sources included total weights of
imports and exports, the latter being broken down into
very broad commodity groups.

Besides this, trade totals

in terms of "exchange zlotys" translated into dollars
at the official rate of exchange, leave much to be desi
red.

The pre-war and early post-war pattern of Polish
foreign trade approximated closely so called "coal
monoculture".

Before the war three main items; food

(37 per cent in 1937), fuel (18 per cent) and timber
made up almost four-fifths of the export total.

Coal

was the principal export item in trie first post-war
decade, however its share in exports total was steadily
declining.

In 1945 coal made up 77 per cent of exports

and-7 '' in 1949, 46 per cent. Besides coal and coke, the
other important commodities in 1949 exports were;
agricultural and food products - 20 per cent of exports,
raw mater ia ls a n d se mi -manufactures - 17,6 per cent,
industrial goods - 16.2 per cent.%
X
T. P. Alton, Polish Postwar E c o n o m y . p. 275.
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STRUCTURE CE IMPORTS AND, EXPORTS BY COMMODITY GROUPS
(in million of U. 8, dollars at current prices and per
centage distribution)

GROUPS OP

,•

MILLIOH $

PmCmiAGE

1956

1965

1965 = 100
1966 196Y

1022

2296

+5.1

399

770

Fuels and raw
materials
497

COMMODITIES

1956

1960

1964

1965

5.5

100

100

100

100

11.5

3.7

33.2

27.1

30.6

32.8

1085

2.5

8.4

48.6

51.5

48.7

47.3

Unprocessed
and nrocessed
food'
123

286

-2.2

11.0

12.1

16.0

15.3

13.2

Consumer's
manufactures

155

4.7 -11.9

6.1

' 5.4

5.4

6.7

Total imports
clf
1.

Machinery
and Equlp, merit

2.
3.

4,

TOTAL EXPORTS
fob

63

985

2130

5.4

9.6

100

100

100

100

1. Machinery and
Equipment
152

762

15.8

16.2

15.6

28.0

33.4

34.4

2, Fuels and raw
materials
629

732

0.2

4.3

63.8

43.8

35.5

35.1

3. Unprocessed and
processed food 116 357 -18.2

1.1

11.7

18.1

18.7

18.2

4., Consumer's
manufactures 88
279 20.8 11.0
8.9 10.1 12.4
.. .
... .... . Sources: U, N. Statistical Yearbook 1965, pp, 390-393.
Concice StatTstical. YeaVoook of Poland, 1966
pp. 168-170.
Economic Survey of Europe' in 1965
ÜTN. New York, l^SFTp. STT
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12.3

DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN TRADE BY COMMODITY GROUPS

qppi^T-prnA
rn N
OJrijvJLi'
_Lv A m
l ±VIM

index I 9 6 0 =100
at I960 prices
r„ .,r
1956
I960
1961
1962
1963

—

1964

1965

Turnover

65

100

114

127

134

147

165

Imports

66

100

114

128

135

139

163

Machinery and
Equipment

84

100

121

154

164

156

189

2. Fuels and raw
materials

62

100

112

118

121

132

155

51

100

105

102

120

1%_

132

4. Consumer's
manufactures

71

100

125

165

161

146

202

EXPORTS - .

63

100

114

127

133

. Ma chi ne ry a nd
Equipment

41

100

112

132

155

196

207

2, Fuels and raw
materials

85

100

102

115

119

128

137

3. Unprocessed and
: processed food

46

100

140

139.

103

140

156

4. Consumer's
Manufactures

60

100

129

146

183

202

214

1 ,

3 .

1

Unprocessed and
processed food

Source:

....1 5 7

Concice Statistical Yearbook of Poland, 1966,
‘p, 168,
171
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The composition of imports v/as as follov/s;

machinery

and apparatus - 19 per cent;rubber and its substitutes17 per cent;chemicals - 12 per cent.
Starting with the Three-Year Plan, Polish foreign
trade policy was aimed at the reduction of imports of
raw materials and semi-manufactured goods.

It was

aimed at obtaining the highest possible share of highly
processed agricultural product and manufactured consumer
goods and lately of machinery and equipment in Polish
exports.

At the same time machinery and raw materials

were still the principal import items due to the increa
sed demand resulting from high rates of industrial growth. .
Since the middle 1950's, it became obvious that the era
of "coal monoculture" was definitely over. Fuels and
raw materials still dominated Polish exports, contribu
ting about 63.8 per cent of export earnings (629 million
dollars) in 1956, and the main items in this group;

coal

and coke accounted for about 46 per cent of the exports
total,%% But by I960 the share of fuels and raw materials
fell to 43.8 per cent v/hile export of coal and coke
contributed only 18.7 per cent to exports. In 1965, this
commodity group accounted for only 35.1 per cent of exports.
At the same time there was a truly spectacular rise of
capital goods into the role of the leading export indus-?
try.

In 1937 machinery and equipment accounted for only

X

Ibid, p. 276, Table 52,
%% Y. Niegowski, -W, Rydygieu, op. cit., p. 608,
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2 per cent of exports. By 1956 the share of this group
rose to 15,6 per cent and in I960 it contributed.28 per
cent of exports total.
During the five year period of 1960-1965 exports
of machinery and equipment rose by 107 per cent reaching
a value of 762 million dollars in 1965.

Within this

commodity group the export of rolling s t o c k s s h i p s ,
machine tools, mining machinery and complete factories
rose most rapidly. The other fast- growing group of
exports are chemical products, 'Besideg the traditional '
exports of soda ash and caustic soda, coke derivatives7,
there was a considerable increase in exports of pro'cessed
chemical..' '7 products like polyvinyl chloride (its
exports rose between I960 and 1965, 13-fold) polystyrene,
pharmaceutical products (122 per cent increase) dyestuffs
(126 per cent increase) and others.%
During the period 1961-1965 Poland appeared for the
first time as an exporter of sulphur. Agricultural
products always played a very important role in Polish
exports.

In pre-war Poland, this group contributed

almost one-third of the exports total.

Exports of

animal products, especially bacon.and tinned meat had an
established market in Western Europe, After the war,
substantial surpluses in Polish food trade turned into
a severe deficit.

During almost the v/hole post-war

period Poland had to rely heavily on the imports of grain,
X

A. Karpinski, The Polish Economy, p. 102,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

174

The net'grain import depended on the year's harvest
and played a quite important role in determining her
import capacity with respect to other commodity groups.
Agricultural produce still plays a very important role
in Polish exports.

Since about 85 per cent of agricul

tural produce goes to the countries of Western Europe
with which Poland has a persistent and remarkable deficit
in the balance of payments, every possible effort has
been done to maintain and expand these exports. In
1956 the export of agricultural products reached the

value of 116 million dollars and amounted to 11.7 per
cent of total exports.

By 1965 it increased by 56 per

cent, its share in exports total went up to 18,2 per
cent.

The most important export items were; ham (about

70,000 tons in 1965), butter (56,000 tons in 1965),

eggs (third place in the world exports of eggs), liquor
(220,000 imperial gallons in terms of pure spirits) sugar
and others.
In the group of consumer's manufactured,
traditional export items are; woolen and cotton fabrics,
cut glassware, porcelain and crystal.
During the period of 1958-1961 export of manufac
tured consumer goods increased by II4 per cent amounting
to 279 million dollars (12,3 per cent of exports).
As far as imports are concerned fuels and raw mate
rials continue to be leading import items.

Their share '

in imports total increased rapidly during the Six-Year
X

Ibid,

pp.

1 0 2 -1 0 3 .
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Plan,

This v/as mainly due to the heavy investment poli

cy adopted in this plan as well as to the autarchical
drive’ to develop several industries simultaneously.
Some industries created during the Six-Year Plan have
been too materially intensive and,what is more important^
they were ill-adjusted to the resource-basis of the
country.

Thus, the bulk of input requirements for these

industries had to be covered by imports.
In 1956 imports of fuels and raw materials reached
the value of 497 million dollars.

Its share in import

totals amounted to 48,6 per cent.

Subsequent economic

plans took much pain to correct the disproportions
v/hich arose during the Six-Year Plan and eased partially
the pressure of import requirements of raw-materials.
Because of the size of the country and its factor endow
ment, it is highly improbable that any drastic reduction
in the volume of these imports can take place in the
future.
Sgcond in order of importance is the group consis
ting of machinery and equipment.

In 1956 its share amoun

ted to 33.2 per cent of total imports and changed only
slightly during the last decade. However, the value of
imports of machinery and equipment was 127 per cent
higher in 1965 as compared with 1956 amounting to 770
million dollars.in 1965, These imports played an enormous
role in the process of the industrialization of the
economy.
In the meantime, machinery and equipment established
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itself as the principal export industry.

However, this

should not indicate that imports of this group would be
diminished if Poland would proceed along the lines of
specialization of production in these branches,where
she has comparative advantage, and disregard former em
phasis on autarchy.

Pre-war Poland had a substantial

surplus in her food trade and depended only on imports
of some tropical foods and oils.

Post-war agricultural

policy resulting in stagnation -in'agrlculture"'
turned this surplus into quite a ^severe',.déficit. 7 The
government inflamed "class war" in the villages aiming
to eliminate richer peasants and to organize the poorer
peasants into cooperatives, discriminatory tax policies
and schedules of compulsory deliveries of farm products
to the state, movement of the considerable amount of
agricultural labour force to the cities to meet the
demand of the expanding industries together with the low
priority of agricultural investments - all have made
their own contribution to the collapse of agricultural
production in the early 1950's.

New agricultural poli

cies adopted by the end of 1953 and aimed at increasing
agricultural production, did not seem to be really
effective.

In 1956 imports of unprocessed and processed

food reached the value of 123 million dollars.

Its

share in import total amounted to 12,1 per cent.

By 1965

this share increased to 13.2 per cent, while the value
of imported foodstuffs rose more than two-fold.
Imports
of grain played the most important part in this group.
Since the early I960's it has regularly exceeded 6 million
tons per year.
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Ill GEOGRAPHICAL DIRECTIONS OF TRADE
A.

^TRADE PATTERN WITH BLOC COUNTRIES
The intensity of the political impact on Poland’s

foreign economic relations is perhaps most striking in
the case of her new geographical network of trade.

In

1937 only 7 per cent of Polish total trade .was/ directed
to the Soviet Union and other East European countries
which after the war formed the so called Soviet Bloc,
In 1948 the share of this group in trade totals increa
sed to 40 per cent and was continuously growing, reach
ing 66 per cent in 1965. There is a whole chain of
events and forces which.lie behind this shift of trade
channels from West to East and only a surface of this
change can be mirrored in statistical data. The tradi
tional Polish trade network was violently disrupted by
the war.

The very incorporation of Poland into the

Soviet - Bloc favored the develooment of her trade
contracts with Soviet Union and other satellite countries
Immediately after the war, due to the disorganization of
transport facilities in Europe as well as in result of
commodity credits granted to Poland by the Soviet Union
with the purpose of re-establishing normal economic life
in the country seriously destroyed by war, the Soviet
Union became Poland’s leading trade partner.
I n the

late

1940's other factors

joi n e d to f o s t e r

Eastern orientation of Polish foreign trade patterns.
177
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THE GEOGRAPHICAL STRUCTURE OP POLISH FOREIGN TRADE
IMPORTS BY COUNTRIES
1950
In MIL.
U.8.$

1955 I960. 19%4
IN IN MIL. U .8. IN
%
%
M m ™

Tbtal-mporW"
cif

668

socialist
countries

408

61.1 605

advanced
countries %

239

35.8 251

-350

76

underdeveloped
countries
U:S;S;R.
Great Britain
France.'.
Italy
Sweden r
West Germany

3.1

192

28.8

63
20
21

9.5

17

U.S.A.

5

Canada

0.07

2130

100

1408

66.1

536

25.6 542

25.4

206

231

11.4 180

8.5

413 465

642

31.0 728

31:1

89
34 26
8 ^ 21

82

4

96

45
32

2

35

%. 5
1.6

15
23

17
71

22

1.5 49
1.1^ 28 '

74

3.5

84 - .3.9

2.5
3.0

84

113
46

5.5

30

1.4

2.1

24

1.1

100 932 1495 2072 100

21

32

1965
IN MIL. IN
U.S. $
%

68

3
3.1
4.7
2.5
0.6

939 1305

15

63

2.3
1.3

AustriaBelgium, Denmark, Finland, Prance,'Netherlands,
WgSt Germany, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Great Bri^
tain, Italy, Canada, U.S.A, Australia, New Zeland.
Source : Concice Statistical Yearbook of Poland, 1966,

ppTTTTTTZr"------------------- r
■;-

Economic Bulletin for Europe, Nov. 1964, p. 77.
U« N. Statistical Yearbook T96$, pp. 39-393.
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THE GEOGRAPHICAL STRUCTURE OF POLISH FOREIGN TRADE
EXPORTS BY COUNTRIES
1950
INi MIL. IN
U. 8 . $ %

1964
1955 I960
IN MIL . O F
U.S. $ CURRENT
PRICES

1965
IN MIL.
U.S. $

IN

%

Total Exp.
fob

634

100

919

1326

2096

2296

100

Socialist
Countries

361

56.9

578

826

1350

1451

63.

Advanced
Western
Countries

242

38.1

187

320

456

582

25.

31

5.0

154

180

190

263

11.5

154 24.3
Great Britain 53
France
24
16
Italy

280
78

390

721

781

35

99

128

128
30

Underdeve
loped coun
tries
U.S.8.R.

Sweden

36

West Germany 15
U.S.A.
11
Canada
0.3

13
6,4
20
29
23
0.6

15
30 '
18
75
32
2

36
52

56
32

29
92

115

55
9

69
11

'Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands,
y/çst Germany, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Great Britain,
Italy, Canada, U.S.A., Australia, New Zeland.
Source:

Ooncice Statistical Yearbook of Poland. 1966,
p. 171 - 172
U. N. Statistical Yearbook. 1965, p. 39-393.
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First, under Soviet pressure Poland refused to participa
te in the Marshall Plan tightening her trade links with '
the Bloc countries.

The appearance of the Council of

Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) in January 1949 sym
bolized the beginning of forcing Soviet satellites into
economically harmonized groups.
Secondly, the political tensions of the "cold war"
policy which reached its peak before and during the
outbreak of the Korean War, divided the world into two
hostile camps and somewhat strenghtened the tendency
for the coehesion.of the Soviet-bloc for security reasons,
Thirdly, the so called "strategic embargo" imposed
upon the Soviet Union in 1948 and subsequently extended
to the entire Soviet Bloc gave a new, strong impulse
to a further tightening of economic relations within the
Bloc and cutting off existing trade links with the West,
Besides this, several economic factors have acted to
encourage Polish trade with her Bloc partners,
1) Trade with the West was becoming increasingly diffi
cult due to the rapid change in the commodity composi
tion of Poland’s import demand and export supply.
Her pre-war traditional pattern of trade with Western
countries consisted of the export of agricultural and
light industrial products, and the import of machinery
and consumer goods. Poland began to produce at home,
some of the previously imported machinery and import of
X

As years long experience indicate CEMA proved to be
rather ineffective instrument of intra-bloc coordina
tion of economic systems of its member countries.
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others was restricted by the scarcity of "hard" foreign
exchange at her disposal.

The agricultural exports

shrunk due to production problems.

On the other hand the

manufactured goods which could fill the gap left by the
decrease in exports of foodstuffs were not attractive
to her Western partners because of their poor quality
and the fact that they were produced in the Y/est in
sufficient quantities.
2) A great deal of bureaucratism and inflexible trade
policy adopted by the organ of foreign trade monopoly
did not encourage ( and rather hampered) the successful
trade contacts between PTE’s and their Western partners.
3) The terms of trade which Poland received from her
trade with Bloc countries were more favourable than
those received from the West almost during the whole
post-war period,
4)

By 1950 the centralization of Polish foreign trade

under the state monopoly was completed and the system
was subjected to the discipline of central economic planning.
X

As Pryor estimates, in 1958 the Polish terras of
trade with the West were for the whole trade sample
152 per cent, for the sample without coal I40 per
cent, v/hile any percentage over 100 indicate that it
is more advantageous to trade with the Bloc countries.
It seems that the most important factors responsible
for this situation were: differences in the commodity
structure of Poland’s trade with bloc and non-bloc
countries and differ enc es in the quality of products
traded which were not always reflected in prices,
P. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, p. 172,
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From this point of view, Polish foreign trade authorities
found it relatively easier to deal with their Bloc part-;
ners who had a - similar organizational structure and
also operated under national economic plans.
Their trade contracts have become based on long
term trade agreements.

These almost purely barter

arrangements determined the quantities of commodities
exchanged, and provided a firmer basis for economic
planning than uncertain trade contracts with Western
countries,

,

Considerable relaxation in the international politi
cal climate which took place after Stalin’s death, and
the new policies announced by N. Khruschev and the
following political events of the autumn of 1956 in
Poland, opened up possibilities for the reestablishment
of former commercial contacts with the Western world.
On the other hand, these new tendencies have been counter
acted upon by more intensive consolidation of economic
ties within CEMA.

It should be noted that a long period

of isolation from Western markets, as well as the consi
derable degree of adjustment of production patterns of
the Bloc countries, together with the established prac
tice of arranging bilaterally balanced trade deals,
gave their trade contacts power of self-perpetuation
and made the reorientation of trade patterns much more
difficult than could be expected. It is easily seen
from the very fact that the partial removal of formal
barriers v/hich previously restricted Poland’s trade with
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the West did not reflect itself in any marked increase
in the share of this group in Polish foreign trade.
MECHANISM OP INTRA-BLOC TRADE
The mechanism of trade between Bloc countries which
continued to channel the bulk of Polish post-war foreign
trade to these markets is very interesting and specific.
Some of the reasons for which Polish post-war trade was
increasingly oriented toward the Soviet Union and other
Bloc countries have been already discussed.

■

The effective consolidation of Bloc countries into
an economically harmonized group, was the main reason
for the establishment of the Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance on January 21, 1949 in Moscow, of which
Poland became one of the original members.

One of the

purposes of this organisation as expressed in several
vague articles and communiques, was to organize and
foster trade relations between the member-countries. Since
the purposes and activities of CEMA received a thorough
going over by numerous economists, giving birth to
hundreds of articles and books there is no need to repeat
it here.%

To mention just a few:
R. M. Bird, COMECON and Economic Integration in the ;
Soviet Bloc, The Quarterly Review of Economics and
Business, Vol."%n7i.nt^ 1'%'4','
4.-------------ETTHes~’Economic Integration in the European Soviet
Bloc, A .E .R , Vol. 49, 1959 Papers and Proceedings.
E. NeuHmrgér, International Division of Labor in CEMA
Limited Regret Strategy, AER,~ Vol. 54, 1964, Papers and
,
Proceedings Eastern source ;
A. Bodnar,Gospodarka Eiropeiskich Kraiow socjalistycznych
Economics of European Socialist Couniries) Warsaw Kiw
1962 K, Secomski, Problem miedz.ynarodowego podzislu pracy
na tie tcorii rozmiesauzenia sil wytworczych. Economisea
No. 4, 1 9 6 4 .
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It seems safe to say that the role of CEMA in shapingforeign trade patterns has been negligible until recently.
Since the late 1940's, Polish trade relations with other
Bloc countries were carried out under bilateral clearing
agreements concluded between the Polish Ministry of
Foreign Trade with the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the
country in question.

These clearing agreements were in

reality formalized barter arrangements, determining the
detailed lists of commodities exchanged v/hile the pro
visions were made to balance the mutual trade in order
to minimize the currency transfer. Payments resulting
from these transactions were also subject to formal
arrangements under which both countries kept accounts
in their state banks, recording each commercial delivery.
These accounts were intended to balance each period
covered by the agreement in question. Prom the formal
point of view three methods were envisaged in the case
of the "failure" of one of the partners to match in
value the deliveries of the other;
1) supplementary deliveries of goods
2)

payment in convertible currency of Western countries

3,)

shipment of gold
Because of severe shortage of "hard" foreign curren

cy which all the Bloc countries experienced, and rather
scarce resources of gold in their possession (with the
only exception of the U.S.S.R.), these accounts were
usually brought into balance by the first method.
It should be also pointed out, that the character of
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these clearing agreements is quite different from that
used in trade with or between non-Soviet countries.
Concluding a clearing agreement the only obligation
which the "capitalist" government takes, is to issue
a certain amount of import or export licences accordingly
to the mutually agreed list of commodities or import
quotas*
Obligations of the state resulting from trade agree
ments concluded by Bloc countries are much heavier.
'Socialist trade agreements express the obligation of
the state to buy and sell quantities of commodities as
specified in the agreement.
■ Very soon it became obvious that this physical
balancing leaves much to be desired, and in effect hampers
the extension of trade between Bloc countries instead of encou
raging it. To mention just a few of the most severe
shortcomings of this method of conducting foreign trade:
1)

it requires the exact adjustment of the mutual

turnovers and in effect limits the exchange to the level
of the weaker partner
2) it gives no premises as to the evaluation of which
transaction is profitable for one or both partners or
along what lines they should specialize their production,
and thus it -limits the advantages flowing from the inter
national division of labor.
3) as with :almOst rail, other%methodsi:ef..parrying out foreign
trade activity adopted by organs of foreign trade mono
poly, it is highly inflexible and unoperational,%
Bloc economists were completely aware of these short
comings and a great deal of criticism for this method
came from their side. See, Z. Kamecki,
Soldaczuk,
W. Sierpinski, Mizd;ynarodowe stosunki ekonomiczne, p. 535*
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Since 1954 the problems of the specialization of produc
tion between CEMA countries and of finding a more ade
quate basis for their trade relations have begun to
receive increasing attention by Bloc policy makers.
As the result of many discussions, several steps have
been taken to reshape the economic cooperation of the
CEMA member-countries and to improve their foreign trade
systems.

In 1964 members of CEMA agreed to introduce

the system of multilateral clearing.

The agreement

included balancing of trade turnovers, exchange of
services and credit facilities on multilateral basis.
To perform this task, the International Bank of Economic
Cooperation has been established
So far it is too early to judge if these measures
contributed in practice to the development and improve
ment of Polish trade relations with other Bloc countries
and what is more important if they really made them more
"rational" and advantageous.
Statistical data available on Polish trade with
Bloc countries is not only incomplete but also inade
quate to make any qualified judgement as to what extent
this new geographical mold of Polish foreign trade was
advantageous or disadvantageous to Poland.

Several

shortcomings of the mechanism of her trade are widely
known and from this point of view it seems that Poland's
economy would benefit considerably on their removal.

Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Economic
Power, 87 Congress, Second Session, Washington, 19’62”,
Deb. 10 and 11, p. 34.
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Official statistics are limited to picture .trade
turnovers with Bloc countries in terms of value of the
very- broad commodity groups, in physical terms of quan
tities or in terras of total weights of imports and exports,
Price information is scarcely available and rather
useless as a device to measure the profitability of
Poland's trade.
In the "socialist group", the Soviet Union continued
to be Poland's leading trade partner.

In 1950 exports

to the Soviet Union reached the value of 154 million
dollars (24.3 per cent of total exports,) Imports from
the U.S.S.R. amounted to 192 million dollars and consti
tuted 28,8 per cent of total imports.

By 1965 this si

tuation changed; the share of imports rose to 31.1 per
cent respectively. As this data suggests,
the deficit in balance of trade with the Soviet Union
which in 1950 amounted to 38 million dollars turned into
a surplus of 53 million dollars in 1965.
It is interesting to note that an appreciable part
of Polish exports to the Soviet Union (over one-quarter)
consists of engineering products, mainly rolling stock,
ships, transport equipment.

On the other hand the majo

rity of imports are essential raw materials,^

This is

rather a peculiar situation for the political leader and
X
Poland sells twice as much machinery and equipment in
terms of value to Soviet Union than she imports from
Soviet Union,
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its satellite.

.

•

At the same time it seems very dubious that these
trade relations have been always based on a so loudly,
pronounced "principle of equality of rights" and mutual
advantage of both trading partners.

The political

events of October 1956 revealed some data indicating
that this was not always the case and that the Soviet
Union took advantage of her political and economic
preponderance.

The most striking example of these

policies was the export of Polish coal to the U.S.S.R.
In accordance with the provisions of the agreement of
August 1945, Poland delivered approximately 65 million
tons of coal to the Soviet Union until.1954. This coal
was priced at the mere cost of transportation to the
Soviet border while the average world price for coal
in this period was about $14-15 per ton.

Thus,' Soviet

gain on this transaction amounted to 900-950 million
dollars, ' In 1956 the Soviet Union cancelled the Polish
debt with the Soviet Union amounting to #542 million
dollars to compensate for these deliveries,^
. This was one of very few examples were the Soviet
Union admitted its discriminatory policies and it is
hard to believe that this was one "exceptional case"
and not a common practice,
; i :Aa far as Polish trade with other Bloc countries is
concerned, the relative equality of bargaining power

A. zauberman, industrial Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East German y , Yô3ïnôTê""ôîripT""^FZT^ ^
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seems to be leas questionable.

In 1950 Polish export

to the Bloc countries (excluding the U.S.S.R.) reached
the value of 207 million dollars, its share in export
total amounting to almost 33 per cent. By 1965 these
exports increased to 670 million dollars, and consbituted 28.2 per cent of export totals. Polish imports
from other satellite countries amounted to 216 million
dollars in 1950 and increased to 620 million dollars
in 1965.

Correspondingly, its share in import totals

Was 32.3 per cent in 1950 and rose to 35 per cent by 1965.
Normally, Poland had a deficit in her commodity trade with
the Bloc countries which was covered by surplus on her
service account. However in 19 64 and I965 Poland achie
ved also a ' surplus on her commodity trade with this
area.

In the conditions of barter exchange it caused

a considerable disturbance in the commodity flows and
payments. In order to remove this obstacle subsequent
economic plans provided for a substantial rise in Polish
imports from CEMA countries.

The second most important

Polish trade partner was Czechoslovakia, which played
a significant part in Polish machinery imports (in 1953
her share in Polish foreign trade was over 10 per cent).
By 1957 Pclish-Czechoslovakia trade fell sharply, but
was reestablished to the previous level in early 1960's.
Discoveries of rich deposits of sulphur and copper in
Poland, the development of which is financed to the
considerable extent by Czechoslovakia, seem to provide
suitable environment for further extension of trade
contracts between these two countries.

Generally, the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

190

Polish post-war pattern of trade with Bloc countries
changed significantly. In the first post-war decade
Polish imports from this area consisted mainly of
.machinery and equipment supplemented by some raw mate
rials and semi-manufactured products.

At the turn of

1950's, almost 90 per cent of Polish exports to this
area consisted of raw materials (mainly coal, coke and
unprocessed chemical products).

In the 1960's the commo

dity pattern of trade with the area changed.

The share

of engineering products in Poland's exports increased to
one-third of total exports, while the share of raw
materials and foodstuffs relatively declined.

Thus

Poland's commodity pattern of trade with the Bloc area
markedly approximated those usually regarded as typical
for industrial areas of the world.
B.

TRADE PATTERNS WITH THE ADVANCED COUNTRIES OP THE
WORDD.

It seems safe to say that political and economic
factors responsible for the moulding of Polish post
war geographical pattern of trade worked unquestionably
towards discouraging Poland's trade relations with the
economically advanced West, Polish pre-war trade has
been mainly directed to Western Europe, accounting for
56 per cent of exports total in 1937 and 72 per cent of

imports.

In 1950 Polish imports from advanced countries

reached the value of 239 m i l l i o n dollars and constituted

35.8 per cent of her imports.

At the same time exports

amounted to 242 million dollars (38.1 per cent of exports
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total).

The most important export item in this period

was coal, making up over one half of total export
earnings from this area. In 1949, Poland’s export of
coal to Western Europe reached the peak amount of 11,8
million tons. An increased supply of British and
American coal in early 1950's, together with Polish
pricing policy brought

these exports to 6.8 million tons

by 1953. Besides coal, Poland supplied considerable
amounts of foodstuffs (meats, eggs), chemicals and
,* '

textiles. On the import side, most important were:
machinery and equipment, metals, wool, rubber and some
raw materials.

By 1955 exports to this area declined

to 187 million dollars
export totals.

and their share to 20 per cent of

Imports showed a slight increase in

absolute terms amounting to 251 million dollars but their
share fell to 26 per cent.
In her trade with Western countries, Poland still
maintains the traditional pre-war pattern, where exports
of agricultural products (mainly meat, eggs, poultry,
butter and sugar) account for about half of exports
total.
Poland seems to be very much concerned with the
reestablishment of her trade relations with the western
world, however, present perspectives for the expansion
of this trade do not seem to be too promising.

This is

mainly due to the strengthening of integration processes
in Western Europe which threatens to irapare her position
of food supplier to Western markets. The share of Polish
trade with the Common Market constituted about 9.1 per
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cent of her trade in 1961 and the trade with BETA
countries about 12,4 per cent respectively.

Great

Britain is Poland's principal partner in this area.

Her

possible access to the Common Market is expected to have
a negative effect of the future of Polish-British trade.
POLISH TRADE WITH THE UNDERDEVEBOPED COUNTRIES.
Since mid-1950's Polish foreign trade relations
with the developing non-European countries has been
increasingly growing in importance. It seems that the
perspectives of further expansion of this trade are
rather promising and mutually advantageous for both
sides.
The new post-war pattern of Polish trade certainly
deteriorated her old trade links with industrialized
areas of the world but at the same time it provided a
firmer base for the development of trade with underdeve
loped countries. Several factors are important in this
respect. First of all, there are some similarities in
the economic position of Poland and her developing coun
try partners. The Achilles heel of Polish post-war
economy was her foreign payments with the group of
I -

advanced countries.

The majority of the underdeveloped

countries experienced the same difficulties.

Secondly,

the dissimilarities in the structure of economics, make'
the commodity exchange very promising.
c o u n t r i e s i n c l u d i n g P o l a n d are

All the Bloc

s t il l h e a v i l y d e p e n d e n t

on imports of raw materials. The shortage of raw mate
rials was critical in many instances. According to the
estimates of CEMA in I960 planned demand for rolled steel
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in. the Bloc was expected to exceed planned production by
about 4 ,500,000 tons;

for steel in bars by about

3 ,500,000 tons.^

Trade with underdeveloped countries
would certainly help to solve the acute shortage of some
types of raw materials.

On the other hand underdeveloped

countries would find markets for their products when the
outlets for selling them to the industrialized West
,markedly, shrunk.

At the same time Poland has chances in

finding an absorbtive market for her dynamically growing
exports of machinery and equipment.

Directing these

exports to markets in advanced countries is rather diffi
cult,if not impossible, because of the strong competition
and still low quality of her products as compared with
Western products.

On the other hand, these products

fit much better the technical requirements and factor
endowment of underdeveloped countries entering the road
of industrialization. Besides this, the exchange can be
arranged on a barter base with a minimal flow of foreign
currency scarce in both partner countries.

Of course,

these possibilities should not be over estimated, as any
barter arrangement requires a match of corresponding
demands and supplies on both sides and this can be diffi
cult to meet in practice.

For this reason, Poland's

ability to sell her products on credit terms would be
of prime importance.

F. Pryor,

Actually, Poland can hardly afford

The Communist Foreign Trade System, p. 32.
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this, and this situation-can have a negative impact on
further expansion of her trade with developing areas.
There is an additional advantage which Poland can draw
from this trade, and a very important one from the point
of view of making her economic policy less dependent on
the Soviet Union, During the whole post-war period
Poland heavily depended on Soviet deliveries of raw
materials.

It seems clear that under such circumstances

any Soviet refusal to continue these deliveries would
bring economic crisis to the country.

Thus, the threat

is by no means negligible and must be constantly kept in
mind by Poland's policy makers.
In 1 9 5 0 , Polish trade with underdeveloped countries
was of rather marginal importance.

Imports reached the

value of 21 million dollars and constituted about 3 per
cent of total imports.

Export to these countries amounted

to 31 million dollars and its share in export totals was
roughly 5 per cent. By 1965 exports to underdeveloped
countries reached the value of 263 million dollars, or
more than 8 times higher than in 1950, On the import
side, the share of underdeveloped countries in Polish,
imports was about 8,5 per cent. In terms of value,
imports from this area amounted to 180 million dollars.
The biggest 'trade partners in this area were:

1

Latin',,

America; Brazil and Argentina, in Asia, India, Indonesia,
Pakistan, Ceylon and Iran, in Africa - Egypt and Morocco.
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POLAND'S FOREIGN PAYMENTS POSITION
In the conditions of rapidly increasing foreign
trade relations which took place in the post-war period,
Poland was almost continuously experiencing a deficit
in her balance of payments. This was by no means, a new
phenomenoh, Poland's inter-war economy suffered from an
insufficient capital supply and her foreign payments were
almost entirely dependent on thq commodity trade.

A

systematic analysis of the Polish balance of foreign
payments is extremely difficult, its conclusions uncer
tain and questionable as the information on foreign
exchange and bullion holdings and flow are not published.
Prom the occasional statements' of political leaders,
announcements of foreign credits, very scarce information
on the state of foreign debts it seems to be certain that
the deficit in foreign payments is continuously a severe
burden for the economy.

It is much easier to observe

the behavior of her trade balances.

The balance of

commodity trade is shown in Table No. 1.
As these data indicate Poland had a considerable
deficit in her commodity trade during the period 19471963.

The recent few years brought a marked increase in

her trade turnovers. Since the raid-1950's the subsequent
foreign trade plans determined the rate of growth of
exports on a relatively higher level than that of imports,
in order to decrease the trade deficit. The faster
rate of growth of exports than that of imports did not,
however, bring any radical improvement in her foreign,
payments position.

In 1964, as data indicates, trade
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balance was closed with a moderate surplus.

It is,

however, impossible to estimate to what extent it impro
ved her overall payments position, as the burden of
foreign debts seemed to reach considerable dimensions.
As Prof, Kalecki remarked "In the course of work on the
perspective plan, it appeared time and again that the
bottleneck in economic development was foreign trade
balance, that is the difficulty in balancing the nece
ssary increase in imports by a corresponding one in
exports."^

Trade deficit which persisted practically

over the whole post-war period was partly covered by
foreign credits, and there is no doubt that foreign
credits played quite an important role in solving many
of the "key" economic problems of the country, ' Some of
them (mainly commodity credits) have been granted by the
countries of the Bloc, In terras of values, the greatest
financial assistance has been provided by the Soviet
U n i on.^ The real economic value of this aid is difficult
to assess, especially when taking into account the Soviet
discriminatory policies applied in trade with Poland,
is quite probable that on balance, this aid could be
Completely offset by los'ses ^brought.;,about ,by '".unfair
trade".

It

The credit granted to Poland by Czechoslovakia

and designated for the development of Polish coal, copper
and sulphur extractions seem to be much more important.

Nowe Drogi, No, 8, 1958 cited by A, Zauberman,
InHusTrxaT Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East
■Germany, p. jib.
^

A very interesting discussion on this problem can be
found in
M. _J. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, New York, 1967,
Chapter 1 and 2,
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Since the mid-1950's substantial credits were granted to
Poland by Western countries.

Among them, the biggest

and most advantageous were American credits. In the
light of Poland’s actual political orientation, it
does not seem very probable that Western assistance will
be continued,
A part of Poland’s trade deficit is covered by
earnings from shipping and railway services.

These

earnings played an important role in covering Poland’s
large deficit.

Bloc trade was a regular feature in this

deficit till 1964. By 1964 the Polish payment situation
with the Bloc impmved significantly and the deficit in
her commodity trade turned into surplus.

The persisting

deficit in Poland’s trade with Western Countries which
in 1961 exceeded the amount of 72 million dollars (about
one half of her total exports to these countries) is
much more serious and troublesome.

It was accompanied

by the deficit on the service account.

Poland's payments

difficulties with Western countries seem to be of
structural character and it is mainly for this reason
that all her efforts to promote trade expansion with
the advanced Western countries have little chance to be
successful.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

198

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The post-war pattern of Poland's foreign economic
relations has been enormously conditioned by her new
political orientation.

The political regime which emer

ged after the second world war as a result of her incor
poration into the Soviet-bloc set for itself as the main
task to build the socialist economy.

Centralized economic

planning was introduced in order to speed-up the reconst
ruction. Having largely eliminated capitalistic forms of
economic organization through nationalization of the
:
major sectors of the economy the Polish government found
it necessary to develop an administrative organization ;• :
and schemes of control to-manage the new highly centra
lized planned economy.
•
In the field of foreign trade it found its immediate
reflection in the establishment of the state monopoly

•

of foreign trade and subjecting the foreign trade to the
discipline of centralized economic planning. :: ;
:I : Concentration of the decision making on
thehighest
level of the apparatus of foreign trade monopoly and almost
exclusive reliance on comprehensive economic planning in
carrying out foreign trade activity had or could have
some advantages:

'

;t

1)
It gave the possibility of selecting such :apattern"
of foreign trade which would be preferable from the point
of view of the fulfillment of a national economic plan
and the achievement of the highest possible rate of growth
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of the economy.
2) It permitted radical changes to be made in the commo
dity structure and directions of foreign trade in
relatively short time.
3)

In :a

country suffering from a .persistently strained,

situation in the balance of payments,the state control
over import and export movements seems to be helpful
and justified.
4)

In a ruined by war country there was a considerable

shortage of highly trained foreign trade personnel.

Prom

this point of view the centralization permitted a few
cadres to conduct large amounts of trade.
On the other hand the establishment of foreign trade
monopoly and,following it.separation of production and
trade had many disadvantages.

First of all, the adminis

trative mechanism constructed to transmit commands and
directives through the several ladders of the hierarchical
structure proved to be inefficient and unoperational in
practice. Large organizations are almost always bureau
cratic, tend to move slowly, to adopt themselves with
increasing difficulty.

In general, the vaster the

organization becomes,the more difficult are the structural
problems of management, coordination and control.
effect, the consequences are following:

In

1) the system lacks flexibility to meet day-to-day
opportunities
2) the costs of transmitting information through admi
nistrative channels are quite high and the whole process
becomes time-absorbing.
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Secondly, the separation of production and trade
caused many conflicts of interest between manufacturing '
and trading enterprises, and made the problem of
coordination of trade and production extremely difficult.
Thirdly, the lack of continuous contact between
domestic producers and foreign markets made it very
difficult to adjust their production pattern to the
changing conditions on the world market, and to familia
rize them with the most recent techniques, production
methods and quality requirements.
Very enthusiastic drive towards decentralization and
reforms in the system of state administration,which took
place after "October Revolution" of 195§ had a very
short life and in the long-run brought surprisingly little
change. The organizational reforms which were introduced
were too limited in scope and did not go far enough to
bring any lasting improvements in the system.
Decades long experience of Soviet-type economies
seems to indicate that centralized planning failed as a
device to bring rational allocation of the economy's scarce
resources.
Planning techhiques are still very crude in spite of
the fact that modern mathematical methods and techniques
are finding increasingly extensive application in planning.
Material balancing which is still at the core of planning
proved to be a completely inadequate tool to meet the
requireme-nts of consistency and comprehensiveness of the
central plan. Foreign trade planning and the coordination
of the foreign trade plan with the requirements of the
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over-all national economic plan is undoubtedly even more
troublesome than planning in the domestic sectors of the
economy which are under the full control of the state.
Foreign trade involves contacts with foreign markets
which are independent of the planning authority but,
which at the same time condition the plan fulfillment.
The heavy bureaucratic machinery of nation-wide economic
planning is too rigid to secure quick and effective ad
justment of foreign trade plans to the changing conditions
oh theâwbrld market.
Besides this, it should be noted that whatever the
ease or difficulty of framing an internally consistent
version of the national economic plan there is still a
problem of meeting the efficiency condition.

It is here,

that the inadequacy of existing planning techniques
manifests itself most acutely. It seems quite, obvious
tfcet a plan balanced toa nicety does not necessarily meet
the efficiency condition.
During the first post-war decade economic calculation
and profitability considerations were almost completely
neglected by Polish policy makers.
The doctrinal thaw which followed the .
October 1956 created a much more favourable environment
for the economists,allowing them to raise the problem of
the efficiency of a centrally planned economy and of the
efficiency of foreign trade. Intensive research in the
field of foreign trade profitability which followed, seems
to indicate that any simple mechanism which could ensure
rationality

in ;c decision making is extremely difficult
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or impossible to be found.
The basic obstacles which make the economic calcu
lation impossible or unmeaningful are to be found at the
core of the adopted system of centrally planned economy.
The distorted price system, rigid rates of exchange and
the separation of domestic and foreign trade prices
deprive the planners of any reliable and satisfactory
yard-stick to measure the extent to which the trade is
gainful.
It is interesting to note that in spite of all the
shortcomings of the planning system adopted in Poland ,
that" her post-war foreign trade was growing at relative
ly high rates.

At the same time radical changes took

place in the commodity composition and directions of
foreign trade. In the pre-war Poland agricultural
products and foodstuffs dominated on the export side while
the engineering products and machinery were the main
import items. Poland's post-war commodity composition of
foreign trade approximated more closely the trade pattern
of industrialized countries and the machinery and equip
ment established itself as the principal export industry.
The geographical network of Poland's post-war trade has
undergone deep changes. The war violently disrupted her
traditional trade pattern. The new, post-war trade
network became more Eastern oriented. The economic
contacts with the Bloc countries strenghtened while trade
w i t h the re s t

of the w o r l d r e l a t i v e l y d e c r e a s e d .

There

is a whole chain of events and forces which lie behind
this shift of trade channels from West to East.

However,
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it seems that the political factor and the incorporation
of Poland into the Soviet-bloc had the decisive impact.
As far as the balance of payments is concerned the
shifts, which occurred in the pattern of trade brought
surprisingly little change.

Pre-war Poland was almost

continuously experiencing a.deficit in her balance of
payments.

Foreign payments are still the Achilles heel

of Polish post-war economy.
To sum-up, Poland’s post-war foreign trade policy
and performance of the apparatus of foreign trade had
many shortcomings, the removal of which would unquestion
ably have a favourable effect on the economy.

There

were also many achievements. The development of Poland's
post-war foreign economic relations was,perhaps.not
amazing but still very significant.

However, there is one

question which the economist investigating these problems
would like to answer and for which the answer is very
difficult to find. The question is, what was the cost
to the economy and society of these achievements and short
comings'.

•
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